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This thesis seeks to establish William H. Taft’s influence over the U.S. experiment 
with empire in the Philippines. It shows how a politician who is often characterised as 
a loyal servant of Theodore Roosevelt, at least before 1909, was in fact a key driver of 
policy decisions. Taft’s views of empire may have been built on the ideas of others, 
but his own synthesis of these ideas and the career path he followed during this period 
single him out as one of the most influential figures in U.S.-Philippine relations. Taft 
saw the Philippine relationship as a long-term prospect and foresaw a future where the 
islands would eventually become a dominion of a United States, like the relationship 
between Great Britain and Canada. This, it is argued here, was Taft’s distinct 
“imperial vision.”1 
This thesis reassesses the role of Taft in the American imperial experiment in 
the Philippines between the years 1900 and 1921. During this period Taft was the 
highest-profile figure arguing consistently for a permanent imperial relationship with 
the Philippine Islands. Various historians have covered Philippine affairs during this 
period, but none has made such a detailed analysis of Taft as a leader in guiding 
Philippine policy toward retention. Taft held a number of high-level roles during the 
period 1900-1913 – when the Republican Party continuously controlled Philippine 
policy – which allowed him to maintain a permanent influence over the nature of 
U.S.-Philippine relations. After this period Taft had less direct influence, but utilised 
his experience, reputation and contacts to speak out against the Democratic Party’s 
policy for the islands and became the figurehead of a campaign to retain the 
Philippines.  
                                                
1 The terms “Great Britain,” “British” and “Britain” are used in this introduction to refer to the United 
Kingdom. This is done for greater continuity between commentary and source materials: almost all 
references to the United Kingdom in the correspondence between Taft and his contemporaries referred 
to the United Kingdom in these terms, or, in other cases, more inaccurately as “England.” 
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The two decades following Taft’s inauguration as the first Civil Governor of 
the Philippines, on July 4, 1901, mark the first half of the U.S.-Philippine colonial 
experience and represent the first phase in the evolution of U.S.-Philippine policy 
regarding the question of the imperial relationship’s future. Historian Peter Stanley 
describes 1921 as the year when ‘a stalemate had been reached in Philippine-
American relations,’ with the fate of retention in the balance.2 In relation to Taft’s 
involvement in the debate, historian David H. Burton states that Taft’s appointment as 
chief justice in 1921 ‘brought a virtual end to his life in diplomacy and the politics 
that had been part of it.’3 During this two-decade period Taft had taken on the mantle 
of chief retentionist, but his appointment as Chief Justice of the United States – his 
life’s ambition – and the return of the retentionist Republicans to government in 1921, 





 William H. Taft was an integral figure in the history of the American-
Philippine relationship, and historians have acknowledged this fact. However, the 
focus of this thesis contributes a portrait that is currently missing from the existing 
historiography. There are two published works of note that concentrate on Taft’s 
personal role in the Philippines. These two works focus on short periods within the 
timeframe discussed here and draw different conclusions about Taft and his role in the 
U.S. imperial venture from those made in this thesis. The first of these is Ralph E. 
Minger’s 1975 study of Taft’s career from 1900 to 1908, in which the author devotes 
                                                
2 Stanley, Nation in the Making, 262.  
3 Burton, Confident Peacemaker, 115. 
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two chapters to Taft’s time in the Philippines.4 Minger’s work is a largely narrative 
and sympathetic account of Taft’s role in the Philippines during this time, which 
draws heavily from traditional biographical accounts such as Henry Pringle’s 
comprehensive 1939 work.5 Although Minger presents a cohesive summary of Taft’s 
involvement in the Philippines during this period, he breaks no new ground beyond 
drawing together the many facets of Taft’s role as Civil Governor of the Philippines 
and then as Secretary of War. His comments are also almost entirely uncritical of 
Taft, aiming to show that Taft was largely successful in his various foreign 
assignments that his experiences helped to prepare him for the presidency with an 
almost unprecedented knowledge of U.S. foreign relations. 
More recently Rene Escalante’s 2007 monograph examines Taft’s role as a 
Commissioner and Civil Governor in the Philippines from 1900 to 1903. Escalante’s 
objectives and conclusions differ markedly from what this thesis argues. Although 
Escalante recognises that most historians date the so-called “Taft Era” as a period of 
concerted influence from 1900 to 1913, he chooses to analyse the much shorter period 
when Taft was part of the Philippine administration, arguing that after 1903 Taft was 
preoccupied with affairs elsewhere and delegated the matter of the Philippines to the 
Philippine Commission. Escalante also states that he does not seek to ‘dwell on the 
effects of the policies that he [Taft] implemented to American foreign policy and to 
his political career.’6 In these respects, among others, Escalante’s work bears distinct 
dissimilarities in purpose and, in some cases, assumptions, to this thesis.7  
                                                
4 Minger, The Apprenticeship Years. 
5 Pringle, The Life and Times of William Howard Taft. 
6 Escalante, The Bearer of Pax Americana, 5-7. 
7 Escalante’s belief that Taft’s concern with the Philippine issue reduced significantly after 1903 is 
simply not persuasive, as this thesis shows in detail. In support of his assertion, Escalante cites Taft’s 
numerous other duties as Secretary of War and points to the fact that Taft visited the Philippines only 
twice between 1904 and 1908. However, Taft’s predecessor as Secretary of War, Elihu Root, was 
certainly interested in the Philippines, yet Root never visited the islands during his tenure at the War 
Department, despite Taft’s entreaties for him to do so.  
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Aside from these specific examples, there are further works that concentrate 
on Taft’s role in U.S. Far Eastern policy. The most comprehensive is Walter Scholes 
and Marie Scholes’ 1970 study of the Taft administration’s foreign policy.8 The 
Scholes book deals with the period of Taft’s presidency, but the Philippines are not 
addressed directly within the scope of the Scholes book, leaving this aspect of Far 
Eastern policy unexplored. David Burton’s book, Confident Peacemaker, provides a 
useful discussion of Taft’s internationalism but has little to say on his Philippine 
policy that is not dealt with more thoroughly in non-Taft focused studies of the 
period.9 Also worthy of note are the numerous biographical studies of Taft, all of 
which give some attention to Taft’s time in the Philippines, but all of which also focus 
almost exclusively on the period when Taft was physically present in the islands.10 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, it is the Philippine and Far Eastern policy of Theodore 
Roosevelt, not Taft, that is preponderant in the historiography dealing with the 
                                                
8 Scholes and Scholes, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration. 
9 Burton, Confident Peacemaker. 
10 Some are generous studies published during the run up to Taft’s 1908 presidential campaign: Oscar 
King Davis, William Howard Taft: The Man of the Hour, and Robert Lee Dunn, William Howard Taft, 
American. Following Taft’s death in 1930, a number of largely narrative studies appeared: Herbert S. 
Duffy, William Howard Taft; Francis McHale, President and Chief Justice: The Life and Public 
Service of William Howard Taft, and Edward H. Cotton, William Howard Taft: A Character Study. The 
most complete study is still Henry Pringle’s two-volume 1939 work, Life and Times. Pringle was the 
first to make use of the Taft Papers at the Library of Congress and was aided further by corresponding 
with and interviewing Taft’s friends, family and associates. There are two 1973 volumes focusing on 
Taft’s presidency: Donald Anderson, William Howard Taft: A Conservative's Conception of the 
Presidency, and Paolo Coletta, The Presidency of William Howard Taft. Later books that focus on 
periods beyond and including his presidency are: Judith I. Anderson’s William Howard Taft: An 
Intimate History and David H. Burton’s numerous works: Taft, Wilson and World Order; William 
Howard Taft: In the Public Service; The Learned Presidency: Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard 
Taft, Woodrow Wilson, and Taft, Roosevelt, and the Limits of Friendship. Most recently published in 
2009, as an updated version of the Taft volume in the Kansas series on U.S. presidents, is Lewis 
Gould’s The William Howard Taft Presidency. In terms of studies of Taft after the presidency there are 
fewer works, among these the most comprehensive is Alpheus Thomas Mason, William Howard Taft: 
Chief Justice; the earlier, Frederick C. Hicks, William Howard Taft: Yale Professor of Law & New 
Haven Citizen; and more recently David Burton, Taft, Holmes and the 1920s Court: An Appraisal. 
Also, two bibliographical collections exist on William H. Taft and offer a fairly exhaustive list of 
publications specifically relating to Taft, the first of these is the more recent and most comprehensive: 
Paolo Coletta, William Howard Taft: A Bibliography, and Gilbert J. Black, William Howard Taft 1857-
1930: Chronology, Documents, Bibliographical Aids. 
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influence of specific political figures.11 This thesis seeks to add a missing piece to the 
narrative of Taft as a figure in American and Philippine history. 
Beyond works that seek, like this thesis, to centre primarily upon Taft, there 
are a great number of important and influential works looking more widely at U.S.-
Philippine policy during this period which make important analyses of U.S. Philippine 
policy, Taft and the Taft Era in the islands that are engaged with in this thesis. There 
are a multitude of works that take different approaches to the Spanish-American and 
Philippine-American Wars, which are useful in interpreting the causes of, ideals 
behind, and voices against the U.S. imperial adventure that followed the war.12 In the 
first half of the twentieth century, there was a dearth of material published on U.S. 
policy towards the islands following the Spanish-American War. However, in recent 
decades this deficit has been amply rectified by a surge of interest among historians 
                                                
11 There are a number of works on U.S. policy in the Philippines and the Far East that focus on 
Theodore Roosevelt, illustrating the continued fascination among historians with Roosevelt in foreign 
affairs, ahead of Taft. Among them are: Oscar M. Alfonso, Theodore Roosevelt and the Philippines 
1897-1909; Thomas A. Bailey, Theodore Roosevelt and the Japanese-American Crises: An Account of 
the International Complications Arising from the Race Problem on the Pacific Coast; Howard K. 
Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power; G. Wallace Chessman, Theodore 
Roosevelt and the Politics of Power; Tyler Dennett, Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War; Raymond 
A. Esthus, Theodore Roosevelt and Japan; James R. Holmes, Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: 
Police Power in International Relations; Frederick W. Marks III, Velvet on Iron the Diplomacy of 
Theodore Roosevelt; George E. Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt and the Birth of Modern 
America, 1900-1912; Charles E. Neu, An Uncertain Friendship: Theodore Roosevelt and Japan, 1906-
1909; Serge Ricard, Theodore Roosevelt: et la Justification de l’Impérialisme; William N. Tilchin, 
Theodore Roosevelt and the British Empire: A Study in Presidential Statecraft, and William N. Tilchin, 
and Charles E. Neu, eds., Artists of Power: Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, and Their Enduring 
Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy. There are numerous other volumes dealing with TR’s foreign 
endeavours, aside from the glut of biographical studies, helping to evidence the relative dearth of 
materials relating specifically to Taft, despite his influential involvement during this period.  
12 Relatively recent works dealing with the Spanish-American and Philippine-American Wars and the 
role of the U.S. military in the Philippines include: Philip Foner, The Spanish-Cuban-American War 
and the Birth of American Imperialism, 1895-1902. Vol. 2 1898-1902; John Morgan Gates, 
Schoolbooks and Krags: The United States Army and the Philippines, 1898-1902; Willard B. 
Gatewood, Jr. Black Americans and the White Man’s Burden, 1898-1903; Richard E. Welch, Jr. 
Response to Imperialism: The United States and the Philippine-American War, 1899-1902; Lewis L. 
Gould, The Spanish-American War and President McKinley; Kristin L. Hoganson, Fighting for 
American Manhood: How Gender Politics Provoked the Spanish-American and Philippine-American 
Wars; Samuel K. Tan, The Filipino-American War, 1899-1913; Thomas Schoonover, Uncle Sam’s War 
of 1898 and the Origins of Globalization; Paul T. McCartney, Power and Progress: American National 
Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism. 
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working from varying interpretative standpoints.13 This thesis seeks to engage with 
this ever-growing field of scholarship and yet marks out a still under-explored aspect 
of the U.S. imperial-era in the Philippines. The role of Taft in forming, guiding, 
enacting and opposing U.S. Philippine policy throughout the period 1900-1921, 





Beginning with Henry Pringle’s use of them for his 1939 biography, the 
William Howard Taft Papers at the Library of Congress have remained the best single 
source of information about Taft and his imperial vision. The collection has been 
utilised by virtually all historians of Taft and the American-Philippine relationship, 
and they are still the most useful and extensive source of evidence for the 
development of Taft’s ideas and imperial theories during this period. In relation to the 
Philippines, as has been mentioned, the focus of most historians has been on the 
periods when Taft was physically present in the islands, between 1900 and 1903, and 
                                                
13 There are a number of excellent works on the nature of U.S. policy in the Philippines during, and in 
the years following, the Spanish-American War. The earliest studies that are still widely cited include, 
Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States and Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother. 
Some excellent collections of essays can be found in: Norman G. Owen, ed., Compadre Colonialism: 
Philippine-American Relations: 1898-1946; Amy Kaplan and Donald E. Pease, ed., Cultures of United 
States Imperialism; Hazel M. McFerson, ed., Mixed Blessing: The Impact of the American Colonial 
Experience on Politics and Society in the Philippines, and Julian Go and Anne L. Foster, ed., The 
American Colonial State in the Philippines: Global Perspectives. Recent monographs on the U.S.-
Philippine imperial experience of particular note are: Stuart Creighton Miller, “Benevolent 
Assimilation”: The American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903; Lewis E. Gleeck, Jr. The 
American Half-Century and The American Governors-General and High Commissioners in the 
Philippines: Proconsuls, Nation-Builders and Politicians; Bonifacio S. Salamanca, The Filipino 
Reaction to American Rule 1901-1913; Toward a Diplomatic History of the Philippines; H. W. Brands, 
Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines; Frank H. Golay, Face of Empire: United 
States-Philippine Relations, 1898-1946; Peter Stanley, A Nation in the Making: The Philippines and 
the United States, 1899-1921; G. A. May, Social Engineering in the Philippines: The Aims, Execution, 
and Impact of American Colonial Policy, 1900-1913; Stanley Karnow, In Our Image: America’s 
Empire in the Philippines; Paul Kramer, The Blood of Government: Race, Empire, the United States 
and the Philippines, and Julian Go, American Empire and the Politics of Meaning. 
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during his two trips to the islands in 1905 and 1907. However, this thesis explores 
Taft’s correspondence regarding the islands well beyond this period, as well as re-
evaluating letters already discussed in the historiography and how they relate to the 
different analytical aims of this thesis.  
In addition to the Taft Papers, the papers of other leading figures in the U.S. 
and the Philippines – notably Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt, and William Cameron 
Forbes – proved invaluable in researching this thesis. Moreover, the many 
governmental reports, speeches and articles written by Taft and his contemporaries 
add another set of resources through which to evaluate Taft’s ideas about empire and 
how he conveyed these to his various audiences. Contemporaneous newspapers and 
journals have also proved a rich source of opinions regarding the imperial experiment, 
as well as recording some of Taft’s lesser-known public utterances.  
As this thesis looks primarily at Taft’s views and his understanding of empire 
and the nature of his imperial vision, there is, as a result, not as much attention given 
to Filipino perspectives of the impact of these ideas and realities as has been the case 
in other recent works on the U.S.-Philippine relationship. In recent years the 
historiography on U.S.-Philippine affairs, as discussed above, has offered an array of 
works analysing Filipino reactions to and interpretations of American rule, especially 
in works by historians such as Bonifacio Salamanca, Paul Kramer, Julian Go and 
Frank Golay. This thesis is seeking to build upon these important works, by 
reassessing the role of Taft and his ideas as a matter of importance that has been 
somewhat sidelined in recent years. It also aims to help provide new insight into the 
possibilities and alternative outcomes for the U.S. colonial experiment, with its re-
evaluation of Taft’s imperial vision as its focal point. 
 
 12 
Determining an Imperial Vision 
 
Throughout this thesis numerous terms arise that are somewhat contentious 
and used rather differently by various commentators, including: empire, imperialism, 
expansionism and, specifically in this thesis, “imperial vision.” This section 
contextualises and defines how these terms are understood and used in the chapters 
that follow. 
The historiography of U.S. imperialism has developed a great deal during the 
last century. Until the 1970s, economic interpretations of imperialism dominated in 
academic treatment of the subject and provided some of the most influential studies of 
U.S. imperialism. The 1960s saw the heyday of this school of interpretative thought 
with the so-called “Open Door” school, made up of key historians such as William 
Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber.14 As historian Wolfgang Mommsen notes, 
the Open Door school argued that the U.S. followed a continuous process of ‘informal 
or free-trade imperialism,’ with the exception of a ‘brief interlude of overt 
imperialism between 1898 and 1900,’ which they regarded as a ‘temporary deviation 
from the main path of development.’15 Though the impact of this group is still keenly 
felt in discussion of U.S. imperialism, since the 1970s the topic has been subjected to 
far wider interpretation – as indeed has the idea of the imperial moment of the late 
1890s. Writing in 1978, historian James A. Field rejects the importance of the need 
for export markets and the beginnings of foreign investment as causes for taking 
political control of overseas territories, instead claiming that technological 
                                                
14 See William Appleman Williams, The Tragedy of American Diplomacy and Walter LaFeber, The 
New Empire, 1865-1898. The works of these two authors in particular were hugely influential in 
guiding theory about U.S. informal imperialism in the latter decades of the twentieth century. An 
excellent introduction to the most important works in this field can be found in: Frank Ninkovich, “The 
United States and Imperialism,” pp. 79-102, in: Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American 
Foreign Relations. 
15 Mommsen, Theories of Imperialism, 93-94.  
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developments and historical “accidents” paved the way for the U.S. annexations 
following the Spanish-American War.16 Field’s essay contains a call for further 
interpretation and analysis of “American imperialism” that has been somewhat 
satiated in subsequent decades. The term, often eschewed by U.S. historians in the 
earlier twentieth century, has now become relatively commonplace, and instead of 
referring simply to the events of 1898 and the former Spanish colonies or to U.S. 
economic influence, has been utilised to meet a multitude of different interpretative 
purposes.  
The last four decades of literature on imperialism is vast, and footnotes can 
merely scratch the surface.17 In 2002 historian Frank Schumacher noted that fourteen 
years after Lloyd Gardner criticised historians’ ambivalence in coming to terms with 
the U.S. as an empire, the field had developed substantially. Schumacher attributes 
some of these developments to an increasingly interdisciplinary approach by 
historians to the subject of empire, integrating disciplines such as literary scholarship, 
anthropology and sociology to broaden scholarly discourse.18 In 2004, Mona Domosh 
suggested that, until recently, the term “American imperialism” had ‘been understood 
in terms of its territorial and political claims – commencing with the Spanish-
American War, and continuing with increasing vigour through to the late twentieth 
century as the United States became the dominant global power.’ Domosh claims that, 
in the last decade, scholarship has added a ‘complementary but different story…that is 
as much about “civilization” and consumption as it is about conquest and production,’ 
                                                
16 James A. Field, “American Imperialism,” 644-645 and 667-668. 
17 Some key volumes not already mentioned in previous footnotes, relating to U.S. imperialism, 
include: Whitney T. Perkins, Denial of Empire: The United States and Its Dependencies; Ernest May, 
American Imperialism: A Speculative Essay; V. G. Kiernan, America: The New Imperialism--From 
White Settlement to World Hegemony; Frank Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism; Andrew J. 
Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of U.S. Diplomacy, and Niall Ferguson, 
Colossus: The Rise and Fall of the American Empire.  
18 Schumacher, “The American Way of Empire,” 35-36. 
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though one might argue that such a movement in interpretation began somewhat 
earlier than the last decade alone.19  
In his book on French and British imperialism at the turn of the twentieth 
century, historian Winfried Baumgart called “imperialism” ‘a vague and imprecise 
catchword.’20 “American imperialism” is an equally vague term, and it means 
something very different in today’s historiographical discourse from what it meant to 
most Americans in 1898. William H. Taft was raised in a world where empire, if 
anything, meant something slightly more concrete. Britain and France, for example, 
had vast empires, which were named as such, and involved control over various far-
flung nations at a number of different levels. Economist J. A. Hobson, writing in 
1902, noted that Britain had divided its empire up into various types of control from 
heavily controlled “crown colonies” to relatively lightly controlled, mainly white, 
states that had achieved responsible government.21 Canada, the United States’ near 
neighbour, and summer destination of choice for Taft and his wife, was a British 
possession that was largely self-governing, but had a number of its key executive, 
legislative and judicial powers still resting with Britain.22 As historian J. D. B. Miller 
notes, despite these reserved powers, it was mainly in the area of foreign relations that 
nations such as Canada had little independence from Britain.23 It was Canada, as it 
related to Great Britain in this period, that Taft spoke of often when discussing what 
is referred to here as his “imperial vision.” 
The Philippines, an Asian archipelago with a primarily non-white population, 
represented more of a typical British crown colony, where self-government was but a 
                                                
19 Domosh, “Selling Civilization,” 453. 
20 Baumgart, Imperialism, 1. 
21 Hobson, Imperialism, 23. Hobson’s seminal text argues that special interest groups motivated nations 
toward imperialism, though the theory has been subject to great scrutiny over the subsequent century. 
22 Marriott, The Evolution of the British Empire and Commonwealth, 212-214. 
23 Miller, The Commonwealth in the World, 24.  
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distant dream. However, for Taft, the Philippines would, given roughly a century of 
tuition, be able to reach a relationship with the United States like that of Canada to 
Britain (which will here be called a “dominion” relationship). As Chapter Two 
discusses, the Philippines would achieve some “native” representation immediately – 
in terms of political positions at lower levels of government – and within years 
Filipinos were represented on the islands’ ruling commission, putting them far ahead 
of “native” participation in a British crown colony.24  
Perhaps the most unconventional usage in this thesis is how the term 
“expansionist” is approached. Taft saw “expansionists” as those who actively 
advocated territorial aggrandisement of the United States at the turn of the century, 
and he did not number himself among them. A number of prominent Republican 
politicians, typified by Theodore Roosevelt and Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, actively 
sought to extend U.S. influence by acquiring strategic possessions. Roosevelt 
subscribed to a “Large Policy” that would see the United States come to equal terms 
with European nations. In one recent study, historian James Holmes argues that 
Roosevelt sought to project U.S. power into a region of interest and exclude its great-
power rivals.25 For Roosevelt there were clear geo-political gains to be made from a 
Large Policy that saw the U.S expand its possessions and prestige into previously 
underdeveloped corners of the globe.  
Unlike the Large Policy advocates, Taft did not believe that the United States 
should actively aim to expand its territory. He stated in 1900, when appointed to the 
Philippine Commission: ‘I am not and never have been an expansionist. I have always 
                                                
24 Although the term dominion was used widely at the turn of the century, the precise definition of a 
dominion came much later with the 1926 Balfour Declaration which set out that: ‘They are 
autonomous Communities within the British Empire, equal in status, in no way subordinate one to 
another in any aspect of their domestic affairs, though united by a common allegiance to the Crown, 
and freely associated as members of the British Commonwealth of Nations [italics in original].’ 
25 Holmes, Roosevelt and World Order, 143. 
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hoped that the jurisdiction of our nation would not extend beyond territory between 
the two oceans. We have not solved all the problems of popular government so 
perfectly as to justify our voluntarily seeking more difficult ones abroad.’26 However, 
Taft accepted the position as head of the Philippine Commission and with it the idea 
that by this point annexation of the islands was a fait accompli. In addition, Taft came 
to accept that, in hindsight, McKinley had had little option in taking the islands given 
the alternatives on offer. Taft felt that the Philippines were not fit for independence 
and that chaos would reign if they achieved premature liberty and U.S. rivals would 
surely take the islands in such an eventuality. Thus, though Taft did not agree “in 
theory” with expansion, he certainly saw the attraction of its outcomes and perceived 
the potential benefits that imperialism could bring to the Philippines and the United 
States. Taft was far more enthusiastic about the practice of governing an empire than 
he was about seeking one. Roosevelt, more geo-politically and strategically minded 
than Taft, began to question the benefits of the Philippines to the United States, as is 
explored in Chapter Four. Taft, however, felt that the wider project of accomplishing 
his imperial vision was the most important aspect of U.S. policy in the islands. 
Roosevelt was willing to expand U.S. sovereignty just as he was later willing to 
withdraw it for similarly strategic purposes. Taft was reluctant to annex additional 
territories but became equally reluctant to leave the islands without having 
accomplished the lasting imperial bond that he desired.  
*** 
There has been a great deal of historiographical discourse over how different 
the “imperial moment” at the turn of the century was from U.S. expansionism before 
1898. Historian Alfred Weinberg, in his work Manifest Destiny, identifies the 
                                                
26 Washington Weekly Post, March 6, 1900.  
 17 
following factors as important in spurring on continental expansion: ‘metaphysical 
dogmas of a providential mission and quasi-scientific “laws” of national development, 
conceptions of national right and ideals of social duty, legal rationalizations and 
appeals to “the higher law,” aims of extending freedom and designs of extending 
benevolent absolutism.’27 Many of these themes were taken up by the imperialists of 
the late 1890s as ideas to inform the government of the Philippines and William H. 
Taft was certainly among them. A number of historians contend that U.S. imperialism 
at the turn of the century was merely an extension of the ideas that had fed Manifest 
Destiny and the conquering of Native Americans and others in the quest to stretch 
across the continent. Historian Walter L. Williams suggests that instead of seeing 
1898 ‘as a new departure, historians might view Philippine annexation as the last 
episode of a nineteenth-century pattern of territorial acquisition and direct political 
rule of subject peoples.’28  
Nevertheless, despite distinct continuities with previous moments of 
expansion, especially in rhetoric, there were important differences between previous 
continental expansion and the annexation of territories following the Spanish-
American War. The annexations brought about fierce domestic opposition in the U.S. 
to an extent that had never been seen in previous moments of expansion. In 1898 and 
afterwards, those both in favour of and opposed to annexation of the Philippines 
considered the situation to be different, uniquely controversial and an experiment not 
subject to precedent in U.S. history. What seems a more satisfactory interpretation is 
one that accepts certain continuities alongside some distinct departures in 1898. 
Certainly, for Taft, paternalistic ideas of “civilising” and “duty” were examples of 
continuity with previous moments of expansion. However, the new form of political 
                                                
27 Weinberg, Manifest Destiny, 2. 
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and constitutional relationship that resulted from the designation of the islands as 
“unincorporated territories” was a departure that Taft was keen to take advantage of, 
as it allowed him far more freedom of direction as head of the Philippine 
Commission. 
In terms of this departure from previous methods of expansion, Taft was aided 
in formulating his imperial vision by the anomalous legal and political status of the 
islands following the 1898 Treaty of Paris. A legal scholar writing in 1934 described 
the situation thus: ‘Not the Americans who negotiated the treaty but the subsequent 
ingenious statesmanship of the Supreme Court invented the mysterious doctrine of 
“unincorporated territory,” whereby until Congress “incorporates” newly annexed 
territory the governmental power of Congress over it is subject to some only of the 
limitations of the Constitution, that is, subject to those and those only which the 
Supreme Court deems “applicable.”’29 The Insular Cases, as the series of Supreme 
Court decisions relating to the U.S. insular possessions (mainly between 1901 and 
1905) came to be known, established that the Philippines were not a U.S. territory in 
the sense of Alaska, Oklahoma or even Hawaii. One of the most important differences 
in this new form of U.S. territory was that such “unincorporated territory” was not 
fully governed by any existing precedents regarding its future or the extent to which 
the U.S. Constitution applied therein. As contemporary legal commentator L. R. 
Wilfey pointed out, ‘hitherto Congress, in the government of the territories, in the 
exercise of its powers under the Constitution, has proceeded on the theory of ultimate 
statehood,’ but in the case of the Philippines the Supreme Court established that they 
were not a “territory,” and therefore the question of future statehood went 
                                                
29 McGovney, “Our Non-Citizen Nationals, Who Are They?” 598. 
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unresolved.30 Given this malleability, Taft came to envisage a long-term period of 
trusteeship over the Philippines, lasting perhaps a century or more, whereby the 
islands would be taught democratic American principles until they were capable of 
responsible self-government. He envisaged that, on achieving this distant goal, the 
Philippines would then be fully aware of U.S. benevolence and would celebrate their 
imperial relationship, becoming a dominion of the United States and a beacon of U.S. 
enlightenment to the rest of Asia.  
*** 
The annexation of the Philippines came after a period of substantial shifts in 
U.S. race relations. Although the Reconstruction era had seen a positive legislative 
overhaul in African-American rights, the period of Southern “Redemption” and Jim 
Crowism that followed was characterised by racially motivated disenfranchisement, 
lynching and segregation that peaked around the turn of the century, particularly in 
the American South. This period also saw the final stand of Native American peoples 
in armed resistance to U.S. continental expansion and a substantial influx of Asian 
immigration to the West Coast. Race was evidently a major concern in U.S. domestic 
politics during the period in which Taft – born in 1857 – grew up and rose to 
prominence in public life. Taft was raised in Cincinnati, Ohio, and after his 
undergraduate years at Yale he returned to his home city to study law and his early 
legal career was largely confined to that region.31 The Cincinnati of the mid to late-
nineteenth century was fast-growing and, according to historians Nancy Bertaux and 
Michael Washington, contained a ‘highly diverse population.’ Taft lived in a city of 
racial diversity and, though his family’s wealth kept him in a state of relative racial 
homogeneity, the racism and racial separation of the late nineteenth century were not 
                                                
30 Wilfey, “Our Duty to the Philippines,” 311. 
31 With the exception of a brief period as U.S. Solicitor General from 1890-1892, which saw him move 
to Washington D.C. for the first time. 
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completely foreign to him. Cincinnati, like most cities in the U.S. at the time saw its 
substantial African-American population routinely subjected to discrimination in 
fields such as education and employment.32 
Aside from the legal implications and repercussions of the Reconstruction 
legislation, the period also saw a significant shift in intellectual dialogue concerning 
race. Historian Michael Krenn notes that although Charles Darwin’s theories on 
evolution were widely known and read in the United States, a particular variant of his 
theory came to dominate American intellectual and political thinking during this time, 
the concept of Social Darwinism.33 Social Darwinism was applied to explain the 
differences between the human “races,” and was adapted to justify the notions of 
white supremacy that were already widespread in the United States at the time. 
Academic Mark van Ells contends that ‘grounded in scientific “fact,” the aura of 
white supremacy seemed unassailable to many, if not most, white Americans at the 
end of the nineteenth century.’34 
The late nineteenth century also saw a further narrowing at the “top” of the 
racial hierarchy in the guise of Anglo-Saxonism. British historian Paul Rich positions 
the main period of ‘Anglo-Saxon solidarity’ between Britain and the U.S. as running 
from 1895 through to 1905, and resting largely on ‘a common illusion in both Britain 
and America of a collective racial superiority over other peoples.’35 Jane Samson 
suggests that there was a ‘particularly vigorous school of thought’ in Britain and the 
U.S. that saw “Anglo-Saxons” as ‘the highest stage of human development.’36 
Historian Paul Kramer sees this Anglo-Saxonism as a ‘racial-exceptionalist bridge 
                                                
32 Bertaux and Washington, “The ‛Colored Schools’ of Cincinnati,” 43-44. 
33 Krenn, The Color of Empire, 38. 
34 Van Ells, “Assuming the White Man’s Burden,” 611. 
35 Rich, Race and Empire in British Politics, 25. 
36 Samson, Race and Empire, 73. 
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between the United States and the British Empire.’37 Thus, Anglo-Saxonism provided 
an important link between U.S. racial ideals and imperial ideals, in a period that saw a 
political and ideological reconciliation between the U.S. and Great Britain. Many 
upper-middle class American politicians, such as Taft, had Anglophile leanings and 
were proud of their British ancestry. During this period many began to perceive a 
closer kinship with Great Britain over other nations and Anglophilia certainly 
coloured Taft’s approach to world affairs. Taft looked to Britain as an example for 
U.S. imperialism in some respects and, as Chapter Six discusses, was keen to keep 
them on good terms during the League of Nations debate.38 In this way race was not 
only formative in terms of how Americans, such as Taft, viewed Southeast Asians but 
also in how they understood their role in imperial nation building. 
Taft saw the key to success in racial matters as best sought through a gradual 
movement towards increased rights and equalities for non-whites. However, unlike 
contemporaries such as Theodore Roosevelt, Taft did not appear to regard racial 
theory as of fundamental importance to his worldview. Roosevelt’s personal 
correspondence often goes into great detail regarding his theories of racial difference, 
whereas Taft appears to have adopted what was an increasingly accepted view for 
someone of his class and education. Despite the increasing stratification of the racial 
hierarchy during the period, there was also a section of society – to which both Taft 
and Roosevelt belonged – that subscribed to the notion of racial improvement. As 
historian Frank Ninkovich contends, Lamarckism was the ‘reigning scientific view’ of 
the day in the United States at this time.39 Lamarckism held that races differed in their 
innate abilities, but it also conceded the possibility of racial improvement through 
                                                
37 Kramer, “Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons,” 1326. 
38 Taft’s legal background had given him great respect for the English legal tradition. An example of 
his praise for the English legal and political system can be found in his introductory essay entitled 
“English Political Genius,” in J. N. Larned ed., English Leadership. 
39 Ninkovich, The United States and Imperialism, 70. 
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education. Education became a keystone in Taft’s efforts to attract Filipinos to the 
benefits of U.S. rule, as discussed here, particularly in Chapter One. Ideas about race 
certainly proved influential during the lifetime of Taft and were evident in his earliest 
ideas of how a U.S. form of imperialism should operate, as this thesis seeks to 
illustrate. 
 
Outline of Thesis 
 
 The rest of this thesis consists of six chapters arranged in a broadly 
chronological manner, running from 1900 to 1921. The organisation of the chapters 
emphasises the earlier period, 1900-1908, covered in four chapters, over the later 
period, 1909-1921, which is covered in only two. There are several reasons for this 
uneven chronological divide. The organisation of the first three chapters allows for 
three thematically focused introductions to Taft’s involvement in the debates over 
empire and imperial ideology of the time. This groundwork is necessary for 
understanding the origins of Taft’s ideas and policies in their full historical and 
theoretical context, and helps give a coherent basis for the analysis of Taft’s 
Philippine policy in later years.  
 The years 1900-1908 constitute the period running from Taft’s arrival in the 
islands at the head of the second Philippine Commission, through his tenure as civil 
governor until 1903, and then as U.S. Secretary of War until 1908. The relevant 
chapters explore how Taft’s ideas regarding empire developed and changed during 
what was a fundamentally formative period, as it was the period in which Taft had the 
most direct interaction with and influence over Philippine affairs, and spent the most 
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time in the islands themselves, guiding day-to-day policy-making. What divides these 
chapters is partly chronological but primarily their thematic focus.  
Chapter One, “The Benevolent Educator: Social Policies, Education and 
Racial Uplift, 1900-1903,” begins by assessing how Taft came to terms with the idea 
and ideal of the United States as an empire within the framework of social policies, 
most notably education policies, during his time as a Philippine Commissioner and 
then as civil governor. This chapter contextualises Taft within the contemporaneous 
debates surrounding the imperial issue, but also shows how he created his own 
synthesis of these ideas to form some distinctive impressions on matters of race and 
education that would stay with him throughout the following decades. The chapter 
explores how existing academic, political and even existing U.S. military ideas and 
concepts of race influenced Taft’s views and how, in various respects, they guided 
what would become known as Taft’s “policy of attraction,” the keystone in his 
imperial policy, which sought to win over the Filipino people to the idea of U.S. rule. 
The chapter also assesses Taft’s placement of education at the centre of the policy of 
attraction and how such a policy was guided strongly by ideologies surrounding both 
empire and race. The first chapter concludes by considering Taft’s negotiations to 
purchase the Vatican-owned friar lands, perhaps the high-point in the policy of 
attraction and suggesting to the Filipino people that there was something genuine 
behind Taft’s rhetoric of the “Philippines for the Filipinos.” 
Chapter Two, “The Devoted Imperialist: The Question of the Islands’ Future, 
1900-1903,” concentrates on one of the most important themes in Taft’s Philippine 
experience: the role of the U.S. civil government in the Philippines and the idea of 
Filipino political education.  The chapter begins by examining contemporary debates 
over the status of the islands, including the very different options of U.S. statehood 
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and independence. The chapter charts Taft’s progression towards the conviction that 
ultimately the Philippines should remain indefinitely in a permanent imperial 
relationship with the United States after they achieved a sustainable level of self-
government. Taft believed that in order for this ultimate goal to be achieved some 
shorter-term strategies had to be employed to bring the Filipino population around to 
the benefits of his imperial vision. The policy of attraction also extended through to 
politics. Taft believed that the Filipinos must undergo a period of U.S. tuition in 
government, but also conceded that he must garner the support of enough of the 
existing Filipino elite to make this practicable. Such support could only be gained by 
what Taft really considered premature elevation of Filipino elites to low- and 
medium-level roles in the government, later termed “Filipinization”: a short-term 
concession for the greater good of his long-term aims.  
However, despite some concessions, Taft was always firm when it came to 
talk of independence. The concept elicited cautionary speeches from Taft on the 
dangers of independence and especially the promise of future independence and its 
repercussions for the success of the U.S. venture in the archipelago. Taft struggled to 
balance the ideas of long-term political tutelage, what he considered premature 
elevation of the Filipino elite, and keeping independence off of the Philippine political 
agenda. These problems became increasingly clear as the years progressed, as Chapter 
Four shows, and Taft’s attempts to quash the power of pro-independence parties and 
patronise the pro-U.S. elites failed to make significant progress after he departed from 
the islands. Ultimately, even the pro-U.S. elite conceded that independence would 
have to form part of their party platform, despite the suggestion that many of them 
had grave reservations about the consequences of premature independence. Taft had 
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to rethink his approach to maintaining the permanent imperial bond in the light of 
these developments.  
 Chapter Three analyses another key theme in Taft’s policies for a continuing 
imperial relationship, looking at the commercial development of the islands and trade 
relations between the two nations, during a longer period than the preceding chapters. 
The title of the chapter, “The Enthusiastic Developer: The Tariff and Chinese 
Immigration, 1900-1908,” sums up the two key aspects of Taft’s policy that it 
addresses. Taft believed that the abolition of tariffs between the United States and the 
islands would do much to gain the goodwill of the Filipinos. Firstly, it would prove 
there was a special relationship between the two places, feeding into the wider policy 
of attraction. Secondly, it would stimulate trade and help bring about the cultural 
exchanges that this entailed. Taft also had a strong belief that in order for the 
Philippines to see the true benefits of their imperial relationship, the United States 
should invest heavily in improving infrastructure in the islands. This latter policy, 
Taft believed, would once again show U.S. goodwill and commitment to the islands, 
but more importantly, draw the United States and the Philippines into a long-lasting 
economic relationship.  
The second part of the chapter connects with the issue of economic relations 
by focusing on the hitherto neglected issue of Chinese immigration to the Philippines. 
This issue provides an interesting case study of the extent to which Taft wished for a 
strong economic union between the two nations that would provide a firm foundation 
for a continued imperial relationship. General Arthur MacArthur, the islands’ last 
military governor, had restricted Chinese immigration in line with the exclusionary 
policy of the mainland United States. However, Taft wavered over the question of 
Chinese immigration rather than simply accepting and maintaining the status quo. 
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The continued lobbying of U.S. and European businessmen in the islands, who 
desired a relaxation of the immigration restrictions following the end of military rule, 
struck home with Taft’s idea of attraction and long-term investment.  
Despite its positive potential, Taft was also certain that most Filipinos, just 
like Californians, did not want Chinese immigration and that to allow such 
immigration would undermine his rhetoric of the “Philippines for the Filipinos.” 
Where many Filipino opponents were wary of cheap competition for jobs, U.S.-based 
opponents feared that allowing Chinese immigration to the Philippines would provide 
a stepping-stone for a “yellow flood” across the Pacific. As a result, Taft vacillated 
over the issue, his preferences ranging from total exclusion to Commission-specified 
restrictions on Chinese immigration.  
Taft’s aims for a revision of the existing tariff and immigration policies in 
regard to the islands appear to have lacked a clear comprehension of the wider 
concerns of many within the American public about such changes, and help to explain 
the shortcomings of his policies in these areas. Though the islands’ anomalous status 
allowed Taft some useful flexibility in how he could implement his imperial vision in 
the Philippines, it also made some in the U.S. fearful that changes to policies such as 
the tariff might have wider ramifications when it came to whether or not all of the 
U.S. Constitution might “follow the flag.”  
 Chapter Four, “The Great Postponer: The Japanese Threat and Self-
Government, 1904-1908,” examines two different themes regarding the Philippine 
question: the matter of military-strategic considerations in the U.S.-Japanese 
relationship, and the matter of growing calls for independence from within the islands 
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during Taft’s tenure in the War Department.40 As Secretary of War from 1904 to 
1908, Taft was able to keep a close eye on Philippine policy as the islands were 
administered through the Bureau of Insular Affairs, a division of his War Department. 
The new role obviously gave Taft wider diplomatic responsibilities that in turn 
touched very importantly upon the Philippines.  
President Theodore Roosevelt made Secretary of War Taft a sort of diplomat 
to China and Japan during a period of upheaval in U.S. relations with these nations, 
particularly in regard to immigration. However, Japan was Roosevelt’s primary 
concern as he saw the Japanese as the main military threat in Asia and a potential 
danger to U.S. interests in the Far East. Japan’s victories in the Sino-Japanese and 
Russo-Japanese Wars had established it as the primary military power in East Asia. 
As a result Japan was keen to be recognised as an equal on the international stage, 
something Japanese leaders regarded as undermined by exclusionary U.S. 
immigration policies. During this period much was made of the potential for a war 
between Japan and the United States. In any such potential conflict the Philippines, as 
Roosevelt noted, would provide a military Achilles’ heel. For Taft, and his 
determination for a continued imperial relationship with the Philippines, there was 
added reason to repair the diplomatic goodwill between the U.S. and Japan: if the fear 
of war continued, U.S. strategic interests in the Philippines might well call for 
expedited independence.  
 Whilst on diplomatic duty, Taft was sent to the Far East twice in four years, 
allowing him not only to keep relations with Japan friendly but also to visit the 
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Philippines and inspect the day-to-day running of the colonial administration there. 
Historian Bonifacio Salamanca argues that both Roosevelt and Taft ‘favored ultimate 
independence as the culmination of American policy,’ even though they never 
explicitly stated this viewpoint.41 However, this thesis argues that Taft was 
determined that independence should never become the logical conclusion; to him this 
was certainly not the case. In terms of an imperial relationship, what is clear is that 
Taft was indeed keen to postpone any change in the relationship, but for him, unlike 
others, this was a long-term aim. His visits to the Philippines as Secretary of War 
made these views all the more clear, and demonstrated that he was willing to depart 
from his usual loyalty to Roosevelt in order to postpone the issue of independence for 
the islands. For Taft’s imperial vision to remain intact, he had to use these visits not 
only to conciliate Japan, but also to help convince the headstrong president that the 
Philippines were not an Achilles’ heel and instead remained a potential asset to the 
United States in the region. This chapter also explores the idea that Taft was more 
narrowly focused in his priorities and lacked the wider geo-political thinking of the 
more pragmatic Roosevelt. 
 Chapter Five, “The Reluctant President: Maintaining the Status Quo and the 
End of the Taft Era, 1908-1913,” begins by exploring Taft’s final months as Secretary 
of War in 1908 and his Philippine policy after the opening of the new Philippine 
Assembly. However, 1908 was also the year in which Taft ran for the presidency and 
won against anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan. This chapter explores how the 
Philippine issue was approached and developed in the 1908 election debates, even if it 
did not prove the decisive factor in Taft’s victory. The next part of the chapter 
explores how, on assuming the presidency, Taft was able to maintain his favoured 
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status quo policy in the Philippines without the fear of a sudden change in executive 
policy. It also looks at how, when he became president, Taft attempted to develop his 
Philippine imperial vision, particularly through tariff reform. However, as the latter 
half of the chapter explores, the Philippine issue only really came to the fore after 
Taft’s defeat in the 1912 presidential election, when the Democrats’ return to power 
posed a real threat to the future of Taft’s imperial vision.  
This final section of this chapter analyses Taft’s stance against the Democrats 
and their policy of promising and expediting Philippine independence. This key 
period was Taft’s last chance to define Philippine policy and represented the 
consolidation of his position as a full-blooded retentionist that would characterise his 
post-presidential activities. Overall, throughout this period and despite changing 
conditions in both the United States and the Philippines, Taft maintained his stance on 
Philippine retention consistently, whether as Republican presidential candidate, sitting 
president, or lame duck. This chapter shows that in the period when Taft had the 
greatest ability to guide U.S. foreign policy in the Far East of his entire career, his 
attitude against Philippine independence remained resolute, and that to the best of his 
ability he maintained a firm retentionist policy until his departure from federal office.  
 The final chapter, “The Chief Retentionist: The Wilderness Years, 1913-
1921,” explores Taft’s continued involvement in the Philippine debate after his 
presidency and up until Republican President Warren G. Harding appointed him as 
Chief Justice of the United States in 1921. In his final State of the Union Address in 
December 1912, Taft warned that Democratic plans for Philippine independence 
constituted a ‘policy of scuttle’ that would make the Philippines the ‘football of 
oriental politics.’42 With only three further months in the White House, Taft was fully 
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aware that his ability to influence Philippine policy was coming to what he considered 
a dangerously premature end. During the “wilderness years” that followed, Taft 
involved himself politically in a continued fight against the Democratic-sponsored 
Jones Bill, which promised Philippine independence. He also became a figurehead for 
movements and organisations aimed at retaining the Philippines.  
During the same period Taft played a high profile role in the League of 
Nations debate, where he offered his support to Wilson’s plans for the maintenance of 
international peace. Taft’s open public support, as the former president, provided 
evidence that far from being an embittered partisan who followed the party line, Taft 
was a figure with his own beliefs. However, the League of Nations debate touched 
upon the key issues of self-determination and decolonisation, which had clear 
implications for his imperial vision. Taft was torn between his support for the League 
of Nations, Wilson’s promise of post-war self-determination and his commitment to 
Philippine retention, and ultimately he felt obliged to put Philippine retention before 
the consistency of his support for all aspects of Wilson’s vision. The chapter helps 
illustrate the long-term significance of Taft’s imperial vision, and how it offered a 
decisively different theme to what became the dominant thrust of U.S. foreign 
relations in the twentieth century. The general pattern of the rest of the century saw 
the United States intervene, attempt to install a new American-friendly government 
and then leave. For Taft, this sort of policy of scuttle spelt disaster. Taft was not a 
natural expansionist and believed that the United States had much to do perfecting its 
own systems before it should feel able to change those of other nations. Nevertheless, 
for Taft, if the United States became involved in installing a government in another 











William Howard Taft, like most Americans of his time, had little idea about 
the Philippines until the U.S. became involved in the islands during the Spanish-
American War of 1898. What Taft thought about U.S. expansion, imperialism and the 
role of the United States in the Philippines prior to 1900 is difficult to gauge with any 
certainty. Even after the end of the war, and the subsequent annexation of the islands, 
Taft had little reason to think about the distant archipelago until he was asked to head 
the Second Philippine Commission in January 1900, when he undertook to learn as 
much as he could about the situation in the islands. Among the first matters Taft made 
public about his thoughts on the islands was that he did not agree with any expansion 
in U.S. territory overseas. Instead, he felt that the United States was not a perfected 
model in itself and that adding to its concerns at this stage was ill-advised. It is worth 
noting at this early stage that although the terms expansionism and imperialism were 
and still are often conflated, it is argued here that Taft saw the two concepts as 
distinct. Taft’s dislike for the concept of expanding U.S. territory did not equate to a 
natural opposition to imperialism in general, as will be explored in this chapter and 
throughout this thesis.  
When Taft arrived in the Philippines in June 1900 the fighting was far from 
over, even though the Spanish-American War was long finished. Since the 
capitulation of the ruling Spanish, the United States had continued fighting in the 
Philippines against nationalist Filipinos, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, 
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who desired independence from the United States.43 Taft did not arrive in a peaceful 
place, ready to accept the reality of U.S. civil government, but in a place still unstable 
and unsure of the benefits of American rule. Historian Brian Linn notes that as the 
fighting continued, it began to resemble what Kipling envisaged as a ‘savage war of 
peace,’ where the frustrations of the troops were often transformed into ‘brutality and 
torture.’44 Although Taft was critical of the military excesses, especially when trying 
to expedite the transition to civil rule in the islands, he accepted that many such 
instances resulted from ‘outrage of feelings’ in response to the actions of insurgent 
Filipinos.45 For Taft, the war was prolonged by a small band of irreconcilable rebels 
and most outrages by U.S. soldiers were provoked, if not excused. Nevertheless, as 
this chapter goes on to argue, Taft utilised the Filipino dislike of the U.S. military to 
his advantage in pursuing a policy of attracting Filipinos to the idea of U.S. rule. 
When Taft became civil governor, he sought to distance himself from the unpopular 
military government that had preceded him and as he only controlled the “peaceful” 
parts of the Philippines, this distinction was not hard to perceive.  
This chapter begins by assessing how Taft came to terms with the idea and 
ideal of the United States as an empire, firstly by looking at what evidence there is of 
his ideas prior to reaching the Philippines and then how these ideas developed once he 
had arrived. It focuses specifically on the role of social policies, and most notably 
education policies, during Taft’s tenure as a Philippine Commissioner and then as 
civil governor. This chapter shows how through his own synthesis of existing ideas 
and his experiences in the islands, Taft formed some distinct impressions on matters 
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of race and imperialism that would stay with him throughout the following decades. 
The chapter also explores the formation of what became known as Taft’s “policy of 
attraction,” the keystone in his imperial policy, which sought to win over the Filipino 
people to the idea of American rule. Taft placed primary education at the centre of the 
social dimension of his policy of attraction, and his education policies were guided 
strongly by ideologies surrounding both empire and race. The chapter concludes by 
assessing the overall aims and execution of Taft’s policy of attraction and its rhetoric 
of “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” and how his social policies during his time in 
the islands adhered to his longer-term imperial vision.46 
 
A New Commission 
 
On January 20, 1899, President William McKinley appointed the first 
Philippine Commission headed by Dr. Jacob Schurman, president of Cornell 
University.47 Schurman resisted appointment to the Commission, initially citing his 
opposition to McKinley’s Philippine policy, but eventually became the head of the 
commission; a pattern Taft would later repeat.48 The Commission was initially 
envisaged to head off a war with Spain, but arrived in the Philippines too late to 
accomplish this task. It went on to form close links with Filipino leaders who rejected 
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the nationalist government set up by Emilio Aguinaldo and instead threw their lot in 
with the Americans. As historian Julian Go notes, Schurman recognised that the 
Filipino people would best be won around to U.S. rule by gaining their trust and 
addressing their needs: views taken up and acted upon in the following years by 
Taft.49 In January 1900, the Schurman Commission reported back to the president 
recommending a shift from military to civilian U.S. rule in the islands.50 With the 
Schurman Commission’s recommendations in mind, President McKinley appointed a 
Second Philippine Commission with the task of preparing the way from military to 
civilian rule as the report had suggested. William H. Taft headed this second 
commission. Until January 1900, Taft had been serving on the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Sixth Circuit and was apparently taken aback when summoned to the White 
House and asked to travel to the Philippine Islands with the new commission. He 
summed up his surprise at McKinley’s offer by saying that the president may as well 
have asked him to ‘take a flying machine,’ and there is nothing to suggest that Taft 
had any inkling that such an offer was in McKinley’s mind.51  
Taft was, in the words of historian David Burton, ‘born to be a judge,’ and his 
nature was to ‘dispense justice through the administration of the law.’ Burton also 
observes that Taft was also largely disinterested in and innocent of the implications of 
the annexations that followed the Spanish-American War in regard to America’s 
‘world position.’52 As his biographer Henry Pringle notes, Taft simply had a non-
political mind.53 These useful insights suggest a crucial aspect of Taft’s personality 
when it came to his views on the Philippines. Unlike his friend, the Large Policy 
champion, Theodore Roosevelt, Taft was not that concerned about the geo-political 
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and strategic implications of Philippine annexation. Taft was concerned with the law 
and, when he came to be involved with the Philippines, recreating an American 
system in the islands. His view could be characterised as concerned chiefly with U.S. 
legal and political values, but also as narrowly-focused and lacking ample concern 
with the wider implications, both in mainland U.S. and internationally, of America’s 
Philippine policy.  
However surprised Taft might have been at the idea of being sent to the 
Philippines in 1900, his views on U.S. involvement in the Philippines prior to 1900 
are difficult to determine with any great accuracy. Taft’s most comprehensive 
biographer, Henry Pringle, relates the widely accepted view that Taft was generally 
‘unsympathetic’ to, but largely disinterested in, the Spanish-American War, and in 
terms of the outcome of the war ‘In so far as he expressed any opinion, it was 
opposed to annexation.’54 Pringle’s citations for these two opinions come from third 
parties, the former a letter to Pringle from Taft’s brother Horace in 1933 and the latter 
from the autobiography of Taft’s wife, published in 1914.55 A more recent biography 
by historian Paolo Coletta, suggests that Taft revealed ‘no interest’ in the fruits of the 
Spanish-American War prior to its intersection with his career.56 Helen “Nellie” 
Taft’s recent biographer, Carl S. Anthony, echoes this idea and also cites Taft’s wife 
as claiming there had never been ‘any unusual interest’ in the Taft family regarding 
the Spanish-American War, the only exception being the fate of Colonel Theodore 
Roosevelt in Cuba.57 Historian Stuart Creighton Miller puts it more accurately when 
he describes Taft as ‘a Republican suspected of haboring anti-imperialist 
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sympathies.’58 The fact that there are so few references to Taft’s opinions on U.S. 
imperialism, and the Philippines in particular, prior to 1900, does suggest that Pringle 
is correct in contending that Taft was largely disinterested with the entire affair before 
he was thrust directly into it.  
 Some of the potential influences on Taft’s opinion can be found among his 
incoming correspondence from family members during the years prior to 1900. Taft’s 
brother Horace wrote in June 1897, during a national debate over the idea of annexing 
Hawaii, that ‘The greatest misfortune and the greatest folly that has been perpetrated 
in the last few years has been, in my opinion, the admission of half a dozen of the new 
states, which with those we had before, give us about twenty senators from sparsely 
settled and uncivilized sections of the country. If we could have any assurance that 
Hawaii was fit for any place in our government system, I should be willing to risk any 
foreign complications.’59 Here is evidence that Taft’s brother Horace was anti-
expansionist, and his sentiments here were very similar to those Taft expressed after 
1900, which will be explored later in this chapter.  
In October 1898, following the conclusion of the Spanish-American War, 
Taft’s mother wrote to her son of a conversation she had with a naval captain from 
Ohio: ‘He [the captain] naturally thinks it could have been avoided if the navy could 
have managed it. The order from Washington was “Destroy the Spanish fleet, and 
take Manila”. The last sentence should have been left off. They could have destroyed 
the fleet, but there was no use in taking Manila. He thinks the Philippines will be a 
burden, but if we keep any, we must take the whole.’60 This letter offers a glimpse of 
the fact that Taft and his family were not completely devoid of interest in the 
Philippine question prior to 1900 and it also addresses the idea of retaining the 
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Philippines. Another letter from his mother provides further evidence of some interest 
among Taft and his family, where his mother speaks of a need to ‘acquire some 
intelligence about the country,’ but confesses, ‘so little interest in it. I suppose it is old 
age which makes me feel pessimistic as to expansion. I see no advantage in gaining 
sovereignty over those savages. We have more aliens than we can manage.’61 
Although this early correspondence does not allow a clear vision of Taft’s own views, 
it does provide some insight to the opinions he was confronted with from trusted 
family members. The sentiments in these letters were roundly anti-expansionist and 
such views, even if there is no clear evidence of their direct influence on Taft’s 
thinking, were reflected in his public sentiments after 1900. 
Given Taft’s lack of clear interest in the Philippines, and the suggestions of 
anti-expansionist sentiments among him and his family, one might then question why 
he would decide to take a position in the islands. Taft had been appointed to the 
United States Circuit Court in 1892 and it was a guaranteed life-long position if he 
wished it to be so. Most commentators accept, and Taft’s personal correspondence 
concurs, that Taft’s life goal was to become Chief Justice of the United States. The 
Circuit Court put Taft in a very opportune position for elevation to the highest court in 
the land and his existing job provided him financial security as well as federal judicial 
experience. With this in mind, aside from the ideological aspects discussed below, 
Taft certainly had some very practical concerns to consider when McKinley asked 
him to give up his career security, and apparent career goals, to travel to the 
Philippines and take on an executive and political role, rather than one of a primarily 
legal or judicial nature.  
                                                
61 Louise Taft to WHT, January 8, 1899, WHTP 1:18. Partially cited in Minger, Apprenticeship Years, 
2. 
 38 
 On February 6, 1900, Taft was appointed as the head of the Second Philippine 
Commission. Some biographers suggest that figures such as President McKinley, 
Secretary of War Elihu Root, Secretary of the Navy John D. Long and pro-imperialist 
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge (R, MA) helped to urge Taft to accept the position.62 
However, biographer Judith Anderson mentions that McKinley was first alerted to 
Taft’s suitability for the role by Judge William Rufus Day.63 Historian Rene Escalante 
suggests that Day arranged the meeting between Taft and the president.64 Several 
newspapers of the time went further than this and speculated that Judge Day was in 
fact the pre-eminent figure responsible for encouraging Taft to the position.65 Shortly 
after Taft was appointed to the commission, the Hopkinsville Kentuckian suggested 
that Taft’s decision to give up his position on the federal bench came at the urging of 
his fellow circuit court judge from Ohio.66  
Day had served as McKinley’s Secretary of State during the Spanish-
American War and helped negotiate the Treaty of Paris, and so had a clear interest in 
Philippine affairs.  The then Secretary of State did not agree with the idea of keeping 
the Philippines, but felt that the Spanish colonies, excluding Cuba, should have been 
returned to Spanish rule.67 This last factor offers room to speculate as to why Day 
chose to urge Taft to take the post on the commission. The Kentuckian suggested that 
Day was ‘the most trusted friend and adviser of the president’ and had himself been 
McKinley’s first choice to head the Second Philippine Commission, but that his 
health was ‘too precarious’ to allow him to make the voyage. Therefore, the 
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newspaper reported, it was ‘Judge Day who suggested Judge Taft and secured his 
acceptance.’68 The New York Tribune and San Francisco Call added that Judge Day 
accompanied Taft to the White House upon his appointment.69 Perhaps Day believed 
that, as he could not head the commission himself, Taft was the best man for the job 
because he held views close to his own. Day’s belief that the U.S. should not have 
annexed the Philippines was certainly anti-expansionist but his suggestion that the 
islands should simply have been returned to the Spanish empire would seem to 
indicate that he was not anti-imperialist. To this extent, Day and Taft seemed to share 
similar beliefs in expansionism and the role of empire – that it could be beneficial, but 
perhaps not a policy that should be actively pursued. This could help explain Day’s 
suggestion of Taft to McKinley and his urging of Taft to take up the job once it was 
offered.  
 Despite the dearth of evidence as to Taft’s views on empire before his 
appointment to the commission, as soon as he became involved in the Philippine issue 
he became increasingly vocal in his opinions. Biographer Judith Anderson recounts, 
in line with other biographers, that Taft initially suggested to the president that he had 
never approved of keeping the islands.70 Some historians, as well as commentators of 
the time, take this as meaning that Taft was therefore opposed to empire: but such an 
assumption does not necessarily follow, as suggested already. Taft’s insistence that 
he, like Judge Day, was an anti-expansion did not simply lie in private letters and 
discussions. However, McKinley and his pro-imperialist backers, such as Henry 
Cabot Lodge, cannot have been blind to the benefits of having an anti-expansionist on 
the new commission. If the U.S. imperial venture was to appear benevolent, what 
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better than to send a commission, like that of Schurman before it, headed by a sceptic 
on the issue of expansionism.  
At a dinner in the Queen City Club, Cincinnati in March 1900, Taft spoke 
after former Attorney General Judson Harmon had reportedly shocked the audience 
with his proclamation that the U.S. should ‘leave the Filipinos to manage their own 
affairs, and serve notice on the world that they are now under our protection.’ Taft 
followed this controversial utterance – pointing out that he was not speaking for the 
commission, but for himself – by stating that like Judge Harmon ‘I am not and never 
have been an expansionist. I have always hoped that the jurisdiction of our nation 
would not extend beyond territory between the two oceans. We have not solved all the 
problems of popular government so perfectly as to justify our voluntarily seeking 
more difficult ones abroad.’71 The following month, in San Francisco, Taft once again 
‘announced that he was an anti-expansionist, and would have much preferred if the 
problems with which the nation was confronted had not been presented’; the San 
Francisco Call suggests that the audience cheered loudly at this statement.72 
Nevertheless, despite having a secure job that he enjoyed and the fact he harboured 
anti-expansionist sentiments (similar to those of his mother and his brother Horace), 
Taft did take the job McKinley offered to him.  
Biographer Henry Pringle suggests that there were two reasons which 
supposedly helped Taft decide to go to the Philippines: firstly, duty, and secondly, the 
temporary nature of the appointment.73 In addition to these points, most historians 
also cite the promise made by McKinley that, were a high judicial position to become 
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available, Taft would be a high-priority candidate.74 Other commentators point to the 
influence of Taft’s wife, and other members of his family, who purportedly helped 
steer Taft in whatever direction best served his career.75 However, it is the idea of 
“duty” which best fits the argument of this thesis and is best illustrated by Taft’s 
words and actions.  
To illustrate the influence of duty as a motivating factor, it is useful to first 
address the alternative motivations mooted by historians. The potential influence of 
the short-term nature of the appointment makes little sense as a motivating factor. 
Firstly, Taft could not simply expect to return to his previous position, nor could he be 
guaranteed a Supreme Court position. Therefore, the short-term aspect offered only 
uncertainly and insecurity and Taft was not regarded as a reckless opportunist.76 
Secondly, whilst in the islands, Taft opted time and again to stay there, first when 
appointed as civil governor in 1901 and then twice rejecting President Roosevelt’s 
offer of a Supreme Court Associate Justiceship. This suggests that Taft did not feel 
the Philippine position would damage his career plans after a year, or even after 
almost four years.  
In terms of the influence of Taft’s family, they seemed simply to look out for 
his interests, as one might expect. His brother Henry did not seem particularly keen 
that he stay on the bench ‘permanently,’ but did suggest that if Taft was ‘to be simply 
one member of the Commission so that your opportunity will be limited in shaping 
the policy, the proposition does not strike me as tempting.’ Taft would, Henry 
                                                
74 For example: Golay, Face of Empire, 63; J. I. Anderson, An Intimate History, 66. 
75 Anthony, Nellie Taft, 124, presents Nellie Taft as a woman with the aim of pushing Taft towards any 
political promotion that could achieve her ultimate aim of becoming First Lady of the United States. 
Scholes and Scholes, Foreign Policies, 1, also notes the influence of Taft’s family in urging him to 
accept the position for the promise of greater honours that might follow.  
76 Even a promise from McKinley himself would have been far from secure, as the president was up for 
re-election that very year. 
 42 
reasoned, be best served to accept only if he were the president of the commission.77 
Taft’s younger brother Horace wrote that he ‘must accept. I take it for granted that the 
position is for President of the Commission… You can do more good in that position 
in a year than you could do on the bench in a dozen.’ However, it is difficult to say for 
sure that family opinions were integral to Taft’s acceptance of the position. In fact, 
Horace went on to give an indication of Taft’s own feelings on the subject in the same 
letter: ‘I am glad you feel as you do about the Philippines… I hated to have us take 
the Philippines, but I don’t see in the world how we can give them up. It makes me 
tired to hear the Declaration of Independence quoted on the subject.’78 These last 
words suggest that Taft himself had indicated to his brother that the key factor in his 
decision to go to the Philippines was the idea of duty to his nation, now that 
expansion was a fait accompli. 
Soon after the meeting with McKinley, Taft wrote to Secretary of War Elihu 
Root suggesting that he was ‘inclined to accept’ the president’s offer and added that 
the ‘work to be done is so full of perplexing problems that the responsibility and risk 
in attempting it will be very great. I doubt my capacity to meet them but an earnest 
desire to succeed and hard work may overcome many obstacles. If I am to undertake 
the work, however, I should like to be in a position in which I shall be really 
responsible for success or failure.’79 In this statement Taft expresses some polite 
modesty regarding his ability, but illustrates his true feelings when he suggests that he 
would actually like to be responsible for the work of the commission, in line with the 
supportive advice of his brothers. Taft may have been anti-expansionist, but he felt 
that the duties that came with annexation could not be reneged upon.  
 
                                                
77 Henry W. Taft to WHT, January 30, 1900, WHTP 1:18. 
78 Horace Taft to WHT, January 31, 1900, WHTP 1:18. 
79 WHT to Root, February 2, 1900, ERP Box 164. 
 43 
The White Man’s Burden 
 
The idea of duty to the Philippines would, and already did, have racial overtones 
when Taft adopted it as his raison d’etre for taking on the job there. Taft might have 
had in mind the words of Rudyard Kipling’s famous poem of 1899, published in 
McClure’s Magazine: ‘Take up the White Man’s burden- / Send forth the best ye 
breed.’80 A renowned author and poet, who had followed the Spanish-American War 
with much interest, Kipling wrote to Theodore Roosevelt in September 1898 that 
‘America has gone and stuck a pickaxe into the foundations of a rotten house and she 
is morally bound to build the house over again from the foundations or have it fall 
about her ears.’81 In Kipling’s mind, the “white man’s burden” that had so long been 
Britain’s was now also well and truly a burden for the United States. Historian Albert 
Weinberg goes so far as to refer to the “white man’s burden” as the ‘Kipling-
McKinley doctrine,’ bringing the implications of such thinking more directly to the 
Taft Commission.82 In this sense, the Philippines were the burden of the United States, 
unwanted but nevertheless in need of the United States – much in line with Taft’s anti-
expansionist feelings, but still allowing for a belief in the benefits of empire.    
Secretary of War Root and President McKinley’s instructions to the Taft 
Commission, transmitted on April 7, 1900, abounded with the idea of duty brought 
about by the new addition to American terrain: 
As high and sacred an obligation rests upon the Government of the 
United States to give protection for property and life, civil and 
religious freedom, and wise, firm, and unselfish guidance in the paths 
of peace and prosperity to all the people of the Philippines Islands. I 
charge this Commission to labor for the full performance of this 
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obligation, which concerns the honor and conscience of their country, 
in the firm hope that through their labors all the inhabitants of the 
Philippine Islands may come to look back with gratitude to the day 
when God gave victory to American arms at Manila, and set their land 
under the sovereignty and protection of the people of the United 
States.83 
 
Commentator Phillip Darby, considering both U.S. and British imperialism, 
argues that ‘the commitment to high moral principles’ was a persistent trademark of 
U.S. foreign policy.84 Similarly, historian Fabian Hilfrich suggests that, among other 
factors, ‘American expansion was rationalized as something inherently unselfish 
because it contributed to the betterment of the world.’85 Reflecting just such 
sentiments, President McKinley had pledged to ‘deal unselfishly’ with Filipinos with 
fitting regard for ‘their interests and their advancement.’86 Certainly, few historians 
and critics would deny that, at least in theory, U.S. expansionism had always been 
rationalised around the theme of benevolence and the United States was not the only 
country to utilise this sort of vocabulary to explain the thrust of expansion and 
imperialism.  
As president of the Second Philippine Commission, Taft would be at the 
forefront of establishing this ideological motif in the Far East. Although the rhetoric of 
duty and civilisation had been established prior to Taft’s involvement in affairs, it was 
within the sphere of Taft’s authority as the head of the commission to go about 
realising and establishing the methods for turning rhetoric into action. Very much in 
line with the idea of “duty,” “benevolent imperialism” was an idea that required not 
only the goodwill and patience of the imperial ruler, but recognised the failings and 
needs of the governed. Such theories were indelibly bound up with ideas of cultural 
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superiority at the time and were to be formative in how Taft set about his job first as a 
head of the commission and later as the first U.S. civil governor of the archipelago. 
The Philippine Islands are, and were, the home to a vast array of different 
cultural groups, largely unfamiliar to the American citizenry, and to Commissioner 
Taft. As an early Taft biographer put it, they represented ‘an archipelago of fifteen 
hundred islands, inhabited by no one knew how many tribes, speaking languages that 
were utterly strange to the western world.’87 Historian Richard Welch suggests that 
U.S. ignorance regarding the Philippines caused Americans to rely heavily on British 
sources for information, such as those of travel writers who had ‘laid great stress on 
the tribal divisions of the Filipinos as well as their childishness.’88 Such stresses are 
also apparent in the Schurman Commission’s report of January 1900, a source of 
invaluable information and guidance to the Taft Commission prior to their arrival in 
the islands, which delineated the Filipinos into three distinct races: Negrito, 
Indonesian, and Malayan.89 Race and racial difference were certainly among the key 
considerations from an American viewpoint when thinking about the Philippine 
Islands and their people. Historian Paul Kramer takes as part of his central thesis the 
idea that race ‘as a mode of power and knowledge was a core element in the making 
of formal colonialism in the Philippines.’90 However, as a racial group (or groups) 
without a real presence in the American population, Filipinos had yet to be fully 
categorised within the existing U.S. racial hierarchy, allowing for a modicum of 
flexibility in how to view their potential as a subject people. This was particularly 
important when it came to thinking about ideas of racial improvement and uplift. 
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The nature of the relatively unknown Filipino people was a recurring motif in 
Taft’s early observations of the islands, especially in his correspondence with 
Secretary of War Root. In July 1900, Taft wrote to Root that the ‘population of the 
Islands is made up of a vast mass of ignorant, superstitious people, well intentioned, 
light hearted, temperate, somewhat cruel, domestic and fond of their families, and 
deeply wedded to the Catholic church.’91 These remarks, although generalised, are 
more critical of Filipino beliefs and cultural traits, as Taft saw them, rather than their 
racial types and appearance, although Taft was not exempt from making such 
observations. In August 1900 Taft updated Root on his earlier general impressions of 
the Filipinos, adding that they comprised:  
…a mass of quiet, lazy, polite, ordinarily inoffensive, rather light 
hearted people, of an artistic temperament in an imitative sense; easily 
subject to immoral influences; quite superstitious, and if aroused at all 
exceedingly cruel to animals and each other. They have, if needed to 
protect themselves, the greatest duplicity, but they have not ordinarily 
the Macchiavelian [sic] natures which are attributed to them.92 
 
 Taft’s observations suggested that Filipinos were not on a level with Anglo-
Saxons in terms of their cultural development, but also that many of their undesirable 
traits were relatively harmless.  
 Though Taft considered the majority of the Filipino population harmless, he 
had harsher words for the educated Filipino elite, suggesting perhaps that he was 
more concerned with class, in some regards, than race.93 However, Stanley Karnow is 
among the historians that contend that Taft relied heavily on the opinions of Filipino 
elites (ilustrados) who, he claims, held their ‘own people in low esteem,’ serving to 
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validate Taft’s opinion of the Filipinos as ‘abysmally backward.’94 Taft may have 
been influenced by the elites of Filipino society in his thinking on the general 
population, but he was far from uncritical of the elites themselves. Taft regarded the 
existing elite as a group of ‘educated meztizos’ who influenced too easily the 
‘ignorant’ masses with their ‘superficial knowledge’ and ‘appearance of profound 
analytical knowledge of the science of government.’95 The elites of the islands, Taft 
asserted, ‘deal in high sounding phrases concerning liberty and free government they 
have very little conception of what that means.’ In this set of observations a clear 
picture arises of the role Taft sought to take. Taft saw the existing elite as corrupt 
hangovers from the Spanish era who could not ‘resist the temptations to venality, and 
every office is likely to be used for the personal aggrandizement of the holder thereof 
in disregard of public interest. These conclusions are not theories.’96 Taft’s 
conclusions led him to believe that such figures should not take any substantial role in 
political life, where avoidable, and the Americans could and should take their places 
wherever this would be practicable. More promising for Taft’s wider plans was the 
conclusion that the general population was so easily swayed and suggestible by those 
in political power, as already mentioned. With the Americans in positions of power, 
in place of the supposedly corrupt Filipino elite, the Filipino population would surely 
be won over to the American imperial venture. However, there was a major drawback 
in this simple plan, and that was that that the existing elite were not so easily 
discarded. This matter will be discussed in the second chapter that deals directly with 
Taft’s political manoeuvrings in the Philippines.  
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The Policy of Attraction 
 
 Taft’s most important policy, and one which affected all of his other policy 
decisions during his time in the Philippine Islands, is often called the “policy of 
attraction.”97 The overarching aim of the policy was as simple as it sounds: to attract 
the Filipinos to both Taft and American rule more generally. Historian Ralph Minger, 
who is broadly sympathetic to Taft, regards the policy of attraction as one where there 
‘was to be no concealment or deception.’98 The policy was designed, after all, to 
engender the trust of the Filipino people. Historian Peter Stanley characterises the 
policy of attraction as, at its ‘loftiest’ soaring ‘beyond efficiency and stability- out of 
the realm of currency, tariffs, and infrastructure- to a concern with democracy, due 
process, and the dignity of the individual.’99 The concept of the policy of attraction 
was benevolent and distinctly in Filipino interests above all others, presenting the 
head of the commission as the bringer of selfless and high-minded idealism. 
Although the policy of attraction would take some lessons from military rule, 
a key facet of Taft’s concern over his policy was that its aims would have to appear 
very separate from those of the military. The U.S. military were responsible for much 
harsh treatment of the so-called “insurgents” in the islands during the Filipino-
American War. Equally, the U.S. military in the islands had, at best, a mixed record of 
race relations, which is perhaps unsurprising for a group who had been fighting the 
Filipinos for several years. Taft was noted for referring to the Filipino people as the 
“little brown brother” of the United States, but an oft-quoted U.S. military song about 
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the Philippines from the time helps to illustrate the apparent nature of the transition 
from U.S. military policy to Taft’s policy of attraction: 
 I’m only a common soldier in the blasted  
Philippines. 
  They say I’ve got brown brothers here, but  
I dunno what it means. 
  I like the word fraternity, but I still  
draw the line. 
  He may be a brother of Big Bill Taft, 
  But he ain’t no brother of mine.100 
 
Taft felt that in relation to Filipinos, ‘where the [U.S.] officer resorts to cruel 
methods and treats them as inferiors and as “Niggers”, the insurgents are able to find 
recruits.’101 In Taft’s opinion, the overt instances of racial disrespect often evident in 
the behaviour of the U.S. military were an important factor in helping the Filipino 
nationalists to find support among the Filipino people in general.102 Taft later noted 
that ‘The contrast between the desire of the Commission to consult the natives as to 
what shall be done and the brusque, abrupt way of the military commander of course 
makes the Commission more popular.’103 As ex-Filipino politician Rafael Palma 
wrote in 1923: ‘between the saber and the gown, public opinion was decidedly for the 
latter.’ Perhaps this would be unsurprising even without the policy of attraction; as the 
face of U.S. aggression in the quashing of Filipino resistance to American rule the 
military were very unlikely to be regarded as the favourable option when contrasted 
with the Taft Commission. However, Taft was keen not to rely simply on the fact that 
                                                
100 Wolff, Little Brown Brother, 313. 
101 WHT to Root, July 14, 1900, WHTP 8:463. 
102 The African American members of the U.S. military in the islands, unlike many of their white 
counterparts, formed far friendlier relationships with the Filipino population. The work of Willard 
Gatewood Jr., in particular, discusses the role of African Americans in the imperial venture. Gatewood 
suggests that it was Taft who was instrumental in calling for the African Americans soldiers to be 
removed from the Philippines, see: Gatewood, “Smoked Yankees,” 243. Taft’s correspondence 
suggests that his personal objections stemmed from the African American soldiers’ relations with 
Filipino women, which he saw as a demoralising influence: WHT to Root, April 27, 1901, ERP Box 
167. 
103 WHT to Root, March 17, 1901, WHTP  8:464. 
 50 
the commission were the only U.S. alternative to military rule, but to also have his 
commission appear as trustworthy and as pro-Filipino as possible. Palma also 
recognised the role of Taft’s persona in the policy of attraction: ‘Mr. Taft had a very 
attractive and winning personality and he was able to impart to the civil government 
an atmosphere that was agreeably different from the military…No one could have 
inaugurated civil government better than he.’104 Taft was able to use his role as a 
replacement for military rule, along with his message of benevolence, to create 
himself as the figurehead of the policy of attraction.  
Despite Taft’s general antipathy towards his military predecessor as governor 
of the islands, General Arthur MacArthur, Taft also had some lessons to learn from 
the general that would play an important role in the policy of attraction.105 Firstly, 
Taft believed MacArthur’s public parties and open displays of goodwill had been well 
received by Filipinos. As early as July 1900, Taft commented on the positive effects 
of a fiesta put on by MacArthur: ‘If there’s one thing more than another that a Filipino 
likes, it is a fiesta.’106 However, it was the matter of Filipino inclusion in such 
festivities that particularly struck Taft. Taft praised the New Year’s festivities held by 
MacArthur, commenting that ‘the democratic feature of the reception in inviting the 
public generally to come struck the Filipinos with very great force and has been 
commented on in the press generally.’107 In another letter Taft refers to the festivities 
once again: ‘[Guests] were cordially received and the crowds of white and brown 
faces were completely mingled and there was no separation according to color… This 
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I know from what I have heard was peculiarly gratifying to the Filipinos.’108 Taft was 
impressed by MacArthur’s policy of demonstrating goodwill by including Filipinos in 
such social events, and he felt that these policies had made a definite impact on the 
Filipino people. It was observations and conclusions such as these that would prove 
informative to Taft when he enacted his policy of attraction, both on a personal level 
and on an official basis. As Mrs. Taft noted in her autobiography, the Tafts ‘made it a 
rule from the beginning that neither politics nor race should influence our hospitality 
in any way.’109 The idea of hospitality, public displays of goodwill and the perception 
that the Filipinos should be seen to be welcomed by Taft and his commission and 
involved in social affairs were all integral to Taft’s early designs in the islands.  
Indications of the Filipino “social inclusion” aspect of the policy of attraction 
were soon evident in Taft’s behaviour as commissioner. In March of 1901, during a 
visit to the outlying provinces, Taft reported to Root that he and his fellow travellers 
had held an informal reception where the ladies ‘shook hands with the natives.’110  
Although this might appear to echo the metropolitan fiestas held by MacArthur, Taft 
went on to note that the military authorities in the provinces ‘were disposed to be 
shocked at the idea of having natives… shake hands with the ladies,’ but, ‘the ladies 
did not mind and the natives much appreciated the evidence of a desire to avoid a 
color line.’ Taft might not have come up with the idea of inclusive social events, but 
when writing to Root he was certainly suggesting that he was taking the policy 
further, and that the military were less keen on it than him. Taft felt that Filipinos 
viewed such racial mixing at social events as a sign of ‘our confidence in them and… 
the wiping out of the color line.’111 In her autobiography, Mrs. Taft recounted the 
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effects of such an instance of social mixing: ‘much to the disgust of the military 
authorities present, we all shook hands with everybody and assumed the friendliest 
kind of attitude.’112 Such social mixing of races was hardly a widespread convention 
in the United States at the time, and in the American South it would have been viewed 
widely with dismay among whites, suggesting that the white U.S. military in the 
islands were not alone in their feelings of distaste for social miscegenation. Rather, 
what this all suggests is that Taft was not bowing to certain U.S. conventions on the 
social mixing of races, but instead recognising the importance of appearing to 
consider race secondary, in order for his policy of attraction to succeed.  
Although an appearance, at least, of some form of social equality was key to 
Taft’s policy of attraction, it was not the only form the policy of attraction took.113 
There are numerous examples in Taft’s correspondence of the time, illustrating his 
own varied schemes of how to attract the Filipino people to U.S. rule. In one of his 
frequent letters to Elihu Root, Taft wrote about a project that would establish a 
musical conservatory that he thought ‘may be productive of great good.’ This policy 
had a clear metropolitan bias, but followed in the same vein as the idea of fiestas and 
festivities. The theory behind such a project was that: ‘Filipino people as a whole are 
wonderfully fond and wonderfully apt in the art of music,’ and that such a project 
would therefore, ‘greatly touch the hearts of the people.’ Taft concluded that the 
Filipinos were ‘emotional and sentimental, and such an act of generosity would touch 
them more and affect them more than administrative reforms of a much more 
important kind.’114 Perhaps this letter sums up most concisely the much broader 
purposes and motivations behind the policy of attraction. On some level, the policy of 
attraction would be based around grand gestures of goodwill, which in line with 
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Taft’s views of the Filipino people, would be most productive in winning what one 
might now call “hearts and minds.” Taft did not shy away from suggesting that such 
populist gesture politics would be far more effective in winning over Filipinos than 
more complex and controversial political and administrative reforms.  
 One example of a Taft attraction scheme that failed to come to anything, but 
was indicative of his thinking, was the idea of bringing President McKinley to the 
Philippines. In numerous letters Taft urged such a visit, telling Root, among others, 
that it would have a very ‘healthful effect.’ Taft once again followed up his idea by 
asserting that what Filipinos liked was ‘ocular demonstration, even to the point of the 
spectacular, of the interest that America feels in these Islands, and the desire to create 
a good government here.’ 115 There is little doubt that a McKinley visit would have 
qualified as a spectacle, especially as at this point in history no sitting U.S. president 
had left mainland American soil. 
 Overall, the aims and nature of Taft’s initial thoughts on the policy of 
attraction were that it needed to be clear to the Filipino people that the United States 
was there for the benefit of the Filipino people, “the Philippines for the Filipinos,” as 
Taft put it.116 The policy was guided by some seemingly racial assumptions, such as 
the suggestibility of the Filipino masses and the extent to which they were impressed 
by grand gestures, but it could also be argued that American politicians thought 
similarly of uneducated white voters in the United States. The policy of attraction did 
not end with the idea of grand social gestures by any means, but it is useful to 
consider this technique first of all, as it is the simplest example of how important the 
idea of attraction was to Taft in selling U.S. rule to the Filipinos. 
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Education and Uplift 
 
In June of 1900 Taft described the Filipinos, as ‘in many respects nothing but 
grown up children,’ a common trope at the time when referring to non-white races.117 
Examples of such an assumption can be found easily elsewhere among white 
American elites of the time. In 1899 Alfred Thayer Mahan, the famous naval 
strategist, recommended that the U.S. should follow the recent British model and deal 
justly with its Filipino wards who were ‘still in race-childhood.’118 Historian Vicente 
Rafael suggests that President McKinley regarded the Filipinos as ‘errant children’ 
who needed to be treated ‘with firmness if need be, but without severity so far as may 
be possible.’119 Taft was, therefore, not alone in his belief that the Filipinos were, like 
children, in the infancy of their cultural and democratic development. However, as 
historian Frank Ninkovich contends, Taft was ‘more serious about this civilizing 
mission than most.’120  
Central to Taft’s thinking on how to go about civilising these somewhat child-
like Filipino people, as he saw it, was the idea of racial and cultural uplift through 
education. Education fit well within the wider policy of attraction: Taft saw it as yet 
another gift the United States could give to the Filipino people and prove their 
goodwill and generosity. Historian Renato Constantino goes so far as to describe the 
Philippine educational system as ‘the handmaiden of colonial policy.’121 Education 
was to be at the forefront of policy in two distinct areas, firstly, through primary 
education and schooling, and secondly, through political education and a radical 
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overhaul of the political system. The former aspect will be analysed within this 
chapter with its focus on social policies with the latter covered in Chapter Two with 
its focus on political policies.   
Taft’s predecessors on the Schurman Commission had reported to President 
McKinley with a great deal of interest in the idea of the level of Philippine civilisation 
and the potential benefits of education to its progress. ‘Some writers,’ the report 
stated, ‘credit [the Filipinos] with a high degree of civilization, and compare them to 
the Pilgrim Fathers or the patriots of ’76, while others regard even the more highly 
civilized tribes as little better than barbarians.’122 The report suggested that ‘the 
fitness of any people’ to form a government relies closely on the ‘prevalence of 
knowledge and enlightenment among the masses.’ As a result of this reasoning 
Schurman and his commission recommended rapid expansion of primary education in 
the archipelago through a system of secular and free public schools. This development 
in educational institutions would be best achieved through primary instruction in the 
English language, and secondary education should also be encouraged, though with 
an emphasis on ‘good agricultural and manual-training schools’ as these would best 
fit the present needs of islanders.123 The Schurman report certainly played an 
important role in putting forward many of the ideas that would go on to be developed 
by the Taft Commission. However, even at this early stage, the suggestion was that 
the islanders needed to be educated in basic skills and that secondary academic 
education would take a back seat. Taft’s own commission reported the following year 
along similar lines, that ‘Primary instruction must ultimately be compulsory for all 
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children between the ages of 6 and 12 years,’ and ‘emphasis must be placed upon the 
elementary education of the masses.’124 
Despite the recommendations of the Schurman and Taft commissions, the idea 
of education and schooling as fundamental to U.S. policy in the islands can be traced 
back further to the actions of the U.S. military government in the islands. Dean 
Worcester, a member of both commissions, wrote in later years that the military’s 
pro-education policies had a great ‘moral effect’ upon Filipinos.125 Historian John 
Morgan Gates covers the military’s use of school construction as a mode of 
pacification in his work Schoolbooks and Krags (1973), which deals with the 
military’s education policy in some detail. Gates suggests that ‘in many cases a school 
was the first thing established by the army in a town, even preceding the rudiments of 
municipal government,’ but that they realised by early 1900 that this work ‘was of 
little intrinsic value except as a way to show the goodwill of the American 
government in the municipalities.’126 However, as historian Rene Escalante notes, 
although there had been around 2,167 primary schools in the islands prior to the war, 
by the time Taft became governor, ‘many of them were either destroyed or used as 
barracks, prisons, or hospitals of the army.’127 The idea of schools as a tool in 
pacification was important to the military, but the idea of schools as a gesture of 
goodwill was much more clearly in line with Taft’s policy of attraction. Taft saw that 
as schools were a good method of expressing American goodwill and benevolent 
intentions in the Philippines, this message would require greater stress under his 
oversight. This is illustrated in a July 1900 letter from Taft to Root, where Taft 
criticises the military’s schoolhouses: Taft opined that there were but five or six well-
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built schoolhouses, and he disagreed with MacArthur’s advocacy of continuing with 
schooling in thatched houses for the time being. Taft argued that ‘the Filipino people 
are a people upon whom outward show makes a great effect’ and, to this end, the 
appearance of new schoolhouses had to make the right impression of U.S. intentions 
towards the Filipino people.128  
However, education was more than simply another facet of public display like 
the musical conservatory or a potential visit from President McKinley: education 
could be presented as a genuine grassroots change in the Philippines for Filipino 
benefit. Historians of progressivism Arthur Link and Richard McCormick suggest that 
for every social problem of the early twentieth century ‘somebody offered a solution 
which focused on the schools,’ citing the huge increase in kindergartens and high 
schools within the United States at the time.129 Historian H. W. Brands suggests that 
Taft’s notion of education ‘embraced the progressive ideal of readying persons 
broadly for life in a democratic society.’130 Taft supported this idea of education and 
uplift as being firmly at the forefront of U.S. policy. Although it was an idea that was 
used as a pacification tool by the military and recommended by his predecessors on 
the Schurman Commission, education was, for Taft, the best message to headline his 
wider policy of attraction. In his inaugural address as Civil Governor of the 
Philippines on July 4, 1901, Taft summed up his vision for education policy:  
  The school system is hardly begun as an organized machine. One 
thousand American teachers will arrive in the next three months. They 
must not only teach English in the schools, but they must teach the 
Filipino teachers… Our most satisfactory ground for hope of success in 
our whole work is in the eagerness with which the Philippine people, 
even the humblest, seek for education.131 
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Taft believed that everybody could be won over by a policy that centred on 
education, not only the Filipinos, but the American people as well, all of whom Taft 
thought had a belief in the benefits of education. Taft was good to the promise of his 
inauguration speech and oversaw the arrival of over 1,074 teachers from the United 
States.132 These U.S. teachers were labelled the “Thomasites,” after the ship in which 
they crossed the Pacific between January 1901 and September 1902, and were used 
both to increase the basic number of teachers in the islands and to train new and 
existing Filipino teachers in the American method and English language. Historian 
Paul Kramer sees the term “Thomasites” itself as problematic, arguing that this 
connected their journey to the Philippines ‘to much older trajectories of Protestant 
evangelism in Asia, while moralizing and exceptionalizing U. S. colonialism.’133 
Although the presence of Catholic teachers among later teaching recruits would 
undercut some of the idea of a Protestant mission, it is true to say that this importation 
of missionary-like teachers had some clear imperialist overtones. However, what is 
perhaps more noteworthy, in terms of Taft’s policy of attraction, is that such a focus 
was to be made on importing teachers and focusing upon instruction in the English 
language.   
The Taft Commission’s report of 1901 declared that ‘English is desired by the 
natives, and undoubtedly it should be the language basis of public-school work, but it 
should be introduced gradually.’134 Four years after the report was made, Taft 
explained the importance of using the English language to readers of National 
Geographic Magazine: ‘To the Filipino the possession of English is the gateway into 
that busy and fervid life of commerce, of modern science, of diplomacy and politics, 
in which he aspires to shine.’ Along with this assertion, Taft also pointed to one of the 
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most often cited reasons for the uniform use of English: that the Philippines had no 
one language with which to conduct their affairs.135 After hundreds of years of 
Spanish rule the Filipino elite and the Spanish friars were the only groups of society 
who spoke the Spanish language fluently. Alongside Spanish there were countless 
other languages spoken in the islands, including the majority native language of 
Tagalog.136 However, as Taft suggested, English was not just practical as a method of 
unifying the Filipinos; the language would cast off the memories of Spanish rule, and 
would open up the world of international trade and ideas of Anglo-Saxon democracy. 
In addition, and almost certainly among Taft’s highest considerations on the issue, 
was the fact the language would help tie the islands more firmly to the United States. 
This assumption became further evident in future years, when Taft grew clearer about 
his aim, which began to develop during his time as a commissioner and then solidify 
as civil governor, to draw the U.S. and the Philippines into a permanent imperial 
relationship.  
Beyond the use of American teachers and English as the language of primary 
instruction, another feature of Taft’s thinking on education policy was his decision to 
focus secondary instruction towards industrial and manual skills, as both commissions 
had recommended in their reports. Taft’s chosen head of education, Frederick 
Atkinson, took his model from Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee Institute.137 
Atkinson and other advisors, in line with the Schurman Commission’s 
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recommendations before them, combined to convince Taft that Filipinos would be 
best suited to the type of secondary vocational education that Washington espoused as 
best for African Americans. Historian Mark van Ells cites Atkinson as suggesting that 
the U.S. in the Philippines had to be aware of the ‘possibility of overdoing the matter 
of higher education,’ and that they should ‘heed the lesson taught us in our 
reconstruction period when we started to educate the negro,’ pointing towards 
agricultural and industrial training.138 However, as Frank Ninkovich points out, 
industrial education did not work out as well as the idealists had hoped, as ‘there 
was…not much industry in the Philippines.’139 Aside from ascertaining the success of 
a vocational education policy, this factor lends itself to recognising how the policy of 
education, even with its progressive and high-minded rhetoric, was still guided by 
racial assumptions. Taft’s choice of Atkinson and his acceptance of his 
recommendations in this matter suggest that Taft too saw the Filipinos as a people 
who, at least currently, were unsuited to higher academic education on the basis of 
their cultural backwardness. 
In 1898 fewer than 7,000 Filipino students were in primary, secondary and 
collegiate schools. Under American rule this number would increase markedly.140 
Historian Glenn May argues that although many commentators regard the education 
system as one of ‘great value to Filipinos,’ it was, in many respects, poorly conceived 
and poorly executed.141 In relation to this latter point of poor execution, historian 
Stanley Karnow cites the use of inappropriate U.S. educational materials in the 
Philippines, which, among other things, featured pictures of objects that would be 
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unrecognisable to Filipino children.142 Another key criticism of U.S. education policy 
is that it was largely elitist. Frank Golay points to the fact that under American rule 
primary education never extended to more than thirty five percent of the population, 
and that this represented mostly Manila and other large urban areas.143  
However, education policy under Taft was far from wholly ill-conceived. 
Golay also argues that, despite their shortcomings, U.S. educational policies did 
benefit the Filipinos and that there were undoubtedly ‘substantial financial resources 
allocated by the commission to education.’144 Despite the geographical and social 
disparities that have already been mentioned, the numbers of children in primary and 
other levels of education rose substantially under the first few years of American rule, 
which had to be an improvement for all concerned. For critics of Taft, the focus 
toward vocational education, in combination with the elitism of the system, could be 
seen as evidence of a fairly unequal, superficial and racially motivated education 
policy. However, to his credit, Taft oversaw substantial expansion of and investment 
in new schools, increased enrolment and increased literacy. As Mrs. Taft put it in her 
autobiography: ‘whatever may be said about the American Constitution there can be 
no dispute about the fact that education follows the flag.’145 Even if Taft’s education 
policy was far from perfect, it did achieve its primary aim of providing the visible 
signs of American goodwill and commitment to the Philippines that Taft was so keen 
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The Separation of Church and State 
 
Under Spanish rule, education and the institutions where instruction took place 
had been largely under the control of the Catholic Church. From the outset, Taft made 
it clear that he wished to separate the church from state education in line with the 
American model.146 In the words of his commission’s report: ‘according to the 
American standard, the ideal school is a non sectarian, graded school, with a 
prescribed course of study and definite standards for each year, under charge of 
trained teachers and housed in suitable buildings.’147 In similar terms, after he had 
arrived in the Philippines, Taft wrote privately that ‘we could not support religious 
teaching out of the public funds, and that there must be complete separation of Church 
and State.’148 Of course, the fact that the church in this case was the Catholic Church 
did limit adverse U.S.-based reaction to such a policy to a minority. Religious 
instruction was soon relegated to voluntary status in state-run schools and even this 
took place outside of school hours.149  
Despite this formal separation of religion from state-run schools, Taft was 
keen not to cause a rift with the Catholic Church that, as the majority religious group 
in the islands, would have gone against the general concept of the policy of attraction. 
In August 1900, Taft wrote to Root that:  
We shall try to secure 5 primary school teachers from the public 
schools of San Francisco who are Catholics. The effect of bringing 
catholic teachers here can not be but good, and as they have had 
experience in public schools they will fully understand the possibility 
of maintaining a public school according to our system. 150 
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 In a further letter, concerned with the proportion of Catholic teachers to be 
appointed, Taft explained to Archbishop Placide Chapelle that ‘the policy of the 
Commission was to give the Catholics a fair share, and I thought about twenty or 
twenty-five per cent would be right.’ Keen to show his commitment to attraction of 
the Catholic Church, and more so to the faithful themselves, Taft attended the 
reopening of the Catholic University of Santo Tomas ‘to testify to the faculty that the 
Commission was here to encourage every effort in education,’ even if such efforts 
were run by the church.151 The policy of attraction was a key consideration in the 
formation of education policy with the religious aspect of education in the Philippines 
being yet another example of Taft’s determination to strengthen feelings of goodwill 
between the U.S. administration and the Filipino people. Historian Rene Escalante 
argues that Taft’s attempts at accommodating the opposing forces in the religion 
within schools debate, namely, the Catholic Church and those who objected to any 
religion in schools (such as Fred Atkinson and commissioners Moses and Ide), made 
him ‘more enemies than friends.’152  However, whether Taft satisfied the extremes is 
somewhat beyond his aims in such an accommodation: Taft’s policy of attraction 
aimed to appeal to the masses and be seen to offer a fair hand to all, not to pander to 
special interest groups, even if he privately agreed with them. 
Perhaps the best example of Taft’s stance towards the Catholic Church in the 
realm of education was to be seen in the departure in 1902 of two Taft appointees in 
the education policy-making arena. As early as May 1901 Taft had private concerns 
over his choice of secretary of public education Fred Atkinson, writing to Root that, ‘I 
feel that [Atkinson] is not at all in sympathy with our views of the necessity of 
soothing the Catholic sensitiveness in every way possible and we have to watch 
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him.’153 In October 1902, Atkinson and Commissioner Bernard Moses resigned; they 
had been the primary recipients of criticism from the Catholic press. Atkinson had 
also disappointed Taft with his unwillingness to assure Catholics that ‘nothing was 
being done to discriminate against them.’154 The choice of replacement for Atkinson, 
Elmer B. Bryan, was likely to be more reliably sympathetic to the church as he was a 
Catholic himself. As Taft noted in a letter to Root in November of 1902: ‘with a 
Catholic as Secretary of Public Instruction and a Catholic as Superintendent of City 
Schools in Manila [O’Reilley], I should think that even the wildest catholic editor 
ought to curb his fury against you and me.’155 Bryan’s appointment was indicative of 
Taft’s attempts to achieve separation of church and state, but firmly within the context 
of the wider policy of attraction.  
The influence of religion in the development of Taft’s policy of attraction did 
not end with the educational sphere; the high profile and far-reaching influence of the 
Catholic Church in the islands was a matter Taft was only too aware of. Although 
Taft was Unitarian, he was not a dogmatic adherent to religious sectarianism of any 
sort. As such, Taft did not feel his mission was that of a U.S. protestant missionary or, 
as he put it: the U.S. was not in the Philippines ‘to proselyte for Protestant churches,’ 
but in fact, ‘the way to improve these Islands was to make people better catholics.’156 
Even if Taft was willing to work with the Catholic Church rather than against it, he 
did not approve universally of the Catholic leaders or institutions in the islands. Taft 
had a particularly low view of Archbishop Chapelle and the unpopular Catholic friars 
who were all Vatican appointees in the islands.157 In various personal letters, Taft 
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made no attempt to disguise his frustration at Chapelle whose pro-status quo attitude, 
he claimed, ‘earned him the hostility of the people and has made them despair of ever 
getting rid of the hated monastic orders.’158 In the words of Maria Longworth Storer, 
a Catholic correspondent of Taft’s, ‘Archbishop C. has too re-actionary a tendency 
and does not speak English well enough or comprehend this [friar business] in an 
Anglo Saxon way.’159  
The friar lands were estates that were owned by the Vatican and administered 
by Catholic friars in the Philippines. Within the Filipino population there was 
palpable discontent with the friars, or as historian Joseph Rowe Jr. puts it, a hatred 
that was ‘extensive and significant.’160 Taft was certainly well aware of the 
unpopularity of the friars. In the wider scope of the policy of attraction, as well as 
reflecting U.S. ownership of the islands, it became clear that the friars and their 
estates would prove a bone of contention.  Taft put it simply in a letter to Secretary 
Root: ‘If the Americans could rid these Islands of the friars, the gratitude of the 
people for our action would be so deep that the slightest fear of further disorder or 
insurrection would be entirely removed.’161 In line with his idea of the effect of grand 
gestures upon the Filipino people, removal of the friars and repatriation of their 
Vatican-owned lands fulfilled Taft’s criteria for a major coup in the ongoing policy of 
attraction. 
 President Roosevelt charged Taft personally with the job of negotiating the 
friar issue with the Vatican authorities. Taft wrote to the Catholic Archbishop of St. 
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Paul, Minnesota, John Ireland, that the friar lands matter was ‘a question local and 
temporary dealing exclusively with the Philippines- a business matter, purely and 
simply, to be treated in a business-like way.’162 The main reason for such a comment 
was that the U.S. did not formally recognise diplomatic relations with the Vatican 
and, as such, the task was not, strictly speaking, a diplomatic mission. President 
Roosevelt instructed Taft that settling the friar lands issue was of ‘prime importance’ 
in bringing about complete separation of church and state, but he also stressed that 
nothing relating to ‘diplomatic relations’ were to be sought and that the matter was ‘a 
purely business transaction.’163 Historian Rene Escalante argues that Taft took charge 
of the entire friar lands affair as ‘part of his master plan to bring peace in the islands,’ 
but this, it is argued in this thesis, was really just part of the wider policy of attraction 
with its ultimate goal of winning over the Filipinos to a permanent imperial union 
with the United States.164 
However, from the Vatican’s viewpoint the friar lands were not just a business 
matter, as the Vatican also had to consider the status of the friars themselves, who 
constituted two-thirds of all the priests in the islands.165 During the drawn out period 
of negotiations Taft gave the following address to the Vatican’s representative in the 
matter, explaining the high-minded imperial idealism that supposedly lay behind U.S. 
negotiations for the land: 
I know that we both desire the betterment and uplifting of the Filipino 
people, and that while it is natural that there should be differences of 
opinion as to the method of bringing about such a great result, this 
common desire on the part of the two negotiators gives great hope that 
a conclusion may be reached by them satisfactory to both and 
achieving the common purpose.166 
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The negotiations with the Vatican were prolonged, and at times appeared to 
have failed, but Taft’s diplomacy eventually paid off. The friar lands, consisting of 
410,000 acres, were bought by the United States from the Vatican for $7,239,000 
(despite being valued at $1.5 million in 1893) and sold to the Filipinos on instalment 
plans to be paid for over several years.167 The lands were not vast and would not 
benefit every Filipino but for Taft, as a piece of propaganda to add credibility to the 
policy of attraction, the transaction was priceless. Historian Paolo Coletta argues that 
Taft dealt with the friar lands issue ‘very well,’ and it is clear that despite the 
seemingly precarious nature of the deal at times, the ultimate success of the venture 
cannot be denied.168 This particular case also displayed, for the first time, Taft’s 
ability to deal with a high-profile set of “diplomatic” negotiations in order to further 




Taft’s policy of attraction was critical to the development of his personal aims 
for the U.S.-Philippine relationship, as well as for the nature of the day-to-day 
running of the Philippines. During Taft’s time in the islands from 1900-1903, the 
policy of attraction and the ideology that guided it influenced Taft’s decisions on 
every issue he was faced with. However, the policy of attraction in these early years, 
during Taft’s direct oversight of social, educational and religious policies, formed the 
bedrock of his thinking on the nature of U.S.-Philippine relations as a whole. Taft 
might have arrived in the islands as a suspected anti-expansionist with little 
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knowledge of the Philippine situation outside of official reports, but he left with a 
fierce interest in the islands’ destiny. 
The policy of attraction might not appear particularly novel or innovative, or 
in fact entirely of Taft’s own invention, but he adhered to it strongly in the social and 
political policies initiated during his tenure in the Philippines. The nature and purpose 
of attraction for the military might have been pacification, and for businessmen it 
might have represented profit, but for Taft it manifested as a larger and longer-term 
vision. The policy of attraction, as the next chapter will continue to show, might have 
been in its early stages a policy for pacification, but for Taft it would help form the 
basis for a continued imperial union between the United States and the Philippines.169 
For Taft it was vital that the Filipino population was won around to thinking fondly of 
the United States, the policy’s primary aim. What might have been regarded on the 
face of it as a populist solution to short-term discontent became, for Taft, a blueprint 
for a new U.S. empire, and one that might last forever. In this respect Taft’s aims for 


















                                                









Where the previous chapter introduced Taft’s policy of attraction in the 
Philippines as it related to social policies and the areas of education and religion 
during the period 1900-1903, this chapter continues the analysis of Taft’s policy as it 
pertained to the political status, apparatus and future of the islands.  During his time 
running day-to-day affairs in the islands, Taft developed what was a distinctive 
concept of the future relationship between the U.S and the Philippines and what the 
ultimate aim of his policy of attraction should be. What might have appeared to many 
as a tool for pacification, the first step on the path towards self-government and 
ultimate independence, became something different for Taft. Although Taft saw the 
need for pacification, and limited self-government, with an eye to future self-
government in roughly a century, he began to believe that full independence was not 
the natural outcome of the U.S. presence in the islands. 
 In its political guise, the policy of attraction had many similarities to those 
explored in the previous chapter. Taft adhered consistently to a similar theory that 
education should also lie at the heart of his political policy, in the form of “political 
education,” where the islanders would be tutored in the Anglo-Saxon democracy 
under American supervision until they were prepared for self-government. However, 
Taft’s policy of appearing uniformly benevolent and outwardly projecting the 
message of the “Philippines for the Filipinos” had more visible limits in the realm of 
politics. Though Taft had a relatively low regard for what he saw as a generally 
corrupt class of political elites, he also felt that to succeed in defeating nationalist 
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sentiment he must work with at least some Filipino politicians. To this end the policy 
of attraction had to aim higher up the social ladder than pandering to the masses with 
showy gestures and investment in schooling. The Filipino elites were not so easily 
won over and Taft, who would in his ideal world have wished to overhaul the political 
classes completely, realised he needed to work with some of them in order to have a 
realistic chance of establishing an effective civil government. The price for this would 
be continued elite participation in the Philippine political system.  
 This chapter explores the ways in which Taft developed an idea of the political 
future of the islands as lying within a continued, long-term imperial union with the 
United States. It will explore the measures, both attractive and coercive, that Taft 
utilised towards these ends: such as the appointment of Filipino commissioners and 
the passage of a Sedition Act to prohibit the advocacy of independence. These 
policies aimed to steer a difficult path between the policy of attraction and Taft’s 
increasingly clear concept of a lasting imperial union. This attempted via media 
brought about inevitable concessions and compromises that would return to frustrate 
Taft’s vision in subsequent years. Taft’s success in establishing a civil government 
was tempered by its reliance on the existing elite and the appointment of so many 
Filipinos to office – steps he would later bemoan as over-reaching and premature. 
Taft would later fear he had moved too far, too fast, in the gradual process of handing 
political control over to Filipinos, later termed “Filipinization.” Taft began to realise 
that for an imperialist, too much democracy was perhaps not the easiest policy to 





From Military to Civil Government 
 
 The issue of independence was the most problematic that Taft faced during his 
time in the islands, and it would also be the issue that shaped his efforts at guiding 
policy in the islands for decades to follow. The basic problem was fairly simple: prior 
to the Spanish-American War, during the war itself, and then throughout the 
Philippine-American War that followed, most Filipinos believed that independence 
was the aim of their endeavours. Nationalist Filipinos under the leadership of Emilio 
Aguinaldo were led to believe that when they and their American “liberators” had 
defeated the Spanish, the end result would be independence for the Philippines. In 
January 1899 Aguinaldo declared his presidency of the first Philippine Republic and 
led the fight to wrest control of the archipelago from the Americans who had replaced 
– rather than removed – the Spanish Empire.  
Aguinaldo and his followers believed that President William McKinley and 
Admiral George Dewey had succumbed to the imperialist lobby, and had reneged on 
promises to allow the Philippines their independence, causing Aguinaldo to note in 
1899 that some began to ‘curse the hour and the day on which we had verbally 
negotiated with the Americans.’170 Historian Bonifacio Salamanca argues that most 
revolutionary Philippine leaders were ‘wittingly or unwittingly’ made to believe that 
the United States had promised to recognise Philippine independence at the end of 
hostilities with the Spanish.171 An example of this can be found in the words of 
Filipino politician Felipe Buencamino, who stated in December 1900 that Filipinos 
had ‘believed the United States would aid them in their desire for independence, 
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trusting in the American Declaration of Independence.’172 Salamanca also contends 
that, although pro-independence sentiment was not widespread among Filipinos prior 
to the Philippine Revolution against Spain in 1896, it became ‘a generalized 
sentiment’ by 1898-1899.173 Taft had his doubts about the existence of widespread 
pro-independence sentiment, arguing instead that although the majority of Filipinos 
might think they wanted independence, they simply did not understand what it really 
meant for them.174 However, the 1900 U.S. Republican Party platform did not meet 
the expectations of those who believed the U.S. meant to make good on the contested 
“promise” of independence. Instead, the platform promised the islands nothing further 
than the ‘largest measure of self-government consistent with their welfare and our 
[U.S.] duties.’175 When Taft arrived in the islands, during the midst of the Philippine-
American War, he faced an uphill struggle to at once seek to attract the Filipino 
population and simultaneously seek to stifle their hopes of independence.  
However, it was not Filipino nationalists alone that Taft was up against in his 
quest to attract and win over the Filipinos to American rule. The Democratic Party in 
the United States condemned Republican policy in their party platform, describing it 
as guided by ‘greedy commercialism’ that had involved the United States in an 
‘unnecessary war’ in which the nation took a ‘false and un-American position of 
crushing with military force the efforts of our former allies to achieve liberty and self-
government.’176 The following passage from the platform, announced on July 4, 1900, 
summarises the Democratic policy for the future of the islands: 
The Filipinos cannot be citizens without endangering our civilization; 
they cannot be subjects without imperiling our form of government; 
and as we are not willing to surrender our civilization nor to convert 
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the Republic into an empire, we favor an immediate declaration of the 
nation's purpose to give the Filipinos, first, a stable form of 
government; second, independence; and third, protection from outside 
interference, such as has been given for nearly a century to the 
republics of Central and South America.177 
 
Democratic policy was clear: if their candidate William Jennings Bryan were 
elected to the presidency, Filipinos would secure the promise of independence that 
they felt the Republicans had reneged upon. During the early months of 1900, Taft 
seemed determined that the key to achieve a crushing blow to the Aguinaldo’s 
nationalists did not have to be military, but could be achieved through destroying their 
morale. Central to this concept was that the incumbent president William McKinley 
had to defeat the anti-imperialist challenge of Democrat William Jennings Bryan in 
the 1900 presidential election.  
In August of 1900, Taft wrote to Secretary Root that the ‘only thing that keeps 
these insurrectos [Filipino nationalists] who are still in the mountains and in retired 
parts of the Islands is the hope that by Mr. Bryan’s election they may secure that 
independence of which they say so much and know so little.’178 In a letter written in 
October 1900, Taft expressed his belief that the Filipino nationalists had ‘succeeded 
in convincing their followers and a good many other people who are disposed to 
select the right side before expressing themselves at all that there is every probability 
of Bryan’s election, and that on the 6th of November, or as soon thereafter as the result 
can be announced, independence is to be given to these islands.’179 In these letters 
Taft was making three important assumptions. Firstly, that the advocates of 
independence were of a limited number, secondly, that there was a mass of people 
who were unwilling to commit themselves to the U.S. until they could see the way the 
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political wind was blowing, and finally, that most Filipinos would see a Bryan victory 
as a signal of almost immediate independence.180 If McKinley was victorious, Taft 
told pro-imperialist Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, ‘the insurrection as a political 
movement will fade out in the course of sixty to ninety days.’181 The hopeful 
suggestion in all of these passages was that if McKinley won then it would be a fatal 
blow to the nationalists and that the masses who were ‘not opposed to U.S. rule,’ but 
were simply ‘on the fence,’ would then accept the sovereignty of the United States.182 
Taft told his wife that the fear that ‘the Americans do not intend to stay,’ was keeping 
Filipinos from committing themselves to U.S. rule.183 His suggestions were definitely 
optimistic, but they were assumptions he continued to reiterate in the following 
decades. Taft felt, with a curious conviction, that if the idea of independence seemed 
distant and unattainable, the majority of Filipino people would cease to think about it. 
Ultimately, the election of 1900 did not signal a definitive end to nationalist 
fighting and it certainly did not bring to an end the belief among many Filipinos that 
the islands would, sooner or later, become independent. Nevertheless, McKinley’s re-
election on November 6, 1900, did generally fulfil Taft’s hope that a confirmation of 
four more years of Republican control over the Philippines would help some of the 
undecided and wavering Filipino elite to accept the idea of American rule for the time 
being. Two days prior to McKinley’s victory, Felipe Buencamino, a member of 
Aguinaldo’s nationalist cabinet in 1899, suggested that most influential and intelligent 
Filipinos believed it was ‘necessary for us to live and learn sometime under the 
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sovereignty of the United States of America.’184 This sort of suggestion was exactly 
what Taft hoped for: an end to the idea of immediate independence and openness to 
the idea of the benefits of American rule. The election also signalled an affirmation in 
the United States that America’s imperial duty was one that it took seriously and 
intended to see through, which was critical to Taft’s policy of attraction. McKinley’s 
re-election was also a turning point for Taft’s relationship with the Philippines, as it 
meant that Taft was assured of his role in the islands, and that the administration in 
Washington would not suddenly change their Philippine policy dramatically to disrupt 
his efforts there. For Taft, Filipinos would hopefully see McKinley’s re-election as a 
sign that the United States had accepted the burden of imperialism and had now 
reasserted their devotion to their duty there. 
Once the general concept of the United States remaining in the islands had 
been assured, Taft was keen to move to the Commission’s primary function of 
hastening the replacement of military rule in the islands. The Taft Commission’s 
report of January 1901 stated that the positive effect upon the Filipino people of 
changing the military government to one ‘purely civil’ could not be too strongly 
emphasised.185 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Taft felt that the transfer from 
civil to military rule was an integral part of the policy of attraction. The U.S. military, 
which had long been engaged in hostilities in the Philippines, were the face of 
aggression and, to many, betrayal. The Commission offered a more benevolent and 
far more attractive face. 
From the time Taft arrived in the islands, his relationship with the military was 
frosty and relations with the military Governor General Arthur MacArthur were 
particularly strained. Historian Brian Linn suggests that MacArthur could not accept 
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his ‘subordination to civilian authority,’ and notes how Taft began a ‘letter writing 
campaign’ detailing the many ‘foibles’ of the general.186 Linn goes on to assert that 
the primary difference between the two men was their judgement of the Filipino 
people’s sentiments towards the Americans. Taft saw those Filipinos resistant to U.S. 
rule as a minority whereas MacArthur believed the opposite.187 In late 1900 and the 
early months of 1901, Taft became increasingly insistent, particularly in his 
correspondence with Secretary of War Root, that the transfer of power from military 
to civil government was urgent. Following McKinley’s re-election Taft wrote to Root 
that with the decrease in nationalist activities the time for civil government was 
approaching rapidly.188 Similar messages continued to reach Root in the new year, 
with Taft speaking of a ‘hunger for civil government,’ and crowds of people greeting 
him on a tour in the islands who were ‘anxious to secure civil government.’189 As 
time wore on Taft also grew increasingly critical of MacArthur. Taft told Root that it 
was ‘exceedingly disagreeable to fuss and fuss with a man who resents your presence 
and who is on the keen watch to detect some usurpation of jurisdiction.’190 Taft hoped 
that such continued reports to the Secretary of War about a popular clamour for civil 
government, combined with encouraging messages about the increased peacefulness 
of the islands, would hasten the transfer of power from the military to the his 
commission.  
In another letter to Root, Taft outlined his provisional proposals for a future 
civil government in the islands. Taft suggested that it would comprise ‘a civil 
Governor and a legislature to consist of the members of the Commission and possibly 
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one or two Filipinos.’191 The Taft Commission was made up entirely of U.S. citizens, 
who would therefore form the majority of this future government. This outlook was in 
line with Taft’s general belief in the preferable nature of an American-run 
government, which would serve in a supervisory role, while the Filipino population 
underwent political education. Taft also noted that he would countenance the 
inclusion of one or two Filipinos in the governing commission. This was slightly 
contrary to his characterisations of the Filipinos as unfit for self-government and the 
Filipino elite particularly as corrupt and unfit for government, points explored in the 
previous chapter. However, including only one or two Filipinos in the governing 
commission would make certain their minority and ensure American oversight and a 
virtual veto. The appointment of Filipino commissioners would also serve, as with 
many other aspects of the policy of attraction, as an impressive gesture towards 
Filipino inclusion and American good intentions to both the general population and 
the Filipino elite.  
The American-run Commission that would govern the Philippine Islands 
comprised the original members of the Taft Commission that had arrived in 1900: 
Luke E. Wright, a Democratic lawyer from Tennessee; Henry Clay Ide, a Vermont 
lawyer; Dean C. Worcester, a zoologist with a detailed knowledge of the Philippines; 
and Bernard Moses, a historian and political scientist at the University of 
California.192 On June 25, 1901, Taft wrote to Root of the disagreement between 
members of his commission about the idea of including Filipinos in the proposed 
ruling commission: 
With reference to the appointment of Filipinos on the Commission, 
there is some hesitation on the part of my colleagues. Judge Ide and 
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General Wright think that the appointment at present [June 1901] would 
impede the action of the Commission in the passing of the civil and 
criminal codes… and other important legislation which we may need to 
pass… General Wright has never been very strongly in favor of having 
Filipinos in the Legislative body. Judge Ide has favored it and Mr. 
Worcester and I have always been strongly in favor of it, but Professor 
Moses has not been inclined to it so much. My impression is that 
probably the best solution is not to appoint the Filipinos until the first of 
August or the first of September [after which several important pieces 
of legislation would have been passed].193 
 
 This letter does seem to illustrate that Taft had taken the lead in calling for the 
inclusion of Filipinos in the Commission, though it does not necessarily suggest he 
thought very differently about the place of Filipinos at the high end of politics. What 
seems far more likely is that Taft saw the inclusion of Filipinos in the Commission 
primarily as a part of the policy of attraction. Also, the fact that he was open to the 
idea of appointing them only after much ‘important legislation’ was already in place 
suggests what he saw as the nature of their role on the Philippine Commission. The 
inclusion of the Filipinos on the Commission was not only a display of goodwill, but 
also an example of political realism. Taft recognised that to secure any Philippine 
support for his plans, he had to work with at least a portion of the existing Filipino 
elite. Taft appeared to judge that allegiance to the American cause could be bought 
through political patronage, a very Guided Era outlook, but in allowing Filipinos to 
participate at all this could be sold to the American and Filipino people as a far more 
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Issue of Independence 
  
On July 4, 1901, William Howard Taft was inaugurated as the first U.S. Civil 
Governor of the Philippine Islands, an event timed to coincide with the date of the 
Declaration of Independence.194 Nationalist Filipinos and U.S. anti-imperialists might 
well have questioned the appropriateness of the date, with the curious contrast of the 
occasion’s aim to formalise American imperial rule whilst, in the United States, 
American citizens celebrated the day they had cast off the yoke of the British 
Empire.195 As civil governor, Taft became an unelected head of state having been in 
the islands for just over a year and would lead day-to-day policy for the Philippine 
people. In his inaugural address Taft claimed that this changeover in government was 
the first step in a ‘clearly formulated plan for making the territory of these Islands ripe 
for permanent civil government on a more or less popular basis.’196 Taft then went on 
to stress that the U.S. citizens in the Philippines were representatives of ‘the great 
Republic’ and that as such they should set an example to prove to anti-imperialists 
that, above anything else, ‘we are here to secure good government for the 
Philippines.’197 The message of good, permanent civil government was notably not a 
message suggesting independence in anything like the near future. Taft’s developing 
idea was that time was critical to his policy of attraction, and that if only the U.S. 
were given the opportunity to illustrate the benefits of civil government then the 
Filipino people could be won over to their new imperial rulers.  For Taft it was 
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independence, and the discussion thereof, that was the main opponent to his efforts to 
attract the Filipinos: for attraction to be given its best chance, the issue of 
independence would have to be shelved.  
When Taft had arrived in the islands, the idea that the Philippines were 
presently unfit for independence was the status quo policy of the administration. In 
January 1900 the Schurman Commission, headed by the anti-expansionist Jacob 
Schurman, had declared that the ‘Filipinos are wholly unprepared for independence, 
and if independence were given them they could not maintain it.’198 Taft’s 
commission was envisaged with this understanding in mind and was sent to the 
islands not to prepare for independence but instead for U.S. civil government and 
eventual Filipino self-government. Taft’s strong feelings about independence are 
illustrated in his letters to Secretary Root where he described the Philippines as 
currently ‘utterly unfit for self-government,’ and how ‘an independent government of 
Filipinos would produce a condition worse than in hades.’199 Historian Whitney 
Perkins argues that Taft and Schurman’s ideas about independence were similar but 
that Taft was slower to recognise ‘the strong hold of independence sentiment on the 
minds of the Filipinos.’200 This latter statement is something of an understatement. 
Taft appeared confident that the policy of attraction had a realistic chance of changing 
the pro-independence attitude completely over time, since the Filipino stance was, in 
his mind, based on ignorance. 
One of the most notable acts that Taft passed in the early days of his 
administration was the Sedition Act of November 4, 1901.201 This act dealt a severe 
blow to independence advocates, proclaiming it a crime to ‘encourage, publicize, join, 
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speak for, or act with the independence movement.’202 Taft described the libel and 
sedition laws rather more diplomatically as helping to ‘clear the atmosphere some and 
show that a civil government is not any more helpless against attacks on its own life 
than is a military government.’203 However, the Sedition Act had an aim even Taft 
would have done well to disguise, to bring a forceful end to any talk of independence. 
Taft, with good reason, saw independence activism as the main obstacle to the success 
of embedding a permanent U.S. civil government, which of course was the aim of 
such activists. General McArthur seemed to agree with Taft to some extent when it 
came to recognising the danger of independence advocacy, and MacArthur took his 
own harsh measures such as deporting the leaders of the independence movement to 
the distant island of Guam.204 In Taft’s view, independence was an issue for the 
distant future, certainly not for the present, and any attention given to the issue of 
independence was wasteful and distracting. However, as an augur of Taft’s future 
policy towards the Philippines, the Sedition Act shows that even at this early stage 
Taft’s feelings against independence were so strong, he went so far as to make its 
very discussion a crime. 
With the Sedition Act, Taft showed that although he had every faith in this 
policy of attraction, with its welcoming and benevolent message, when it came to the 
issue of independence he did have a harder side to his otherwise outwardly genial 
character. Nevertheless, historian Leon Wolff suggests that despite the nature of the 
Sedition Act the Filipino people still ‘genuinely liked’ Taft.205 Although Taft’s 
rhetoric of the “Philippines for the Filipinos” and his support for Filipino inclusion in 
government might have been popular with many Filipinos, it met with objections 
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from the American civilian population in the islands, many of whom were there to 
profit from the imperial venture. In October 1901 Taft wrote to Root that it was 
‘gratifying’ to hear of domestic (U.S.) support for the Commission because ‘out here 
[in the Philippines] what between the military and the rag tag Americans and the 
vicious American press, we feel like that man who said that he was sired by no one 
and damned by everybody. Still we are in the fight to stay and we believe that patient 
hard work will bring about the conditions which we seek.’ Taft accepted that despite 
the positive message the appointment of Filipinos sent to the islands’ native 
inhabitants, such an action was not heralded gladly by Americans within the 
archipelago: ‘They bitterly attack the Commission in every way for appointing 
Filipinos and sneer at every effort we make.’ Despite his belief that the U.S. elements 
in the islands felt negatively towards the Commission, Taft felt better about Filipino 
opinion. Taft told military chief General Chaffee, who apparently felt that the 
Filipinos hated the Americans, that ‘the people felt very differently toward the 
American civil government.’206 Given the outcry of many Americans in the 
Philippines described by Taft, one wonders whether domestic support for the 
commission was as united behind Taft’s policies as he believed. 
Despite his fears that Americans in the islands did not like him, by November 
1901 Taft was so confident that he was regarded as the friend of the Filipinos he felt 
able to write: ‘I think I do not exaggerate and am not misled by flattery when I say 
that generally the Filipino people regard me as having more sympathy with them than 
any other member of the Commission and that they would regret anything which 
would make impossible or improbable my continuance as Civil Governor.’207 In this 
sense, it would appear that in Taft’s opinion the policy of attraction was progressing 
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well to present U.S. rule, and himself in particular, as working for the interests of the 
Filipinos. If independence advocates could be silenced, and allow him to work 
unhindered to demonstrate the benefits and benevolence of American rule, Taft felt 
that winning the general Filipino population over was not as far-fetched as many 
would have believed. 
 
The Organic Act 
 
Almost exactly a year after Taft was inaugurated as civil governor the outline 
for the future of the civil government was set out in the Philippine Organic Act of 
1902. The act provided for a bicameral legislature composed of an assembly (lower 
house), and the commission (upper house). It also provided that a general election 
would be held every two years for the assembly, but that no election would be held 
for the commission. Such a step forward in devolution of power was not to be 
accomplished overnight and the bill provided a fairly comprehensive set of conditions 
that meant such a government would not assemble for at least a few years. The 
conditions of the bill required that this government could only be established once the 
insurrection had ended, a census had been taken, and two years had passed peacefully 
following the publication of the census.208 Earlier in 1902 the Brooklyn Eagle 
summarised various important features of future government in the Philippines that 
Taft had suggested before the Senate Committee on the Philippines:  
Governor Taft’s plans would first of all, give to the Filipinos a 
qualified suffrage upon which a popular government would be based, 
restricted at the outset, but enlarged as the people grew in intelligence 
and in material prosperity. A local legislature is included in the 
scheme. It will have an upper and a lower house, the former to be 
appointive and the latter elective, which is the theory of legislative 
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construction adopted by Canada and by other smaller colonial 
dependencies of Great Britain. Taft also proposes that the islanders be 
allowed to send two or three [non-voting] representatives to 
Washington.209 
 
The outline given in this news report neatly summarises the main points set out 
in the Organic Act in terms of election and representation. Also worth noting at this 
point was the fact that, even by the time the first assembly elections took place in 
1907, only a tiny proportion of the Filipino population was eligible to vote.210 The 
point about the nature of the proposed government being similar to that of a British 
Dominion, such as Canada, is particularly noteworthy, as it was this style of imperial 
relationship that Taft began to cite in future years as a model to look towards.  
 The proposed Philippine Assembly was certainly a move in the direction of 
Filipino inclusion in the running of their own affairs, which had been a grievance 
among the Filipino elite for years and was one of the major causes of the Philippine 
Revolution of 1896. Historian Paul Kramer describes the Philippines as having been 
the ‘great political exception’ in the Spanish Empire, ruled by a ‘repressive politico-
military state and the reactionary friar orders.’ 211 This being the case, it was 
unsurprising that, as a result of Taft’s promise of a representative Philippine 
Assembly, members of the Filipino elite sent many approving letters to the governor 
praising his measures.212 Although in its very early stages, the Philippine Organic Act 
could be seen as Taft’s effort to bolster the policy of attraction by showing a clear 
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openness on the part of the U.S. civil government to include Filipinos in the soon to 
be semi-democratic process of running their own affairs. However, the act did 
maintain an unelected, potentially U.S.-dominated upper chamber that could block 
any measures it deemed unwise in the more democratically accountable lower 
chamber. The policy was for limited Filipino involvement and, for Taft, this 
devolution of power looked toward a future relationship not unlike that of Great 
Britain to its dominions. 
Although the Organic Act did not give Filipinos immediate self-government or 
a majority on the commission, it did promise to give the Filipinos a good deal more 
representation in their own affairs than the Spanish had before them. In addition, as 
mentioned above, it was also clear that Taft, more so than his fellow commissioners, 
had been active in bringing this Filipinization about. Taft appeared to have made good 
on his convictions: although he had been tough on those calling for independence, he 
had delivered the legislation for an elected Filipino-run lower house, and a strong – if 
not majority – Filipino presence in the upper house. The conditions set out in the act 
also proved consistent with Taft’s ideals of good governance: the situation was not to 
be rushed as it was the stability of the Philippines that was key to providing long-term 
lasting government.  
Large Policy advocate Henry Cabot Lodge wrote Taft an interesting letter in 
July 1902 suggesting one aspect of the commission’s policy that would later come 
back to haunt him. Senator Lodge generally applauded Taft’s work in the Philippines 
but confessed that: ‘I still think that it is a dangerous experiment and that we are 
going too fast, but I hope I am wrong and you know a thousand times more about it 
than I do.’213 Lodge believed that for all the limitations imposed upon Filipinization 
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and moves towards self-government, Taft had still gone too far, too fast. In the decade 
that followed Taft increasingly came around to the opinion that Lodge expressed at 
this time, but for the duration of his governorship these policies continued at – what 
Lodge at least considered – too rapid a pace. 
 Taft, as the previous chapter explored, considered the educated Filipino elites 
as an important group that held great sway over the general population. However, Taft 
saw the Filipinos elites as flawed in numerous ways, as he told Root in July 1900: 
They are generally lacking in moral character… and are difficult 
persons out of who to make an honest government. We shall have to 
do the best we can with them. They are born politicians; are as 
ambitious as Satan, and as jealous as possible of each other’s 
preferment. I think that we can make a popular assembly out of them 
for the Islands provided we restrain their action…214 
 
As suggested already in this chapter, despite his reservations, Taft’s primary 
motivation in this regard was the policy of attraction on two levels: first, to show the 
Filipino people America’s good intentions and, second, to win around enough of the 
existing elite to support American rule and aid Taft in his quest to shelve the issue of 
independence. Historian Julian Go argues that Taft’s scheme of patronage, 
particularly his inclusion of Filipinos in the running of local government, was well-
received by the circles of the Filipino elite many of whom regarded Taft as ‘the 
personification of American patronage.’215 Taft’s policy of including Filipinos within 
the government structures that the commission put into place seemed particularly 
successful in winning over a number of Filipino elites to the idea of Taft’s personal 
benevolence.  
However, Taft did not completely abandon his reservations about a policy of 
including the existing Filipino elites in the new American imperial set-up. As 
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historian Michael Cullinane notes, along with the U.S. commitment to implanting an 
American style of democracy to the islands, Taft faced the problem of continuing to 
‘satisfy the political aspirations of the Filipino elite,’ while protecting the Filipino 
masses from this very same group.216 Such a balancing act was sure to prove difficult 
to navigate and as historian Carl Landé suggests, Taft was unable to do both, and in 
the following years the Filipino elite ‘established and maintained their rule in the 
manner Taft had feared.’ Landé suggests that this outcome was probably inevitable, 
given the ‘incompatible’ nature of the aims to establish a level of self-government 
quickly and to prevent the existing elite from dominating it.217 Historian Lewis 
Gleeck Jr. takes a different stance, suggesting that Taft worked actively ‘to keep the 
Philippines in the hands of its educated and propertied class.’218 However, Gleeck’s 
summary seems unfair. Taft was certainly not keen on putting the Filipino elites into 
power, but his policy of attraction, and any system of government not run entirely by 
the U.S., could not realistically work without them in the short term. The appointment 
of Filipino elites to positions in the new government, much like the Sedition Act, was 
a short-term measure to help ensure the success of the policy of attraction.  
Appointing Filipinos in local government, and promising a future Philippine 
Assembly were popular ideas with both Filipinos and Americans who wished for 
American imperialism to be more democratic and exceptionalist than that of their 
Spanish predecessors. However, the potential problem for Taft’s imperial vision was 
clear: the proposed popularly elected Philippine Assembly would almost certainly 
become a forum of debate for advocates of independence. The political branch of 
Taft’s policy of attraction was even more difficult to balance than the social 
dimension, as there could be no definitive break from the existing elite while 
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maintaining the idea of attraction. Establishing a new elite would be too slow to 
coincide with the creation of the Philippine Assembly as set out in the Organic Act. 
Therefore, the assembly would likely prove both the coup de grace of the political 
part of the policy of attraction, and also the biggest problem for Taft’s desire to quash 




Taft was not blind to the seeming clash between his suspicion of Filipino elites 
and their inclusion in the U.S.-run government. Therefore, he did his best to convince 
himself and others that such a clash was not as problematic as it might appear. As 
early as August 1900, long before he was installed as civil governor, Taft told Root 
that there were ‘a few notable exceptions’ to the general ‘unscrupulous’ ranks of the 
Filipino elites.219 In this letter, Taft illustrates that he was aware of the problems he 
would face regarding inclusion of the Filipino elite if he were to characterise them 
uniformly as unsuitable for government, by setting up the notion of an elect few who 
were suitable. This idea was in line with the Larmarckian idea of racial improvement, 
suggesting that some rare specimens progressed faster than others of their race on the 
road to civilisation. On September 1, 1901, making good on this concept, three 
Filipinos joined the ruling Commission, an idea Taft had championed, and a subject 
on which he had overruled the desires of some of his fellow commissioners. This 
move was within the accepted wisdom of the policy of attraction: Filipinos were thus 
represented at the highest level of Philippine government, sending out just the right 
message to the population.  
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The first three Filipino commissioners were not elected, but appointed, and 
were outnumbered by Americans in the Commission.  The three exceptional Filipinos 
were all also relatively pro-American in their sympathies: Benito Legarda, Trinidad 
Pardo de Tavera and Jose Luzuriaga.220 Taft told Root, a year before these 
appointments, that ‘Mr. Legarda is to be classed only with two or three of the best 
men in the Philippines,’ and was conveniently the ‘most efficient friend of the 
American cause in these islands.’221 Taft also praised Pardo de Tavera as ‘cultivated, 
honorable and entertaining,’ as well as being a fine physician and a man of ‘very 
decided literary attainments.’222 Taft did recognise the evident favouritism he showed 
towards pro-American Filipinos. However, this does not mean he was necessarily 
being cynical in his appointments, but rather, as he saw it, pro-American Filipinos 
were the most intelligent and forward thinking.  
Given the lengths Taft was willing to go to in his attempts to stifle calls for 
independence it is not surprising that he used the early period of his administration in 
the islands to stifle the same people in their attempts to gain political office. Taft’s 
attempts to quash pro-independence elites took on another form with the 
establishment of the Filipino Federal Party, which was launched in December 1900. 
The Federal Party was distinctly pro-American, and its platform accepted U.S. 
sovereignty and a republican style of government.223 Taft spoke of the Federal Party 
as a ‘peace party’ and regarded its inauguration in December as ‘very successful.’224 
It is also unsurprising that all three of Taft’s exceptional Filipinos who were 
appointed as commissioners belonged to the Federal Party. However, perhaps the 
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most remarkable facet of this new force in politics was noted by Filipino politician 
Pardo de Tavera, who later became a commissioner: ‘it was stated as one of the 
ambitions of this party that, ultimately, after peace has been established, that the 
people may aspire to a condition of government where they will enjoy all of the 
personal liberties and privileges of American citizens, and that they may be able to 
demonstrate somewhat in the future their fitness for the organization of these Islands 
into a State of the Union.’225 For Taft, whose primary aim, it is argued here, was to 
subdue the independence movement, the Federal Party represented quite the opposite 
of independence. Nevertheless, the issue of statehood for the Philippines was almost 
as problematic as the issue of independence. 
American statehood for the Philippines was always relatively unlikely given 
the general antipathy among many, if not all, imperialists and anti-imperialists in the 
United States, to the idea of admitting 8 million non-white citizens to the union. 
Secretary of War Root, for example, believed that statehood would simply add 
‘another serious race problem’ to the United States.226 However, although the new 
status of “unincorporated territory” did not include the notion of eventual statehood, 
as might have been expected with the formation of previous territories, it also did not 
preclude such a possibility. Even though achieving statehood for the Philippines faced 
the substantial problem of objections from many within the United States, it was an 
idea that Taft toyed with briefly, at least rhetorically, in his early dealings with the 
Federal Party.  
On January 9, 1901, Taft told Secretary Root that the Federal Party’s long 
term aim was to be ‘made a state within the United States,’ making clear that Taft was 
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not attempting to side-step this issue in his support for the party.227 Over the following 
month Taft remained keen to impress upon Root the potential of this new party, 
writing later in January that ‘the growth of the federal party has been wonderful,’ and 
that it was ‘gathering into its ranks all the leading men of the archipelago.’228 
However, U.S. support for the Federal Party was not restricted simply to Taft and, as 
historian Brian Linn remarks, Taft’s rival General MacArthur also aided the party by 
enabling its members to travel freely throughout the islands and spread their pro-
American message.229 Taft’s choice to support the Federal Party, even with its 
unlikely initial goal of statehood, reflected his willingness to back influential Filipinos 
who would come out for anything opposed to independence, and he urged that the 
Federal Party should be ‘favored and encouraged as much as possible.’230 Historian 
Frank Golay contends that, while governor, Taft left no doubt in the minds of 
Filipinos that he considered the Federal Party to be a ‘bulwark of Republican 
Philippine policy,’ and this was reflected in his ‘reserving appointments to the 
colonial administration for party members.’231 The privileged position of the Federal 
Party was reaffirmed in the results of the local elections of February 1902, where the 
party took hold of power ‘almost everywhere.’232 Taft’s hope was that, with his 
unreserved support, the pro-American Federal Party could be installed as the most 
powerful political entity in the islands. This would have long term benefits for both 
the policy of attraction and the continuation of American rule in the medium to long 
term. 
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As one would perhaps expect, the Federal Party was not as universally popular 
as Taft liked to convey in his letters to Root, and there was certainly determined 
opposition in the islands to the policies advocated by the Federal Party. Historian 
Bonifacio Salamanca remarks that following the official end of hostilities in July 
1902, ‘several nationalists approached Governor Taft to organize political parties 
based on a platform of independence.’233 In response to these pleas Taft did his best to 
convince these pro-democracy advocates not to proceed for the next two years or so, 
and it was not until 1906 that this ban on radical (pro-independence) parties was 
lifted.234 An example of this underlying pro-independence political movement was the 
Filipino Democratic Party whose proposed program of September 1902 declared an 
intention to secure ‘the Independence of the Philippines by lawful means.’235 The 
Filipino Democratic Party was not as radical as Aguinaldo and his followers, who 
fought the United States for freedom and whose nationalist government Taft had 
characterised as a dictatorship. As a revised Democratic Party program of October 
1902 illustrated, the party accepted the fact of American sovereignty and sought to 
work for independence peacefully from that basis.236 As much as Taft might have 
hoped the Federal Party would grow and flourish, the widespread feelings of 
nationalism and support for eventual independence within the islands made it likely 
that pro-independence parties would arise sooner rather than later. In 
acknowledgement of this factor Taft did his best to frustrate and delay the political 
organisation of the Filipino Democratic Party, and he declared to Secretary Root in 
November 1902 that he had ‘succeeded in suspending the organization of the 
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Democratic Party for a time.’237 What this behaviour illustrates is that, with the 
Organic Act of 1902 promising an elected assembly within but a few years, Taft was 
using the influence he currently had to try and establish the Federal Party as the 
largest and most influential party throughout the islands. Taft’s method was clear, he 
simultaneously patronised his favoured party while disrupting and delaying the 
organisation of any substantial opposition. 
Historian Rene Escalante argues that the Federal Party ‘contributed 
immensely’ to Taft’s goal of pacifying the islands in their role as interpreters of 
American policy in the islands.238 Ultimately, however, the Federal Party’s rise to 
power hinged almost entirely on the patronage of Governor Taft, and its lack of a 
popular base would prove to be its downfall. Historian Leon Wolff claims that the 
Federal Party ‘attained its peak the day it was organized and from then it went 
downhill.’239 Frank Golay goes further when he suggests that Taft was critical to the 
party’s survival and that following his departure from the Philippines in 1903 the 
party ‘fell apart,’ due to lack of a rapport with most Filipinos and the gradual 
disillusionment with the party among American administrators.240 Therefore, one 
might count the Federal Party among Taft’s failures in Philippine policy during his 
governorship. Historian Whitney Perkins suggests that Taft’s ‘optimistic good-will’ 
led him to rely too heavily on the Filipino population’s willingness to cooperate with 
the idea of the Federal Party.241 Taft was only too aware of the popularity of the call 
for independence, and he was surely aware also that it was far stronger than any 
desire for statehood. Taft did show optimism in his support and patronage of the 
Federal Party, but any canny politician is aware that appearances are vitally 
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important, and such a belief was illustrated time and again in the policy of attraction. 
Taft was bound to exaggerate the possibilities of the Federal Party, both privately and 
publicly, if it were to have any chance at all of outlasting his patronage. To this end, 
Taft failed, but the policy was consistent with his growing conviction about a 
continued imperial presence in the islands. 
 
A Promise of Independence 
 
From his earliest days in the islands, Taft was certain that the American 
political education programme to prepare Filipinos for self-government would not be 
a short-term policy but more of a medium to long-term policy. In a letter to U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall Harlan, written in June 1900, Taft asserted that 
Filipinos would require ‘the training of fifty or a hundred years before they shall 
realize what Anglo-Saxon liberty is.’242 Taft never set a firm timetable for this period, 
as noted by historian Glenn May, but rather gave estimates of up to three 
generations.243 Although Taft was vague on timing, he was aware that matters had to 
be treated with care, as he informed his brother Horace in April 1901: ‘You are quite 
right in saying that being Americans we are likely to go too fast in conferring self-
government upon these people, but possibly we can keep some checks which will 
prevent the disasters naturally flowing from such a course.’244 Taft, in the policy of 
attraction, saw the measures he instigated as the short term means to an end. This end 
was not self-government, but the attraction of popular opinion to the U.S. imperial 
venture as a whole.  
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In the same letter to his brother of April 1901, Taft went on to discuss his fears 
of a promise of independence, and he expressed grave doubts about the Platt 
Amendment’s promise of Cuban independence made the previous month. Such a 
promise, Taft argued, ‘would destroy the possibility of tranquillity and peace during a 
period long enough to prepare them for self government.’245 In June 1902, anti-
imperialist Senator George Frisbie Hoar wrote to a correspondent following a meeting 
with President Roosevelt. Hoar claimed that his understanding of Taft’s position was 
that ‘to declare our purpose to give them independence would be misunderstood there 
and would set everything at sea again, and that all that he has accomplished would be 
lost.’246 Hoar was firmly opposed to an American empire, but he nevertheless 
summed up the message that Taft was keen to convey about independence. Taft’s 
argument was that to promise independence would cause too many problems in the 
islands, as the Filipino people would undoubtedly misinterpret such a promise. For 
anti-imperialists such as Senator Hoar, this message might have suggested that Taft 
was not necessarily opposed to independence in the future, but that instead he was 
more concerned over making a success of the process of handing over increased 
amounts of control to the Filipino people without having the distraction of the issue 
taking hold in the islands. This is what Taft wished to portray as his motivation, but 
during the same year he revealed a different sort of motivation hovering just below 
the surface of such reasoning. 
In his testimony before the Senate Philippine Committee in 1902, Taft gave a 
detailed picture of his broader thinking about the future of the American relationship 
with the islands and revealed his increasing consideration of a long-term imperial 
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relationship.247 Taft began by expressing his faith in the idea of tutelage, stating that a 
government had to be established under ‘American guidance’ while the Filipinos 
gradually improved their knowledge of ‘what is individual liberty and what is a 
constitutional government.’ Following this generally accepted picture of the imperial 
venture, Taft gave an indication of his own developing idea of the imperial 
relationship by suggesting that when the Filipinos had undergone this tutelage ‘the 
time will come when the United States and the Filipino people together can agree 
upon what their relations shall be.’ This statement may initially appear to be simply 
vague, but the meaning was clearer than it seemed: independence was, in this 
projected future, not a natural outcome of American tutelage.248   
Taft did not stop at simply suggesting a future reconsideration of the imperial 
relationship, but went on to provide a clearer picture of the sort of alternative to 
independence he had in mind: ‘Whether a colony – I mean a quasi-independent 
colony as Australia and Canada are to England – an independence state, or a state of 
the Union, is a question so far in the future, dependent on the success of the operation 
of the stable government, and that I myself have not reached conclusion on the 
subject.’ The idea of Philippine statehood, as has been discussed above, was unlikely 
given the general antipathy towards the idea in the United States, and so Taft’s 
suggestion of this may simply have been a nod to the official policy of his much-
favoured Federal Party. When a Democratic member of the Philippine Committee, 
Senator Edward Carmack (D, TN) pressed Taft on whether he really believed 
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statehood possible for a state ‘with eight or ten million Asiatics,’ Taft dismissed it as 
too early to predict what Americans in ‘two or three generations’ would think.249 
However, Taft, after the options of independence and statehood, offered the Senate 
Committee a third way: a continued imperial relationship, like that of Britain to its 
self-governing colonies – referred to from hereon as dominions.250 Later in his 
testimony, Taft mentioned the term ‘colony’ in a negative tone, and suggested that in 
the eyes of the Federal Party this term meant imperialism in the exploitative nature of 
the Spanish empire.251 Although Taft claimed he had not reached a conclusion on the 
subject, the idea of the Philippines as a future dominion of the United States was 
unusual in the general discussion of the Philippines’ future at the time.  
Taft’s testimony before the Philippine Committee in 1902 was certainly bereft 
of definitive statements on the islands’ future. Vagueness on the future of the imperial 
relationship was consistent with Taft’s attempts to quash advocacy of independence in 
the islands, as he claimed any definitive statement on an eventual outcome of the 
imperial experiment would take attention away from the immediate business of 
building a strong civil government. Taft told the Senate Committee that ‘no matter 
how long’ American tutelage took, the United States had to persevere in the project 
until the Filipino people ‘rise to call the name of the United States blessed.’252 This 
statement was the crux of Taft’s entire approach to the Philippine relationship and the 
ultimate aim of the policy of attraction. For Taft the policy of attraction was not 
simply a stop-gap solution to allow for the establishment of civil government, tutelage 
and eventual independence, but it was laying the groundwork for a long-term U.S. 
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commitment and a lasting imperial relationship. Taft had already revealed that he 
believed it would be many decades before a discussion on the islands’ future would 
need to be held. What he hoped was that if that timing of that decision were far 
enough in the future, the Filipino people might actually opt to remain a dominion of 
the United States of their own accord.  
The views that Taft expressed before the Senate Committee were reiterated in 
one of Taft’s last public addresses in the Philippines, given just days before his 
departure for the U.S. on December 23, 1903. In this address before the Union 
Reading College in Manila, Taft defended his slogan of the “Philippines for the 
Filipinos” as the principle that ‘makes up the web and the woof of the policy of the 
United States with respect to those islands.’ He then continued by broaching the 
independence issue: ‘The doctrine does not include, necessarily, the independence of 
the Filipinos, nor any particular degree of autonomy. It is entirely consistent with the 
principle to object to an immediate extension of popular government on the ground 
we are going too fast for the political digestion of the people, and that it is not, 
therefore, for their good.’253 Historian Julian Go suggests that the Filipino elite heeded 
Taft’s words, particularly the phrase the “Philippines for the Filipinos,” more often 
than those of other prominent U.S. figures.254 However, although Taft promised a 
policy that centred on the “Philippines for the Filipinos,” he specifically did not 
promise independence, and to this end he added the following conclusions: ‘Whether 
an autonomy or independence or quasi-independence shall ultimately follow in these 
islands ought to depend solely on the question, Is it best for the Filipino people and 
their welfare? It is my sincere belief that when America shall have discharged her 
duty toward the Philippines, shall have reduced the tariff, and made the commercial 
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bonds between the two countries close and profit giving to both, the Filipinos will 
love the association with the mother country, and will be the last to desire a severance 
of those ties.’255 In this conclusion Taft noted the many economic bonds that could 
help bind the islands together. These economic bonds, Taft hoped, would prove the 
firmest cement between the islands and the U.S. and this factor, and its role in Taft’s 
imperial vision, is the focus of the next chapter of this thesis. However, much like his 
testimony before the Senate Committee, Taft was envisioning a somewhat distant 
future where the Filipinos themselves would choose to remain part of the American 
empire. It was this vision that guided Taft’s thinking on the Philippine issue for the 




Overall, Taft felt that the Filipino people were not ready for independence and 
that discussion of the subject would serve only to hinder the progress of the American 
administration of the islands. To this end Taft attempted to carry out a carrot and stick 
policy to quash calls for independence. The carrot, or the policy of attraction, was the 
offer of civil government with Filipino inclusion even at the highest levels. The stick 
was aimed firmly at those who called for independence, and was illustrated with the 
passage of the Sedition Act and his patronage of the Federal Party at the expense of 
its rivals. To some extent all of these actions were seen as short-term political 
measures, to work in conjunction with the social measures explored in the previous 
chapter, to attract Filipinos to many supposed benefits of American rule. However, 
what began to set Taft apart from his peers was his growing belief that quashing the 
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independence movement need not only be a short term aim to set the Filipinos on the 
long road to self-government. For Taft, the successful shelving of the independence 
question could set the Philippines on the road to a continued imperial union with the 
United States. 
Even in his final year as civil governor, Taft stuck to his familiar warnings 
about those who called for independence. In a letter to Senator Lodge, Taft described 
the problem thus: ‘the insurrecto Filipino, the man who is shouting “independencia”, 
has no more idea of individual liberty and no more purpose of giving it to the 
common people than the Sultan of Jolo.’256 Taft’s solution for the short term was to 
remain vague on the ultimate outcome of the Philippine imperial experiment, and 
instead stress the need to concentrate on the establishment of a solid civil government, 
on progressing with the policy of tutelage and, more importantly, the policy of 
attraction. In the eyes of historian Vicente Rafael this view amounted to ‘indefinite 
submission to a program of discipline and re-formation requiring the constant 
supervision of the sovereign master,’ in order for the U.S. to father a ‘civilized 
people.’257 However, Taft’s plans were not simply a model for providing for 
civilisation and future self-government, Taft also sought the hearts of the Filipino 
people and with this their loyalty to the United States. 
 Taft’s policy of attraction in the realm of politics had mixed success. 
Whatever the limitations, Taft gave the Filipinos more substantial representation in 
the government of the islands than most would have imagined sensible for a figure 
who had a vision of a continued U.S. imperial bond. Winning over the people of the 
Philippines, the aim of the overall policy of attraction, led Taft to utilise the existing 
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Filipino elite to accomplish his inclusion policy, which jarred slightly with his 
reservations about their ability and character. These might have been compromises on 
the high-minded rhetoric of the U.S.-Philippine policy, but Taft regarded them as 
necessary short-term measures. However, although Taft’s policies were not uniformly 
successful, as the demise of the Federal Party after Taft’s departure illustrated, Taft 
felt he had done all he could within the malleable boundaries of the policy of 











































Most opponents of the U.S. role in the Philippines, at the time, cited the 
economic motivations behind the venture as an example of the exploitative nature of 
imperialism. An economic motivation, for the anti-imperialists, showed more clearly 
than anything else that the American version of an overseas empire was hardly 
exceptional. On the other hand, many advocates of imperialism in the Philippines 
pointed to the trading and commercial benefits of the relationship as perhaps the only 
concrete benefits for American businessmen and citizens, not to mention its much-
heralded position as the gateway to the China market. Administrators such as Taft 
attempted to express the economic benefits of the imperial relationship in a more 
balanced way with the idea that economic and trading benefits would be shared with, 
and maybe even favour, the Filipino people. Taft also saw these economic ties, trade 
links and long-term U.S. investment in the islands in particular, as crucial to 
cementing the social and political bonds around which he sought to create a 
permanent imperial union.  
William Lloyd Garrison, the son of the prominent abolitionist spokesperson 
(of the same name), wrote a poem entitled “Onward Christian Solider!” in 1899 
critiquing the United States’ imperial ambitions. The final stanza aimed particular 
criticism at their economic motivations: ‘Then, onward, Christian soldier! through 
fields of crimson gore, / Behold the trade advantages beyond the open door! / The 
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profits on our ledgers outweigh the heathen loss.’258 The proponents of this critical 
viewpoint were not just contemporaries. The influential “progressive school” of 
historians following on from Charles Beard and the later New Left historians, such as 
William Appleman Williams and Walter LaFeber, regarded economic influence as 
key to motivating U.S. imperialism in this early period and beyond.259 With the reality 
of an overseas empire solidifying during the period 1898-1901, Taft’s attempts to 
strengthen the islands’ economic ties with the United States reveal the clashes that 
arose between short-term measures that formed a part of the policy of attraction and 
his longer-term imperial vision. 
This chapter first addresses Taft’s efforts to remove the tariffs between the 
U.S. and the Philippines during his time in the islands and afterwards. It looks at how 
Taft broke away from the political mainstream in this attempt, illustrating how critical 
he regarded this policy to be. The larger part of the chapter is devoted to a more often 
overlooked element in Taft’s considerations regarding economic methods for bringing 
the Philippines closer to the United States: the issue of Chinese immigration to the 
islands. Chinese immigration was already an issue of growing controversy in the 
United States, as will be explored later, and the addition of the Philippines as a U.S. 
possession further complicated the matter. As Harvard based commentator Russell 
McCulloch Story put it in 1909: ‘The problems of immigration with which the United 
States has had to deal have not been confined, since 1899, to the Western Hemisphere 
alone.’260 Story recognised that the issue of Chinese immigration to the Philippines 
echoed, but did not parallel, the situation in the continental United States. For Taft, 
the varied circumstances and the potential for a different immigration policy for the 
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Philippines were to be integral to his involvement in the issue throughout the next 
decade. 
This chapter argues that Taft’s aim of drawing the U.S. and the Philippines 
into a permanent imperial relationship complicated what could have been a far 
simpler policy in regards to Chinese immigration to the islands. To allow for large-
scale U.S.-led capital investment in and development of the islands, Taft required 
long-term investment as evidence that U.S. interests in developing the islands’ 
resources were not merely fleeting and exploitative. Taft wanted to demonstrate that 
economic involvement would also be beneficial to the Philippines and the Filipinos, 
in the model of the policy of attraction. To accomplish this, Taft needed U.S. and 
European merchants and businessmen in the islands, as well as the U.S. government 
and the Filipino population to support him. Chinese immigration to the Philippines 
was an area where the interests of the mercantile community in the islands departed 
fairly strongly from the interests of the other parties that Taft needed to win over. This 
chapter analyses the difficulties Taft faced over this issue, and what they reveal about 
the wider problems Taft faced when it came to his long-term vision for U.S. imperial 
connections with the Philippines. 
 
The Tariff and the Economic Bond 
 
As early as August 1900 Taft had suggested to Secretary of War Root that one 
of the main drawbacks of granting the Philippines independence was that ‘Capital 
would be driven from the Islands, and after a year [chaos] would reign.’261 In October 
1900 Taft wrote to Senator Lodge that the islands’ ‘capacity for development under 
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American auspices is not to be exaggerated in a material way… Nothing will civilize 
them so much as the introduction of American enterprise and capital here.’262 Here 
Taft focused attention on the potential civilising aspects of economic intervention; 
after all, the United States was a capitalist and economic powerhouse so economic 
motivations did not need to be something to be ashamed of. This suggestion on Taft’s 
part can be looked at in a number of ways. In the most benevolent sense, capital 
investment would see increased productivity and substantial growth in infrastructure 
that Taft viewed as integral both to his policy of attraction and also as evidence that 
the U.S. was in the islands for the long haul and not just a quick gain. In the opinion 
of historian Rubin Weston, Taft wished to tie the Philippines to the U.S. economically 
leading to a permanent relationship through capital investment in the islands, trade 
relations and new tariff regulations.263 This opinion is certainly in line with the more 
general thesis in this chapter, that Taft saw economic matters as yet another method 
by which to draw the U.S. and the Philippines into a more lasting and preferential 
relationship. However, as has already been established, Taft desired more than an 
informal economic empire such as that which gradually appeared in Latin America. 
Taft desired a permanent imperial link between with the Philippines and economic 
bonds were simply one of a number of methods by which Taft sought to bring about 
his imperial vision. 
In line with his beliefs about an economic side to the continuing bond between 
the two places, Taft felt that much could be gained from reducing or even removing 
the tariffs between the U.S. and the Philippines. As early as December 27, 1900, Taft 
criticised the idea of maintaining a high tariff wall between the U.S. and the 
Philippines: ‘The condition in which these Islands would be left were we obliged… to 
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enforce the Dingley Tariff Bill would be most anomalous and difficult.’264 The Taft 
Commission’s report of 1901 recommended that Congress grant Philippine exports to 
the United States a preference of not less than 50 percent of American tariff duties in 
order to stimulate the islands’ economy.265 However, the question of tariff revision 
was far from straightforward, as had been demonstrated when the less threatening 
idea of tariff reduction between the U.S. and Puerto Rico was debated.  
In early 1900 the McKinley administration had suggested revising the tariff 
with Puerto Rico. Historian Göran Rystad suggests that the issue of Puerto Rican 
tariff revision served as a “rallying-point” for anti-imperialists, who went on to 
suggest that the full Constitution should follow the flag to the United States’ new 
insular possessions. Prior to the Supreme Court’s further definition of the islands’ 
status in the Insular Cases of 1901-1905, there was a fear in the U.S. that tariff 
revision could set a wider precedent for equal treatment under the constitution.266 
Since Taft was approaching the tariff question in the Philippines at a time when the 
question of the insular possessions’ constitutional status was still not fully defined, he 
was swimming against the tide of political opinion. 
Despite this earlier outpouring of concern about the potentially wider 
constitutional ramifications of tariff revision, Taft was adamant that it was a good 
idea for the Philippines.  Following the Supreme Court’s classification of the 
archipelago as an “unincorporated territory,” the Philippines were not included within 
the domestic sphere and thus were liable to pay the full (and potentially punitive) 
Dingley Tariff rates of 1897 in the same manner as a foreign country. 267 Historian 
Rene Escalante argues that Taft put particular stress on the idea that by reducing 
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tariffs – which he believed would bring about an improvement in the islands’ 
economy – the likelihood of peace in the islands would move a step closer, in line 
with his policy of attraction.268 Nevertheless, there were issues besides Taft’s policy 
of attraction at stake from the point of view of U.S.-based politicians, as there had 
been in the Puerto Rican case. In addition to this, as political scientist Grayson Kirk 
noted in an essay of 1936: Article IV of the Treaty of Paris specified that the United 
States would admit Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine ports on the same 
terms as the U.S. for ten years.269 Therefore, if there were any ‘attempt to establish a 
special tariff regime favoring the two powers’ this might have brought about clashes 
with other states regarding their rights to share in any special rates.270 However, as 
Escalante goes on to note, the primary opposition to Taft’s calls for tariff reduction 
came in the form of the influential U.S agricultural sector, which saw the existing 
tariff as in their particular interests.271 This was perhaps the most obvious stumbling 
block from an American point of view, as the powerful tobacco and sugar industries 
in particular would certainly not be in favour of any direct competition from the U.S. 
overseas possessions.  
Finally, in December 1901 and early 1902 the U.S. Congress debated a new 
tariff bill to determine the trade relations between the United States and the 
Philippines. Taft told the Philippine Committee in early 1902 that: ‘We are looking, 
so far as we can, after the interests of the Philippine Islands, with a view to 
developing trade there that shall be a benefit to those islands… the lower you get the 
duties on goods coming from the Philippine Islands into the United States, the more 
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trade will be developed.’272 Following long debates in both houses, the tariff rate was 
lowered in March of 1902 when Congress voted to set a duty of 75 percent of the 
Dingley rates on Philippine goods entering the United States.273 The result was less 
than Taft had hoped for and he continued to push for a further reduction. However, 
Taft’s efforts to reduce the tariffs routinely failed throughout his governorship and his 
time at the War Department, and it was not until Taft occupied the White House that 
further action took place on the tariff issue, and by that point the question of the 
Constitution following the flag had been answered far more clearly.274   
Aside from the tariff, the awkward passage of the Spooner Bill, which aimed 
to bring about civil government in the Philippines, helped to illustrate the difficulties 
that Taft faced in his advocacy of strong economic bonds between the U.S. and the 
Philippines. The Spooner Bill aimed to establish that ‘all military, civil and judicial 
powers necessary to govern the said islands [Philippines] shall, until otherwise 
provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons and shall be exercised in 
such a manner as the President of the United States shall direct, for maintaining and 
protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, 
property and religion.’275  The New York Times described some of the main reasons 
for the passage of the bill as: providing a body able to ‘legislate and control the 
incorporation of concerns, regulate mining claims, [and] dispose of public lands.’276 
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Seen in these terms, the Spooner Bill was regarded by anti-imperialists in the Senate, 
such as George Frisbie Hoar, as legislation aimed at ‘economic exploitation’ on the 
part of the Taft Commission.277 Taft was undoubtedly keen to see that the Spooner 
Bill was passed, as he strongly favoured civil government as soon as possible. He also 
regarded the bill as key to allowing for basic economic investment in the islands. 
In November 1900 Taft expressed some hope that the Spooner Bill would be 
passed, writing about a letter from Senator Henry Cabot Lodge ‘in which [Lodge] 
says he thinks the Spooner bill can be passed if the President requests it in his 
message,’ Taft went on to add his own thoughts: ‘I hope that it may be passed for it 
would be like running on one wheel to attempt to develop this country without the 
power to offer investments to capital.’278 In Taft’s view, civil government would be 
fatally undermined without powers to allow economic investment in the islands. 
Ultimately, however, Taft was not to gain the powers he sought in the Spooner 
legislation. As historian Frank Golay suggests, with Senator Hoar’s amendments to 
the Spooner legislation, the powers proposed for the commission were significantly 
cut back. Congress subsequently passed the ‘emasculated’ Spooner legislation as an 
amendment to the Army Appropriations Act.279 Taft was disappointed with what he 
regarded as the failure of the Spooner legislation and with it a delay in the power he 
desired for governing the Philippines and spurring on economic growth and 
development in the islands.  
The tariff issue and the Spooner Bill are just a couple of examples of the wider 
economic-based method by which Taft hoped to further the policy of attraction; the 
aim was to show both the benefits that U.S rule was able to bring to the islands and 
simultaneously draw the Philippines increasingly into the U.S. sphere of influence.  In 
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hearings before the Senate Philippine Committee in 1902, Taft went so far as to claim 
that an end to the U.S imperial presence in the islands would ‘drive out capital; 
prevent capital from coming there; and upon the investment of capital, the building of 
railroads, the enlargement of vision of the Filipino people much of our hope of 
progress must depend.’280 The United States was, after all, an economic power and 
therefore, if the Philippines were to develop in its image and not be exploited as they 
were by the Spanish, Taft believed that not only U.S.-style democracy and 
government had to be duplicated in the islands but so did a modern economic state. 
Taft was aware of the criticism that unchecked statements on U.S. capital investment 
might evoke in the United States, especially from the anti-imperialist camp. In a 
speech before the American Chamber of Commerce in late August 1902, which Taft 
could expect to be an audience friendly to his pro-economic development message, 
the Governor made clear that the U.S. was in the Philippines ‘to benefit the Filipinos 
and not for selfish exploitation.’ Nevertheless, having established this point, Taft went 
on to point out that ‘The investment of American capital, however, is an important 
factor, and the commission will support the businessmen.’281 In this way Taft 
attempted to bring together the theory of U.S. exceptionalism and U.S. investment in 
the Philippines: the U.S. was keen to be involved economically, but only so far as 
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The Other Yellow Peril 
 
Although most historians, referenced earlier in this chapter, discuss the issues 
surrounding U.S. economic development of the islands, such as tariff reform, very 
few touch upon the issue of Chinese immigration. Chinese immigration to the 
Philippines proved a troublesome issue for Taft throughout his years in the islands 
and beyond. The issue illustrates an important aspect of Taft’s attempt to draw the 
islands into a closer bond with the United States via economic development.  
Chinese immigration to the United States had only really become an issue by 
the mid-nineteenth century and the focus of the objections was centred in the Pacific 
states, where the large majority of the Chinese immigrants resided. Objections to the 
Chinese followed a familiar pattern to much of U.S. nativism: as well as racist 
objections, the Chinese represented economic competition and would accept lower 
pay. It is also worth noting, as historian Stuart Creighton Miller does, that ‘cultural 
anxiety over the admission of such a dissimilar migrant as the Chinese was not 
confined to any one section of the country.’282 By 1882 anti-immigration and anti-
Chinese sentiment led to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which prevented 
any immigration to the United States of skilled or unskilled Chinese labourers for a 
period of ten years.283 Historian Andrew Gyory suggests that traditional 
interpretations of the Chinese Exclusion Act, which argue that it came about as a 
result of pressure from workers, politicians and others from California, combined with 
a generally racist nineteenth-century atmosphere, do not paint the full picture. Instead, 
Gyory argues that the decisive factor was the role played by national politicians, who 
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were keen to attract the anti-Chinese vote, during a period of closely contested 
elections, in a state that was evenly divided in its party loyalties.284 In 1882 anti-
Chinese sentiment unified enough animosity among the U.S. population that it 
became a salient electoral issue, and it was not one that disappeared soon afterwards. 
During the debates over the annexation of Hawaii in the 1890s, the idea of the 
islands as a platform, or stepping-stone, for Chinese immigration to the U.S. mainland 
was a matter of real resonance to those opposed to annexation. As Eric Love suggests, 
the incorporation of the existing Chinese (as well as Japanese) communities in the 
islands, was seen as an impending danger to the United States.285 In 1898, when the 
annexation of Hawaii was finally achieved, Chinese exclusion was extended to the 
islands. The results of the Spanish-American War of the same year would bring the 
issue of Chinese exclusion to the islands of Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines. 
In 1902 and 1904 respectively, the Chinese Exclusion Act and immigration 
treaty were extended indefinitely.286 Anti-immigration forces won the day when 
indefinite extension became law with President Roosevelt’s signature on April 29, 
1902.287 The 1902 and 1904 measures included the Philippines and Puerto Rico 
within their terms, bringing Chinese exclusion to America’s new possessions. Like 
the issue of tariff extension to the insular possessions, the fear of unleashing a foreign 
threat to the mainland played an integral role in ensuring that exclusion was extended 
to the Philippines. This chapter analyses the debates over this extension of Chinese 
exclusion to cover the Philippines in the years leading up to and after 1902, and 
particularly Taft’s role in these debates. Taft’s involvement in these debates saw him 
caught between numerous interest groups and between his own ideals regarding 
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attraction and U.S. investment in the islands. In this way, the Chinese immigration 
issue highlights the difficulties Taft faced when trying to reconcile the policy of 
attraction with his longer-term imperial vision. 
Those books on U.S.-Filipino relations that do deal with Chinese immigration 
often do so to form a backdrop to explore other issues: Stuart C. Miller and Stanley 
Karnow, for example, both discuss the history of Sino-Philippine relations in a broad 
sense. Miller says that anti-Chinese sentiment had a ‘long history in the Philippines,’ 
which rose to become ‘violent Sinophobia’ by the late nineteenth century.288 Karnow 
adds that of all the races in the Philippines ‘the Chinese were the most potent 
economically,’ and he provides an outline of Chinese success in business within the 
islands during the Spanish colonial era.289 Antonio Tan’s 1972 work The Chinese in 
the Philippines, 1898-1935, looks more closely at the nature and development of 
Chinese society within the Philippines. Tan makes clear that the Chinese population 
in the Philippines at the end of the nineteenth century was comprised largely of ‘poor, 
illiterate peasants and coolies who came from Southeast Asia for economic reasons’ 
and who lived in a ‘hostile and insecure atmosphere.’290 The Filipino view of the 
Chinese seems therefore to depart somewhat from reality. The poor and illiterate 
Chinese in the islands, like many immigrant groups from across the globe, were seen 
as an economic threat by the “indigenous population” despite what appears to be their 
general poverty in the period that Tan investigates. The hostile anti-immigrant feeling 
towards the Chinese in the Philippines had more than a hint of the Californian 
situation to it, and this hostility from the general population was a big obstacle for 
Taft to overcome. 
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However, it is Tomas Fonacier’s 1949 article on the Chinese exclusion policy 
in the Philippines that is perhaps most pertinent to the issues addressed in this chapter. 
Fonacier details the attraction of the Philippines as a destination for Chinese labourers 
following the defeat of the Spanish in 1898, and with it the arrival of the Americans in 
the islands. Fonacier also relates the U.S. military’s decision to extend the policy of 
Chinese exclusion to the Philippines in September 1898 and the subsequent outcry 
from the Chinese Minister in Washington, Wu Ting Fang. Such diplomatic discontent 
drew a response from the U.S. State Department, which explained that the military’s 
present policy in the islands was not necessarily the settled policy of the United 
States.291 Although both Tan and Fonacier discuss Taft briefly, a more thorough 
analysis of the nature of the policy that he followed during this period is certainly 
required for a better understanding of the nature of Chinese immigration policy during 
the Taft Era in the Philippines, and also of the plans Taft had in mind for the 
continuing imperial relationship between the islands and United States. 
Although the military had excluded Chinese labour from the islands since 
1898, the issue of Chinese immigration to the islands had not been decided upon in 
Washington and therefore the Schurman and Taft Commissions looked into the issue 
for themselves. The Schurman Commission provided the following advice on the issue 
when their report was published in January of 1900: 
In the regions inhabited by the civilized natives sentiment toward the 
Chinese varies considerably in different provinces and islands. Where 
it is strongly hostile the Commission feels that we are bound to take it 
into serious consideration. And we further believe that the inhabitants 
of all parts of the Archipelago should be saved from the necessity of 
being forced to compete with Chinese labor under conditions such that 
they can not hope to compete with success, always provided that the 
legislative economic development of the country is not thereby 
retarded. 
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On the other hand, we feel Chinese labor might be very 
advantageously used in those portions of the Archipelago where, from 
the character of the inhabitants and their indisposition to engage in 
manual toil, or from the absence of inhabitants, and the well-known 
disinclination of the civilized native to leave his home and settle in a 
new region, it would not come into competition with the labor of the 
country. 
We therefore recommend to your careful consideration the 
question as to how, where, and for what purpose the Chinese should 
be allowed to enter the Archipelago.292 
  
 This report from the Schurman Commission introduces a number of the 
pressing issues that would be inherited by the Taft Commission when they arrived in 
the islands. Firstly, there was a marked degree of hostility towards Chinese 
immigrants from significant sections of the Filipino population. In this sense there was 
a similarity in the hostility from white Americans towards Chinese immigrants on the 
U.S. west coast. Secondly, the Schurman Commission held with the fairly widespread 
belief that the Filipinos were a race that was not inclined towards hard manual labour 
– this is perhaps a difference from the arguments made against the Chinese in the 
United States. The Chinese were widely regarded as suited to hard, low-paid work and 
had been feared as competitors for jobs in the western United States since the late 
nineteenth century.293 However, whereas in the United States the Chinese willingness 
to work for low pay made them competitive, in the Philippines, figures such as Taft 
saw this as an advantage given what he saw as the innate disinclination of the native 
Filipino workforce towards labour. These issues were left unresolved by the Schurman 
Commission’s final questions of how, where and why the Chinese should be allowed 
into the Philippines. Although Schurman’s commission had ascertained an obvious 
drawback to such a policy – namely the hostility of Filipinos towards Chinese labour – 
they had left open the question of further Chinese immigration, albeit on a selective 
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and restricted basis. Therefore, in terms of guidance for the Taft Commission in 1900, 
the Schurman recommendations suggested that the issue of Chinese immigration be 






Rather than encounter the issue of Chinese immigration on arrival in the 
Philippines, the issue actually accompanied Taft on his journey to the islands aboard 
the USS Hancock. Taft wrote to his brother, Charles, of his interest in acquiring 
Chinese servants for his role in the Philippines as early as May 1900 whilst en route to 
the islands from Japan. Taft already had preconceived ideas about Chinese as servants, 
telling his brother that employing Chinese would ‘greatly contribute to our comfort,’ 
concluding that, ‘A good Chinese cook and a good Chinese boy and a good Chinese 
laundryman are a thing of joy forever.’294 As mentioned, the passage of the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act (initially renewable every ten years) had seen the Chinese fall 
victim to the first large-scale race-based restriction on immigration to the United 
States. Taft, therefore, was fully aware that Chinese immigration was an issue that was 
temporarily settled in regards to the continental United States, and due for re-
evaluation in 1902. Nevertheless, Taft’s thoughts in this letter to his brother suggest 
that whereas Taft was aware of Chinese exclusion, he was also of the impression that 
members of the Chinese “race” were a great boon to those for whom they worked. 
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When Taft moved into the governor’s residence in Manila, he employed a 
number of Chinese servants in his household.295 Taft’s respect for Chinese servants 
seemed to come from the idea that they were reputed to be industrious, but his 
assumptions also caused him to attribute negative traits to the Chinese. In one letter 
Taft detailed a suspected robbery that caused him to carry out a ‘shaking up’ of his 
‘Chinese household.’296 Taft seemed resigned to accept that at least some of his 
Chinese servants involved in this incident were opium addicts who were determined 
to take financial advantage of, or in his word ‘squeeze,’ him.297 Despite such 
instances, Taft was determined to keep his Chinese serving staff, writing to Root on 
the matter in 1902 when the issue of extending Chinese exclusion to the Philippines 
was a matter of much discussion in the U.S.: ‘You will remember that in our 
interviews with you before the Commission came to the Islands at all, we asked you 
to give us permission to bring in Chinese servants and that permission was given. The 
time is now coming when the Chinese must be registered and it must appear that those 
who are registered are lawfully in the country.’298 In the same letter Taft went on to 
explain that he was unable to find a copy of this permit and asked if Root could 
certify this arrangement with the Collector of Customs making clear that Root had 
‘given authority for the Commission to bring into the Islands domestic servants for 
their own use: this will put upon a proper status the servants whom we now have and 
whom we had prior to the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act.’299 
Aside from such negatives, the positive attributes Taft recognised in his 
Chinese servants saw him and his family employ Chinese servants throughout their 
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time in the Philippines. In 1903, as the time approached for Taft’s departure from the 
islands, he wrote to Root in relation to a particular Chinese in his employ. The servant 
that Taft discussed in his letter was the brother of one of Admiral Dewey’s servants 
who had apparently been allowed to return with Dewey to the U.S. thanks to ‘special 
legislation.’300 Taft wrote to Root unhappily that his own Chinese servant had ‘been 
with me now since I have been in the Philippines and I would give a good deal if I 
could get him in too [to the U.S.], but I suppose I shall have to go back to the same old 
life and tie up my own shoes and arrange my own toilet, because eight thousand 
dollars does not permit any other course.’301 In this instance, Taft’s primary concerns 
seems to be the low cost of Chinese servants more than their efficiency, but the Taft 
family’s fondness for their Chinese servants is suggested elsewhere by the fact that 
Mrs. Taft saw to it that one of the Chinese servants who had worked for her and 
wanted to enlist in the U.S. army was given a position as a steward on a gunboat when 
their family left the islands.302 The factor of Taft’s Chinese servants illustrates that his 
ideas about Chinese and Chinese immigration were not simply U.S.-based stereotypes, 
but were influenced by personal contact with Chinese as servants, even if they 
remained prejudicial.  
The history of Chinese immigration to the Philippines before the involvement 
of the United States had been somewhat different. As Russell McCulloch Story stated 
in 1909, although the Chinese were ‘frequently expelled from the islands… the 
Chinese had been enjoying comparative freedom during the last fifty years of Spanish 
rule. The restrictions which were imposed did not constitute any real exclusion.’ In 
fact, as Story goes on to note, the number of Chinese in the Philippines had actually 
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‘increased at a wonderful rate’ during this time.303 However, as mentioned above, the 
U.S. military had chosen to extend exclusion to the Philippines during their time in 
charge of the islands and the Schurman Commission had recognised the hostility 
among Filipinos towards Chinese immigrants. As the former military governor, 
General MacArthur, told a Senate Committee in 1902, the Filipino ‘dislike’ for the 
Chinese was more a feeling ‘of shuddering, of dread,’ at their ‘indescribable… high 
qualities.’304 Whatever the reason, and this testimony will be explored in detail later in 
the chapter, one can safely assume that Taft was aware of this hostility towards 
Chinese immigration among Filipinos before he arrived in the islands. In October 
1900 Taft illustrated this awareness in a letter to Root, where he noted that: ‘The 
vicious natives of this city [Manila],- of whom there are many ,- seem to delight in 
murdering Chinamen and the crimes are difficult of detection.’305 For Taft a clear 
problem was evident from an early stage: if he desired Chinese immigration, he would 
face substantial opposition from a sizable section of the Filipino population. 
 In May 1901, Taft wrote a letter to Root that dealt with the issue of Chinese 
immigration in detail. Taft began by pointing out that:  
Nearly all the carpenter and stone work that is done here is done by 
Chinamen, and the exclusion of them from the Islands has raised the 
price of their labor to about double what it once was… The pressure 
of the mercantile community on us to allow the introduction of 
Chinamen is going to be greater and greater I can foresee. Every large 
enterprise that comes out there will enter upon work with great 
misgivings as to labor and will harass us for leave to bring in 
Chinamen and then to export them after the work is done.306 
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 In this short introduction to the issue Taft immediately focused on the 
economic results of excluding cheap Chinese artisans and labourers. As a result, the 
cost of labour had increased and U.S. and other commercial interests desired a re-
introduction of Chinese labour in order to lower costs. Taft followed up this neat 
cause and effect illustration by adding the idea that business interests would increase 
pressure to allow Chinese labour, and, importantly, such labour could potentially be 
short term in nature. Indeed, in line with many of Taft’s most seemingly contentious 
policies in the Philippines – such as the sedition laws and his unswerving patronage of 
elites –Taft was keen to stress that if Chinese workers were allowed into the 
Philippines, such a policy would be a short-term measure for the longer-term 
economic benefit of Filipinos. 
 In the same letter Taft went on to further analyse what he deemed to be the 
main cause of ill-feeling towards Chinese among Filipinos:  
The objection to the Chinese by the Filipinos is not to him as a laborer 
I think, but it is to him as a shopkeeper, peddler and merchant… he 
can drive everybody else out of the trading business. When he comes 
in as a laborer he saves money enough to enable him to open a small 
shop. He has a great deal more enterprise than the Filipino and has 
more variety in his goods... Whether a system might be adopted by 
which the Chinamen [sic] could be admitted as a laborer or skilled 
laborer under a license which should forbid his engaging in trade in 
such a way as to be a practical restraint, and still furnish labor, I do 
not know. I think that General MacArthur had some decided views on 
the subject, which rather reflected General Smith’s views as a 
Collector, holding that the importation of Chinese was a menace to the 
situation here. I doubt the correctness of the extreme view, but it is a 
subject to be handled with the greatest care and a question which we 
can postpone certainly until conditions are more settled.307 
 
 Despite his careful words, Taft did not appear convinced that continuation of 
the exclusionary policies that were already in place would be the best way forward for 
the issue of Chinese immigration in the islands. In Taft’s opinion one of the main 
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factors counting against Chinese immigration to the islands could be overcome by 
careful definition of the nature of such immigration. As Taft saw it, if the Chinese 
were to be allowed entry to the islands it must be on a short-term labouring-only 
basis. As a result, such a policy would satisfy the calls from the U.S. and European 
mercantile communities for cheap and efficient labour without importing a long-term 
racial antagonism or encouraging permanent settlement of Chinese in the islands. 
Nevertheless, Taft conceded in his letter, although he did not think Chinese 
immigration was a ‘menace’ to the Philippines, he did understand that perhaps the 
situation might have to wait until the Filipino-American guerrilla conflict had settled 
down.308 
 In a letter written in August of 1901, Taft’s tone had not changed much from 
the above letter, but his message seemed to have hardened somewhat on whether 
importation of labour from China would have to be the ultimate recourse at all, even 
if it were heavily restricted as he had earlier suggested. Taft claimed that tobacco 
companies, in particular, were ‘exceedingly anxious to have Chinese labor admitted, 
because they say that the natives will not labor though offered a peso a day, which is 
considered very high wages here.’309 In this case, Taft and business leaders alleged 
that the labour problem was of the Filipinos’ own making. The Filipinos apparently 
resented the Chinese because they were willing to work for low wages, the very same 
factors that caused U.S. and European businessmen to favour their importation.310  
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Taft explained the Filipinos’ unwillingness to work as not only a matter of 
costs, but partly due their inherent indolence as a race: ‘The lands are so rich and 
produce so much for so little work that the native, naturally lazy, finds he is able to 
support himself with very little labor; his wants are few, his love of idleness is great.’ 
Therefore, Taft concluded, the only solution to the supposed labour shortage that 
retarded the realisation of the islands’ great potential was for the Filipinos to 
overcome their propensity to idleness and fill the gap themselves, or find somebody 
else to fill it: ‘In the great works which are to be performed here it may be that it will 
be necessary to allow companies to bring in Chinamen under a bond to take them out 
when the work is accomplished, but until it is demonstrated that great works cannot 
be done without this we shall probably not recommend such a course.’ Taft finished 
his remarks on the subject by adding that he hoped for an influx of Americans who 
would teach the imitative Filipinos that things they ‘now regard as mere luxuries are 
equally necessities.’311 In this last sentiment Taft once again characterised the 
Filipinos as racially and environmentally conditioned to laziness, but rather than focus 
on this, he looked more hopefully to the imitative “traits” of the Filipino. Taft hoped 
that an injection of U.S. consumerism and capitalist culture would awaken the 
Filipinos to the need to work to acquire more, thus helping to solve the labour 
problem. Taft believed that the U.S. could not only teach the Filipinos to govern in an 
American style but even to become more consumerist and consequently more 
industrious; in this sense it would appear that Taft was willing to put a lot of faith in 
                                                                                                                                      
who felt themselves to be economically deprived in their own countries.’ This view was certainly 
something that figures such as Taft subscribed to, though it could well be said that such sentiments are 
commonly attributed to many immigrant groups throughout the world. See: Charles Coppel, “The 
Position of the Chinese in the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia,” pp. 16-29 in: Coppel, Mabbett and 
Coppel, The Chinese in Indonesia, the Philippines and Malaysia, 19. 
311 WHT to Root, August 25, 1901, ERP Box 167. 
 123 
the imitative qualities he attributed to the Filipinos to make the U.S.-Philippines 
imperial venture a successful one. 
 
The 1902 Congressional Committees  
 
As has previously been mentioned, during early 1902 Taft went before the 
Lodge Philippine Committee, which was primarily investigating allegations of U.S. 
military wrongdoing in the Philippines. Although not the primary focus of the 
hearings, Taft was questioned on the issue of Chinese immigration to the Philippines 
during his time before the committee, as was his predecessor as governor, General 
Arthur MacArthur. The reason for the hearings touching on the issue of Chinese 
exclusion was related to the year 1902 being the second occasion on which the 1882 
Chinese Exclusion Act was due for its ten-year re-evaluation, and therefore added an 
extra urgency to establishing a clear picture on how Philippine policy should relate to 
that of the mainland United States. 
 It is useful to look first at the testimony of General MacArthur on the issue of 
Chinese immigration to the islands, as it provides a comparison when moving on to 
look at the testimony of Taft himself. Senator Edward Carmack (D, TN) began his 
questioning of MacArthur on the issue of Chinese immigration by citing a report the 
general had written in 1901, which had concluded: ‘unmistakable indications are 
apparent of organized and systematized efforts to break down all barriers with a view 
to unrestricted Chinese immigration, for the purpose of quick and effective 
exploitation of the islands; a policy which would not only be ruinous to the Filipino 
people, but would in the end surely defeat the expansion of American trade to its 
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natural dimensions in what is obviously one of the most important channels.’312 When 
Carmack asked for clarifications on MacArthur’s statement, the general stated that 
Europeans and American mercantile communities based in Manila had demanded 
Chinese labour, regarding Filipinos as incapable. However, MacArthur suggested that 
the reason for native apathy to labour was partially due to Chinese immigration. In 
MacArthur’s view the Chinese were such ‘indefatigable laborers’ and would work so 
cheaply that the Filipino zeal for work was oppressed – a somewhat different view to 
that of Taft’s, as explored above. Despite MacArthur’s praise for the Chinese as ‘most 
admirable people,’ he had no qualms in making his position clear: he believed that 
Chinese exclusion should be continued and that any change in this policy would be a 
negative move for the Filipinos and only serve to continue the methods of the 
previous centuries where the native labourers were ignored.313 It appeared that 
MacArthur, although quick to praise the Chinese, saw any encouragement of Chinese 
immigration to the Philippines as a policy that was not in the interests of the United 
States, as it would allow what the general saw as pre-U.S. era labour problems in the 
islands to persist. 
During Taft’s extensive testimony before the Philippines Committee he was 
questioned on the matter of Chinese immigration on several occasions. Senator 
Eugene Hale (R, ME), an anti-imperialist Republican, started by asking Taft whether, 
in the course of increased expenditure on public works, such as his recommendations 
to expand the school infrastructure substantially, he felt that the admission of Chinese 
to the Philippines would become a ‘necessity.’314 Taft’s reply was suitably non-
committal – ‘that is what the contractors say’ – and he followed this by suggesting 
that the committee had most likely received a petition to this end from the Manila 
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Chamber of Commerce.315 From the outset, Taft, as he had in his letters to Root, 
aimed to make clear that Chinese immigration was not his policy, but rather the 
discussion of such a scheme was very much the preserve of the economic sector 
within the Philippines. However, it is also clear that Taft believed that there was 
something in the suggestions of the mercantile community in Manila. Such thoughts 
were strengthened by Taft’s belief that increasing investment and trade, and 
developing infrastructure, were important measures in his policy of attraction. 
 Senator Carmack asked Taft whether he personally believed it was necessary 
to ‘throw open the doors to Chinese immigration in order to secure a supply of 
efficient and helpful labor for the development of the country?’316 Taft’s initial 
response was that he hoped that this would not need to be the course of action in the 
Philippines. However, Taft added: ‘Pressure has been brought to bear upon the 
Commission to recommend such a policy. In certain parts of the archipelago the 
admission of Chinese labor without permission to trade, keeping him a laborer, and 
requiring those who bring him in to take him out again, may possibly aid… in the 
development of the islands like Mindanao, where the population is scarce.’317 In this 
answer there are two key areas of note. Firstly, Taft wanted to make clear that he felt 
pressured to consider the issue of Chinese immigration, one would assume at the 
hands of business interests. This appears to be an example of Taft’s indirect advocacy 
of the policy. By continually distancing himself from direct advocacy of Chinese 
immigration, but also raising the issue on numerous occasions, it certainly appears 
that Taft wished to covertly back Chinese immigration and shield himself from the 
Filipino backlash to such a policy. Secondly, Taft stressed the limited nature that such 
immigration might take and added that such immigration might be focused in areas of 
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low population, an idea echoing that of the Schurman Commission’s report. Indeed, 
Filipino politician Felipe Buencamino had also suggested the population factor as the 
primary supportive consideration when assessing the matter of Chinese immigration. 
In an interview with a U.S. congressman in October of 1901, Buencamino had 
suggested that Chinese should be admitted: ‘The reason for that is because we have 
only twenty-two inhabitants to each square kilometer… There is no race in the world 
that fulfills the precept of God as to multiplying and growing like the Chinese. The 
Philippines need at least two hundred inhabitants to the square kilometer.’318 This 
idea, that Chinese immigration might be strategically targeted to islands with low 
populations, was evidently something which proponents of Chinese immigration were 
keen to stress. By the logic of this theory, not only would targeting Chinese 
immigration to scarcely inhabited islands help develop untouched areas of the 
archipelago, but it would also keep the Chinese away from the Filipinos themselves.  
The next key theme to Taft’s testimony revolved around his advocating the 
notion that, given time, Filipino labour would reach a level of self-sufficiency. Taft 
then proceeded to give some rather speculative reasons for hope in turning around the 
supposed indolence of Filipino labour. Taft’s first line of reckoning claimed that years 
of war had caused suspension of industry and that this in turn led to the Filipino 
labourer losing the ‘habit’ of industry, which one assumes could be regained now 
peace was being restored. Taft also thought that when contractors ‘understand the 
Filipino character better and arrange the hours and methods of labor to suit the views 
of the laborer when it will not interfere with their efficiency, they may be able to 
secure better results.’319 This latter theory was, Taft suggested, based on the evidence 
of differing results achieved by various U.S. military officers and civilian employers. 
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Following this understanding of labour relations, Taft believed that good management 
was the key to unlocking the true potential of Filipino labour, and that once this was 
achieved the Filipino would be able to provide the necessary labour to fill the 
requirements of the mercantile community in Manila. At another point in the hearing, 
Taft stressed the efforts being made by the commission to begin training Filipinos so 
that they would be able to provide the skilled labour that was lacking by adopting 
‘appropriations for the establishment of [industrial] training schools.’320 As was 
suggested to some extent in his letters to Root, Taft’s testimony again reaffirmed the 
idea that Taft viewed Chinese immigration as a possible occurrence that should only 
be a stop-gap solution until a sustainable labour system in the Philippines had been 
established. In this case too, Taft’s belief in education came to the fore. Where Taft 
believed in primary and political education to raise the Filipino to the standard 
required for increased self-government, he also held that Filipino labour could be 
educated to become more self-sustaining.  
Senator Carmack did not leave the issue of Chinese immigration at how it 
might come about, but instead touched on one crucial aspect of the imperial debate 
that related to such immigration. The senator asked Taft: ‘Is it not true that one of the 
great obstacles to the pacification of the islands has been, and is, the fear of bringing 
Chinese labor to the country, and the fear of sudden and excessive exploitation, and 
the belief that the United States want the islands purely for purposes of such 
exploitation?’321 What was clear from this question, and what Taft himself had to 
admit, was that many of the resistance fighters in the Philippines – along with many 
in the U.S. (both supporters and critics) – did believe in an association of U.S. 
imperialism with economic exploitation. If Taft was to press, albeit apparently 
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grudgingly, for limited Chinese immigration to the Philippines against the will of the 
Filipinos, not only would he be undermining the policy of attraction’s theme of the 
“Philippines for the Filipinos” but he would also be making an unpopular decision 
clearly associated with U.S. economic interests. To allow Chinese immigration, 
therefore, would prove much more difficult for Taft to sell to the Filipinos as 
primarily for their benefit, when most of the figures pressing for such immigration 
were foreign trade and business interests in Manila and not the Filipinos themselves.  
Senator Carmack went on to point out that General MacArthur himself had 
suggested that ‘one of the greatest difficulties attending military efforts to tranquilize 
the people of the archipelago arises from their dread of sudden and excessive 
exploitation which they fear would defraud them of their natural patrimony and at the 
same time relegate them to a status of social and political inferiority.’ Taft avoided 
conceding this point outright, responding instead that this was the danger of 
exploitation if it occurred ‘too soon.’322 Nevertheless, the Senate hearing had made it 
clear that if there were to be Chinese immigration to the Philippines, the perception of 
the motivations for such a policy would have to change rather dramatically. If Taft 
wished to encourage U.S. investment on a longer-term basis, tying the U.S. to the 
Philippines economically, it would need to be done in a manner that appeared to 
benefit the Filipinos; otherwise Taft’s policy of attraction might be fatally undermined 
by accusations of economic exploitation. 
 While Taft was still in Washington D.C. for his hearing before the Philippine 
Committee, he also gave testimony on the issue of Chinese immigration to the 
Committee on Immigration on March 5, 1902.323 In a similar vein to his testimony 
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before the Philippine Committee, Taft reiterated his key problem. The Philippine 
Commission had, Taft explained, in ‘casual discussion’ expressed the opinion that 
Chinese immigration ought ‘not to be allowed,’ and this reflected Filipino feelings 
that were ‘very much opposed to the general admission of Chinese.’ Taft’s initial 
conclusion was that this situation had ‘a political bearing which, if general Chinese 
immigration be made possible, would give us a great deal of trouble.’324 If anything, 
Taft’s remarks here only made clearer that the issue was a political dilemma that the 
Philippine Commission would have preferred not to have to deal with. However, 
despite the fact that both the commission and the Filipino population appeared not to 
favour Chinese immigration, Taft went on to lay out a policy towards immigration 
that seemed somewhat beyond the status quo.   
When looking at the manner of Taft’s testimony before this committee, one 
important factor that he considered was the capacity of the U.S. to police any form of 
immigration policy in the Philippines. Taft felt that even if exclusion were to be the 
chosen policy for the Philippines it would prove difficult to enforce. Senator Lodge 
asked Taft what he thought of the probability of Chinese exclusion being a workable 
policy. Taft’s response, in line with the fact that Chinese immigration had not ceased 
entirely during the prior period of U.S. military and civil rule, despite exclusion being 
in place, suggested that he felt that exclusion was unlikely to be entirely enforceable. 
Taft told Lodge: ‘Of course the Chinaman is the greatest smuggler in the world, and 
his capacity for counterfeiting identity, with our lack of power to distinguish one from 
the other… Gives him an advantage in that respect.’325 Despite the racial overtones of 
Taft’s reasoning on the difficulty of enforcing immigration restriction, it would not be 
difficult to assume that in a nation made up of over seven thousand islands located a 
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great distance from the United States, policing immigration was a task that would 
certainly prove challenging. Overall, Taft seemed to concede that exclusion would be 
somewhat ineffective and unworkable in reality, even if the flow of Chinese to the 
islands would be slower with exclusion in place than without.  
As with his testimony before the Philippine Committee, the main discussion 
on immigration focused around whether Chinese immigration policy in the 
Philippines should be the same as it was for the U.S. mainland. What remained to be 
seen was whether the misgivings of the civil commission and the Filipino population 
would give way to the interests of business when Taft came to recommending action 
on Chinese immigration before the committee. Taft told the Committee on 
Immigration: 
 Now, it seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that the best way for Congress to 
meet this problem is to establish its policy with respect to the United 
States, and then to treat the Philippine Islands, so far as concerns the 
introduction of Chinese into the United States, as if it were a foreign 
country, and that then the Commission or the legislative body of the 
islands be given some power and authority in its discretion to admit 
skilled labor, with provision for its return within such time as the 
Commission may determine.326 
 
Taft’s statement in this instance appears to give a much clearer indication of 
the way he was starting to think about at least the short-term policy of allowing 
Chinese immigration to the Philippines. Admittedly, in his previous statements before 
the Philippine Committee and in letters to Root, the idea of highly conditional 
immigration, with some sort of guarantee of the immigration being purpose limited 
and time limited, had been touted. However, what differed in this instance was that 
Taft set out a method for how Chinese immigration policy in the Philippines might 
differ from that of the continental United States. Taft suggested that the Philippines 
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might not be included in the mainland provisions of the Chinese Exclusion Act, but 
rather control of Chinese immigration to the Philippines could be transferred to 
himself and the commission. Ultimately, what Taft was suggesting was that the 
immigration policy of the Philippines be left flexible under his oversight, despite his 
earlier suggestions that Chinese immigration was a thorny issue and something the 
Filipino population appeared to feel strongly against. In this sense, Taft’s mind 
appeared to be anything but set against Chinese immigration, differing from what he 
had suggested in most of his previous comments on the subject. The need for public 
works projects that were integral to the policy of attraction, such as school and road 
building, as well as the calls of the foreign mercantile community in Manila, meant 
that Chinese immigration was something that Taft was not going to resist outright. 
 
The 1902 Congressional Debate on Chinese Exclusion 
 
 Although Taft gave the Committee on Immigration a good deal of information 
regarding his thoughts on Chinese immigration in the Philippines, the question of 
whether he was to establish control of immigration policy in the islands was out of his 
hands. The Congressional Record from 1902 is replete with discussion of Chinese 
immigration, and the issue of this matter in relation to the Philippines was not 
overlooked. On April 4, 1902 the new Chinese Exclusion Bill was discussed before a 
Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union. Representative James B. 
Perkins (R, NY) set out the main provisions of this bill, which were pertinent to the 
Philippine situation. Perkins suggested that the annexation of the Philippines posed the 
United States two problems in relation to Chinese immigration. Perkins argued that the 
first of these problems concerned the ‘at least 250,000’ Chinese who were already 
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resident in the Philippines. Perkins then went on to remind those present that Governor 
Taft had suggested before the committee that ‘the great majority of the Chinese in the 
Philippine Islands would gladly come to the United States if they could have the 
opportunity.’ The problem, therefore, was not so much that there were already Chinese 
in the islands, but that they might travel to the United States, and thus the bill set out 
that: ‘the exclusion of the Chinese against those living in China should be extended to 
the Chinese who live in the colonial possessions of the United States, and the act 
provides that Chinese laborers, Chinese coolies, can not come from the colonial 
possessions to the mainland any more than they can come from China to the United 
States.’ This provision, Perkins confidently believed, was unlikely to meet with much 
opposition; in this instance the Philippines Islands were to be treated as if they were a 
foreign country. However, this first issue was much less controversial than the second 
of Perkins’ problems: ‘Should the exclusion of the Chinese be extended to the colonial 
possessions?’327 
In relation to the immigration of Chinese to the Philippines, Perkins prefaced 
his remarks by noting that the conditions in the Philippines were different from those 
in the United States. Perkins related the following outline of the findings of the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs: 
 There is in the Philippine Islands, for instance, no body of educated, 
industrious, intelligent laborers, and the question was, What is the best 
thing for the interests of the Philippine Islands?… The committee was 
convinced that the desire of the Filipinos themselves was that they 
should not be subjected to the further competition of Chinese labor; 
that they were not ready to compete with them, and certainly they are 
not, and for that reason the committee has reported, by the bill before 
this Committee of the Whole, that Chinese laborers be excluded from 
the colonial possessions of the United States upon the same terms and 
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Representative Perkins from the Committee on Foreign Affairs on March 26, 1902, to replace the 
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in the same manner that they are excluded from the mainland of the 
United States.328  
 
These findings seem quite unambiguous; in the eyes of this particular 
committee Chinese immigration would not be permitted to the Philippines, and 
further, the Philippines should be treated – in this respect – just like the United States. 
What is also noteworthy is the use of the phrase ‘colonial possessions’ by the 
committee, giving credence to the idea of the Philippines as a distinctly imperial 
possession. Given Taft’s suggestion of control over Chinese immigration to the islands 
being given to the Philippine Committee, and for the Philippines not to be treated like 
the United States in this respect, Perkins’ subsequent remarks can be viewed with 
some surprise: ‘Governor Taft, the head of that [the Philippine] Commission, appeared 
before the Committee on Foreign Affairs and gave his evidence. He is in thorough 
sympathy with the exclusion of the Chinese. What he said before the committee had, I 
think, more effect than what was said by anyone else in leading the committee to the 
conclusion that the exclusion of the Chinese from the Philippine Islands was 
judicious.’329 In this situation, what seems evident is that Perkins was seeking to 
impose his own views upon those of Taft’s and add the aura of Taft’s position and 
experience in the Philippines to his viewpoint. There is no sense that Taft ever gave 
such a clear-cut view on Chinese exclusion, as has been discussed at length already. 
 When considering Taft’s testimony before the Philippine Committee and the 
Committee on Immigration, in addition to the testimony Perkins cites from the Foreign 
Affairs Committee, it would appear that Taft’s view on what was the best policy in 
regard to Chinese immigration to the Philippines was not as clear as Perkins wanted it 
to seem. If Taft had convinced Perkins and the Foreign Affairs Committee that total 
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exclusion was best for the Philippines, and that it was his testimony that was most 
influential in leading Perkins to be assured of the judiciousness of exclusion, then 
perhaps his testimonies had been so non-committal as to baffle everybody involved as 
to his opinion on what was the best next step. If Taft believed so certainly in the total 
exclusion policy, then one might wonder just why he had proposed to the Committee 
on Immigration that a potentially flexible policy might be implemented under the 
control of the Philippine Commission. Just as with the controversial issue of 
Philippine independence, Taft had suggested one policy relatively firmly, but left his 
opinions vague enough to allow for a change in direction. However, in the case of 
Chinese immigration, Taft’s seeming ambiguity when it came to a clear-cut statement 
on future policy had failed to be vague enough and in this case Congress looked 
prepared to take charge of making a clear-cut decision based, apparently, on Taft’s 
very own advice. 
 The issue of Chinese exclusion from the Philippines was not as unanimously 
approved of as Chinese exclusion from the mainland, regardless of Perkins’ 
affirmations of the popularity of such a policy. As the congressional debate continued 
over the following days and weeks, various Congressmen highlighted the wider 
complications of extending the Chinese exclusion policy to the islands. 
Representative Ebenezer Hill (R, NY) suggested that Chinese exclusion from the 
Philippines would not only bring ‘embarrassments from a commercial point of view,’ 
but added that ‘the people in the Philippines are, as I have said, absolutely dependent 
upon the Chinese mainland for even the food they eat.’330 The same day a fellow New 
York Congressman, William Harris Douglas (R, NY) stressed the difference between 
the case of the U.S. mainland and the islands, by noting that the Philippines were 
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‘nearly 10,000 miles from our shores’ and much closer to China, meaning that 
Chinese exclusion was not a simple solution to the immigration issue in the 
Philippines. Douglas went on to suggest the following action, which had marked 
similarities to Taft’s suggestions to the Committee on Immigration: 
The Chinese have been there [in the Philippines] in force for hundreds 
of years, and it does seem almost unnecessary, so far as the Philippine 
Islands are concerned, to enforce this law as we propose to make it. It 
seems to me unnecessary to make it absolutely mandatory on the 
Philippine Commission to do so in order to protect the United States. I 
believe that we could with wisdom allow these men to have some say 
as to the provisions of this act and as to the extent to which it shall be 
enforced here… I believe and hope that the gentlemen who are 
pushing this measure will be sufficiently liberal at least to allow the 
Philippine Commission to use discretion, and not do an absolute 
injustice to the Chinese to the extent of excluding them from places 
where they have been since before this country was practically ever 
heard of, when Western civilization was unknown and Eastern 
civilization was at its height.331 
 
 This last point was a direct criticism of the idea of the U.S. exclusion policy 
being haphazardly enforced upon a foreign land with such distinct and separate 
historical and cultural links to China. Douglas was not alone in accepting that the 
Philippines had every reason to be treated differently in this area of policy; the islands 
were geographically, economically and historically closer to China than they were to 
the United States. Essentially, Douglas’s point was that the United States would be 
wrong to impose Chinese exclusion on a region where Chinese immigration had taken 
place for years before the United States had ever been interested or involved in such a 
process. Hill had also echoed the sentiments Taft had expressed before the Committee 
on Immigration: that the Philippines might be best served by allowing the Philippine 
Commission direct ‘discretion’ on Chinese immigration in relation to the Philippine 
Islands. Representative Julius Kahn (R, CA) rejected such ideas, making clear that he 
hoped that such amendments to the bill before them would be rejected, and that the 
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best course was for the ‘existing conditions’ (exclusion) in the Philippines to be 
continued.332  
 One final part of the Congressional debate on the bill relating to the issue of 
Chinese immigration to the Philippines came in the Senate on April 28, 1902.333 
Senator Alexander Clay (D, GA) allayed the fears of Senator Henry Moore Teller (D, 
CO) that the Philippine Commission would not be given leave to ‘open the door to the 
admission of Chinese laborers,’ making clear that instead the Commission would only 
have power ‘to regulate the mode of ascertaining the number of Chinamen in the 
Philippine Islands.’334 As Senator Patterson added, the Commission would also have 
the ‘duty of enforcing the exclusion provisions’ in the Philippines, but have no say in 
controlling the provisions.335 President Roosevelt signed the final bill, with these 
above provisions included, on April 29, 1902.336 
The Congressional debate had raised a number of issues that suggested why 
the policy of Chinese exclusion in the Philippines should be treated differently from 
the policy in relation to the United States mainland. The only influence the Philippine 
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Commission were to gain was responsibility for the implementation of full exclusion 
of further Chinese immigration, and responsibility for deporting any already resident 
Chinese who were unable to acquire appropriate evidence that they should be allowed 
to remain in the islands. One might assume that these were rather onerous duties that 
nobody was keen to take on. Taft’s apparent ambiguity on the question of the role that 
the Philippine Commission should play in Chinese exclusion had ultimately landed 
him additional responsibility and administrative duties, but no actual power to 




The Immigration Debate Continues 
 
 On April 29, 1902, Chinese exclusion in the Philippines was officially 
synthesised with the legislation that was relevant to the mainland United States and its 
other possessions. However, for Governor Taft, this was apparently not the end of the 
debate. Despite the fact that Representative Perkins had cited Taft’s testimony before 
committee as evidence of the judiciousness of extending Chinese exclusion to the 
Philippines, Taft himself decided to keep the debate alive even after the renewal of 
the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1902, which included the Philippines specifically within 
its jurisdiction.  
On May 6, 1902, just over a week after the exclusion law had been extended 
to the Philippines, Commissioner Luke E. Wright cabled Secretary of War Root with 
advice supporting reconsideration of such an extension. Wright informed him of the 
conclusions of an economics-focused investigation undertaken by Professor Jeremiah 
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W. Jenks in northern India, Burma, the Federated Malay States, the Straits Settlement, 
Sumatra and Java.337 Wright’s cable concluded that Jenks’ various findings ‘all 
indicate clearly that foreign labor preferably Chinese possibly East Indian should be 
admitted to the Philippine Islands under careful restriction(s). Exclusion from the 
United States wise but investigation makes clear that if Chinese admitted to 
Philippine Islands under restriction(s) it would benefit immeasurably both Americans 
and Filipinos.’338 This advice gives a different complexion to the debate in favour of 
Chinese admission. In Taft’s testimony before the various committees he had 
consistently stressed that he thought Chinese admission was generally not the 
favoured option and that it was Philippines-based business interests who were 
pressing for such a policy. Professor Jenks offered further, and less self-serving, 
support for the admission of Chinese labour. Jenks’s experiences in other imperial 
possessions in South East Asia, notably the British and Dutch colonies there, 
suggested that conditional Chinese immigration was undoubtedly beneficial for all 
concerned, and that other colonies offered evidence that such a policy could be 
successful. The idea that a model for such a scheme had already been tested elsewhere 
was something that might be expected to play well with those who doubted the 
“theoretical” benefits of Chinese immigration touted by business interests in the 
Philippines. 
By September 2, 1902, during a speech to the board of trade in Manila, many 
of whom were, of course, in sympathy with repealing Chinese exclusion legislation, 
the Washington Post reported that Taft had suggested ‘that the act extending the 
Chinese exclusion law to the Philippines be amended.’ The article went on to state 
that Taft seemed to be reiterating the same message of “flexibility” that he had 
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expressed before the Committee on Immigration: ‘It is contemplated to remove the 
iron-clad restriction which now exists and clothe the Philippine Commission with the 
power to regulate the entrance of Chinese labor.’ These plans entailed what the Post 
described as ‘a wisely regulated system of admissions’ of Chinese as laborers under 
‘sufficient bonds… under proper systems of identification, and a condition that they 
leave the Philippines after a certain specified period in time.’ Finally, the Post 
included a note that such recommendations from Taft were in answer to ‘pressing 
demands’ from American business interests in the islands to aid the ‘development’ of 
the Philippines.339 Here, just over four months since Congress and the president had 
agreed to extend Chinese exclusion to the Philippines, Taft appeared to be urging – 
somewhat more publicly and persistently than before – that some form of limited 
immigration should in fact be allowed. 
 Despite such suggestions that Taft was moving towards promoting an 
amendment to the Chinese exclusion policy in the Philippines specifically, Taft’s 
correspondence at the time still suggested he had reservations about the necessity and 
wisdom of Chinese immigration. In October of 1902 Taft wrote to Root regarding a 
group of merchants in the Philippines who were planning to send a representative to 
Washington to urge modification of the Chinese Exclusion Act ‘so as to admit coolies 
under some restriction.’ Taft warned Root that he did not think that the merchants 
were motivated simply by the desire for ‘cheap labor.’340 Taft reiterated earlier 
suggestions that there might be a case to be made for conditional admission of bonded 
skilled labourers, but felt unskilled labour was not in desperate shortage. Taft 
appeared to be at loggerheads with business interests and, in this instance, openly 
questioned their motivation for advocating Chinese immigration. However, rather 
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than state that he was firmly against the policy of allowing Chinese immigration and 
embrace the existing exclusion legislation, Taft appeared determined to leave the 
window open for negotiation on the issue. 
 On December 4, 1902 the Los Angeles Times reported on a speech that 
favoured Chinese immigration given by Brewster Cameron, an American 
representative of the Chamber of Commerce in Manila, which had been made on 
Taft’s return to the islands (following his trip to the Vatican).341 According to 
Cameron: ‘If the commission had one year ago been given the power to admit skilled 
Chinese labor, there would ‘now’ be in course of construction here a practical manual 
training school for 4000 Filipinos, who were to receive wages while serving as 
apprentices to 6000 Chinese artisans…The 6000 Chinese artizans were to leave these 
islands at the end of five years, by which time the apprenticed Filipinos could have 
taken their places.’ Cameron had gone on to suggest the Philippine Commission 
should not only be given leave to permit immigration of Chinese skilled workers, but 
they should also be given the power to admit Chinese coolies for the ‘building of 
railroads or other enterprises of great magnitude, that must be completed in less time 
than Filipino labor can be found to do the work.’342 In this speech, at the specific 
request of business interests in the Philippines, Cameron not only echoed the request 
that Taft had begun to accept in relation to conditional immigration of artisans, but in 
addition, Cameron included the somewhat more contentious issue of the immigration 
of Chinese coolies. What this speech, unsurprisingly, reveals is that business interests 
in the Philippines were evidently keen to keep the debate on Chinese immigration 
alive, and that, in line with Taft’s remarks in favour of some limited and conditional 
immigration, politicians and those in positions of influence might be open to re-
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evaluating the situation. By the time Taft left the islands at the end of 1903, the issue 
had been legally resolved and lay outside of the commission’s and Taft’s hands. 
Despite this, Taft continued to become involved in debates on the issue of Chinese 
immigration to the archipelago. Taft’s desire to develop the islands’ infrastructure and 
stimulate long-term U.S. investment in such projects, as part of the wider policy of 
attraction and his desire to create a lasting imperial union, made the immigration issue 
far more problematic for him personally than might have otherwise been the case. 
 
The Chinese Reaction 
 
 Although the scope of this chapter mainly deals with Chinese immigration to 
the Philippines, there is inevitably some overlap in relation to wider immigration 
issues involving Taft during his tenure as Secretary of War (1904-1908). Chapter 
Four of this thesis looks at Taft’s diplomatic role in the immigration debates with 
Japan with regard to the United States mainland, rather than the Philippines. 
Therefore, in the remainder of this chapter the subject of Taft’s role in relation to 
immigration will be restricted to the Philippines as far as possible, thus avoiding 
repetition – but also to allow for direct and relevant comparisons with his policy on 
Chinese immigration to the Philippines during his tenure as civil governor. 
  Although the issue of Chinese immigration rose to the fore in U.S. foreign 
relations again during Taft’s time as Secretary of War, the issue of Chinese 
immigration to the Philippines was subsumed into the greater issue from an American 
point of view. President Roosevelt’s second term saw a number of exclusion related 
problems for Sino-American relations including: the Chinese exclusionary movement; 
the Chinese boycott of 1905-1906; an attack on the American mission in Lienchou; 
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and Chinese criticisms of the American China Development Company. 343 However, 
coupling the Chinese exclusion policy in the Philippines with exclusion policy of the 
mainland United States was anther bone of contention in Sino-American relations, as 
it was an issue which Chinese diplomats and officials during the period did not view 
at all favourably. On June 28, 1905 the New York Times reported that the ‘question of 
Chinese exclusion from the United States continues chiefly to occupy the attention of 
the Chinese. The extent and depth of feeling manifested astonish foreigners, and are 
regarded as an evidence of the growth of a national sentiment and public spirit which 
five years ago would have been inconceivable.’ This short extract the Times reflected 
how many commentators regarded the situation at the time. By 1905 the issue of 
Chinese immigration seemed, outside of California at least, to be an issue that largely 
consumed the Chinese rather than the American government. In the view of the Times 
the ‘chief obstacle’ in the settlement of the Chinese immigration debate from the 
Chinese viewpoint was ‘the question of exclusion of coolies from Hawaii and the 
Philippines,’ especially as Chinese immigration had ‘long been established in the 
Philippines.’344 Despite the passage of the 1902 exclusion legislation that had 
incorporated the Philippines within a general Chinese exclusion policy for the United 
States and its territories (incorporated or otherwise), the debate from a Chinese point 
of view was far from settled, the Philippines being one area in particular where the 
Chinese considered there was still some room for manoeuvre.   
 In August 1905 the Chicago Tribune reported that Wu Ting Fang, vice-
president of the Chinese board of foreign affairs and former Chinese minister to the 
United States, had called for the admission of Chinese labourers to Hawaii and the 
Philippines ‘without restrictions.’ The Tribune also reported Wu’s disappointment at 
                                                
343 See: Michael R. Riccards, The Presidency and the Middle Kingdom, 55. 
344 New York Times, June 28, 1905. 
 143 
the 1902 extension of Chinese exclusion to include the Philippine islands: ‘The 
Philippines, he said, had long been a natural field for Chinese industry, but the 
application of the exclusion act to the islands had changed this. Regarding the 
desirability of Chinese labor in the far east Wu instanced the prosperity of Singapore, 
in the Straits Settlements, and the adjacent country.’345 Once again the stress that the 
newspaper made was upon what Wu had said regarding the Philippines: that the 
Philippines was different from the mainland United States and should not be treated 
similarly. Both the Times and Tribune articles cited the argument that the Philippines 
had a “history” of Chinese immigration, and one must assume that this was supposed 
to far exceed in importance the “history” of Chinese immigration to the United States, 
which was far from a sudden modern occurrence. In addition to this Wu had 
suggested, much like Jenks in 1902, the positive potential of Chinese immigration and 
provided examples of various other South East Asian colonies as evidence of this. By 
October 8, 1905 a letter written by Wu was paraphrased in the Washington Post 
suggesting that Wu desired ‘new treaties [which] should provide that the Philippines 
and Hawaii should be excepted from the operation of the Chinese exclusion laws… 
The Philippines are at the door of China, and the “discriminating and humiliating 
exclusion laws” were extended to those islands “without the consent and under the 
strong protest of the Chinese government.”’346 This letter was a more strongly worded 
indication of Chinese unhappiness with the status quo of Chinese exclusion in the 
Philippines. In this case Wu added to historical immigration the issue of geographical 
proximity, but more notably Wu strongly decried U.S. policy on the issue calling the 
exclusion of Chinese from the Philippines ‘humiliating’ and he stressed the fact that 
China’s protests had gone ignored by U.S. policymakers.  
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 Seemingly the Chinese authorities, although generally unhappy about the U.S. 
policy of Chinese exclusion, felt that unlike mainland immigration, insular 
immigration was an area where diplomatic pressure might have some reasonable 
likelihood of success. The issue of Chinese immigration to the Philippines was to 
remain at the very centre of the debates over Chinese exclusion in general, but the 
reasons for reconsideration were issues that Taft and others had raised before and 
during the debate on exclusion in 1902. Although no new evidence had surfaced, the 
issue of Chinese immigration was kept alive by business interests in the Philippines, 
as Taft had often remarked, and also by Chinese diplomatic figures regarding the 




 In terms of tariff revision, Taft was keen to establish free trade so as to 
encourage investment and forge closer economic bonds between the U.S. and the 
Philippines. However, in this instance, though there was some reduction in the tariff, 
Taft was going against the flow of much political uncertainty over such a policy in the 
United States. Taft appeared to be somewhat overlooking the divisions that had 
plagued the tariff debate over Puerto Rico in 1900, when some anti-imperialists had 
seized on the issue to argue for full constitutional rights for the inhabitants of the U.S. 
insular possessions. With many of the Insular Cases still to be passed during the years 
1901-1905, the status of an “unincorporated territory” was still in flux, and perhaps 
the timing was not right for such a bold move in tariff revision.  
  Similarly, in the case of Chinese immigration, Taft’s ambiguity was not 
effective enough to allow for the situation to remain unresolved, given the difficult 
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domestic and diplomatic climate, and consequently the Chinese were excluded from 
the islands in 1902. Taft’s policy towards Chinese immigration in the islands was 
ultimately a failure, but it serves as a useful example of his aim to tie the Philippines 
closely to the United States in order to forge a permanent relationship between them. 
This aim led Taft to become involved in an issue that was never going to bring him 
any personal political advantage or satisfy every group that he wished to placate, 
especially the Filipinos themselves. However, here Taft again seemed to overlook the 
wider picture, especially in regard to domestic U.S. opposition to such a policy. Both 
the tariff and the Chinese immigration issues reveal Taft’s aims to bind the two 
nations together economically, in line with his imperial vision, but also illustrate the 




































On September 5, 1907, William Jennings Bryan, known widely as “The Great 
Commoner,” coined a new nickname for Secretary of War Taft. In a speech before an 
audience of fellow Democrats in Oklahoma City, Bryan was discussing Taft’s 
suggestion that Oklahoma reject their proposed constitution and ‘postpone 
Statehood.’ The Commoner suggested that this was symptomatic of Taft’s policies in 
general: ‘Taft is inclined to postpone everything. He promises to acquire the title of 
the Great Postponer.’ Although the name did not catch on, Bryan did make an 
interesting point. Despite Bryan’s focus upon Oklahoma’s constitutional status, he did 
not fail to extend this theme of “postponement” to the equally debated status of the 
Philippine Islands, a subject on which he had always been a notable anti-imperialist. 
As Bryan was making his speech in Oklahoma City, Taft was on his way back to 
Manila to preside over the opening of the new Philippine Assembly, a keystone event 
in his continued policy of attraction. Bryan, ever the orator, described the analogy 
thus: ‘[Taft] is on his way to the Philippines to tell the Filipinos that, while he thinks 
they ought to have self-government after a while, he wants it postponed for the 
present. It is not strange, therefore, that he should yield to his ruling spirit in the 
matter of statehood and tell you to put it off.’347 
 Having left the Philippines at President Roosevelt’s request to take up the 
position of Secretary of War in December of 1903, Taft had been widely lauded for 
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his work in establishing a stable civil government in the islands. One of Taft’s given 
reasons for accepting this cabinet position, ahead of the offers of the Supreme Court 
associate justiceships offered him, was that as Secretary of War he would be able to 
keep close tabs on the situation in the Philippines.348 Historian Rene Escalante, who 
argues that Taft’s role in the U.S.-Philippine experiment was restricted to his tenure as 
civil governor, concedes that Taft himself saw the move as allowing him to remain ‘in 
charge of Philippines affairs.’349 Escalante also notes that other motivating factors for 
Taft’s move include concerns over his health – that had caused him to return 
temporarily to the United States in 1902 – and the fact that such a move would have 
been regarded as a promotion, despite the actual reduction in Taft’s wages.350 The 
Bureau of Insular Affairs, described by historian Romeo V. Cruz as ‘America’s 
colonial desk,’ administered the United States’ insular possessions and, as a division 
of the War Department, was under the direct charge of the Secretary of War.351 
Therefore, Taft, in his new role, had even more power over Philippine policy than he 
had had as civil governor, although his influence would be diluted somewhat as he 
was responsible for numerous other matters in the ever-growing field of U.S. foreign 
affairs.  
This chapter will explore how Taft’s policy towards the Philippines, though 
overshadowed by the many diplomatic missions Roosevelt assigned him during his 
tenure at the War Department, continued to develop during his time as Secretary of 
War. Ralph Eldin Minger’s book William Howard Taft and United States Foreign 
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Policy: The Apprenticeship Years (1975) and Joseph M. Rowe’s PhD thesis (1977), 
both analyse Taft’s role as Secretary of War on a case-by-case basis following all of 
Taft’s diplomatic postings during this era.352 Where these works attempt to explore 
the numerous diplomatic missions that Taft undertook during his time as Secretary of 
War, this chapter focuses instead on the continuing importance of the Philippine issue 
to Taft. Following on from the previous chapter, which highlighted the influence of 
Taft’s plans for a continued imperial bond with the Philippines and how he 
approached relations with China and Chinese immigrants, this chapter looks at how 
the Philippine question influenced Taft’s conduct in diplomatic affairs with Japan 
during this period. From being concerned solely with Philippine policy from 1900 to 
1903, Taft was thrust into the world of international diplomacy and sent on 
troubleshooting missions to Panama, Cuba, Russia, China and Japan, as well as 
visiting the Philippines twice, which Minger describes as ‘broad responsibilities’ 
beyond what were previously expected of a Secretary of War.353 Taft had no real 
military experience, despite being appointed to head the War Department, but 
Roosevelt recognised the benefit of Taft’s legal expertise and experience in the 
Pacific as useful in employing him as more of a diplomatic than military Secretary of 
War.354 Despite his new role and its different responsibilities and concerns, Taft 
maintained his stance on the policy of attraction, whilst growing slightly sceptical 
about the pace of Filipinization that was integral to the early success of the policy. 
Above all, Taft remained resolute on the idea that the Philippines should not be 
independent, nor be offered independence within the foreseeable future. Most 
commentators conclude that as Secretary of War, Taft was Roosevelt’s man, as 
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historian Serge Ricard puts it: ‘the nonchalant, loyal lieutenant.’355 However, Taft’s 
stance on the Philippines during this period suggests that Taft was more than simply a 
loyal puppet of Roosevelt. During the years Taft spent in the War Department the 
U.S. faced various diplomatic issues that arose in Asia, and gradually public opinion – 
and even the thoughts of pro-imperialists such as Roosevelt – started to accept that 
Philippine independence would be the eventual outcome of the U.S experiment. This 
chapter will show that during a period when imperialists started to question the long-
term presence to the U.S in the islands, Taft did his utmost to secure his vision of an 
imperial future. 
Historian Romeo Cruz argues that although independence was never promised 
in the Taft Era in the Philippines, ‘it was pretty much understood that separation was 
the logical culmination of the policy,’ but that this was undermined by ‘cultural 
“brain-washing” of the nation so that by self-interest and gratitude the colonial 
relationship would be perpetuated.’356 Similarly, historian Bonifacio Salamanca 
argues that both Roosevelt and Taft ‘favored ultimate independence as the 
culmination of American policy,’ despite never explicitly stating this viewpoint.357 
This chapter argues that Taft was intent that independence should never become the 
logical conclusion. In terms of a perpetuated relationship, what is clear is that Taft 
was indeed keen to postpone any change in the relationship, but for him, unlike 
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A Blueprint for Philippine Retention (1904) 
  
In a speech given in Cincinnati on February 22, 1904, Taft spoke on the topic of 
Philippine independence.358 When asked by the Bishop of Massachusetts why the 
U.S. should not just ‘declare’ their aim of ultimate independence, Taft’s reply was 
that the bishop had a ‘fair question.’ However, Taft proceeded:  
…I am as convinced as possible that nothing can do more harm than 
that declaration. It is not that I object to independence when they are 
fit for it. It is, first, that I object to our binding ourselves to doing 
anything which may have to be done 100 or 150 years hence. It is not 
that I object to our agreeing with them, or letting them agree when 
they are fit for it, what government they shall have; but it is that the 
agitators, the gentlemen that are engaged in looking for office under 
an independent government, have very little concern about 
independence that is to come after they are dead; and if you permit 
them independence and make it a definite promise you will have 
continued agitation as to when they ought to have independence; and 
as a consequence, you will have the attention of the people fixed on 
something in the future, and not on the success of the present 
government; and if the present does not succeed, independence cannot 
be a success.359 
 
In this long quotation, Taft made several points but all to one end. For 
seemingly pragmatic reasons, Taft advised against any promise of independence. 
Since independence was an issue for the future, there was no need to distract the 
Filipinos of the present with something that would never apply to them, or even – 
perhaps – to their children. Taft’s point about the potential for instability, and for 
the issue of independence to overwhelm the political agenda of the islands seemed 
largely reasonable. The author, economics professor Henry Parker Willis, who 
cited this speech, felt that Taft had drawn completely the wrong conclusions, and 
stated the very opposite, that ‘the absence of such a declaration [on the matter of 
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independence] is the source of unrest, confusion and agitation.’360 The idea that 
the carrot of independence should not even be dangled before the Philippines, yet 
alone given to them, was to drive Taft’s efforts for many years to come. 
 On April 21, 1904, Taft delivered an address to the Chamber of Commerce of 
New York State, entitled “The Philippine Islands.”361 Taft began by drawing a 
distinction between the U.S. role in the Philippines and that of other colonial powers. 
He divided the population of the Philippines into two groups: Christian (7 million), 
and non-Christian (600,000), the latter group composed of Muslims and people of 
other beliefs. In his opinion the former group offered, in the Philippines, something 
different from European colonies in the region: ‘The problem of the government of 
the Moros [Muslims in the southern islands of the Philippines] is the same as that 
which England has had in the government of the Straits Settlements or India. The 
government of 7,000,000 Christian Filipinos is a very different problem, and one 
which it has fallen to the lot of the United States to solve.’ Taft continued by 
explaining that annexation by the U.S. had been in the interest of the Filipino people, 
especially in respect to what he offered as alternatives. The first alternative, a return 
to Spanish rule, would have been a ‘breach of faith.’ The second, handing over 
government to Aguinaldo and his followers would have led to ‘military dictatorship.’ 
In short, Taft concluded there was ‘no escape’ and U.S. sovereignty the only option, 
‘until by proper measures and patient governmental training and experience they 
could be given self-governing capacity.’ In this introductory part of his lecture, Taft 
was restating the adage of duty and burden: the U.S. had not sought the islands and 
they could do nothing but annex them and lead them to eventual self-government. 
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However, the speech was not simply a repetition of such familiar imperialist 
motifs.362 
 The main thrust of Taft’s speech centred on the theme of “civil liberty.” The 
Filipinos, Taft argued, might not exercise complete political control, but this was ‘a 
very different thing from civil liberty,’ his example being that, ‘Women and children, 
and other non-voters in this country [i.e. disenfranchised African Americans in the 
U.S.], have the civil liberty secured by the Constitution, but do not exercise political 
control.’ So, as Taft saw it, under U.S. civil government the Filipinos were secured 
their civil rights despite their inability to govern themselves, leaving them in a similar 
condition to the female citizens of the United States. Taft cited several examples, 
including African-American disenfranchisement, to suggest that, historically, self-
government was a right that first had to be earned. Taft concluded: ‘In every instance 
it will be seen that the principles of the Declaration of Independence are always 
qualified by the statement that the people who are to be consulted with respect to their 
own government shall have sufficient capacity to govern themselves and better 
themselves by such self-government.’ It is worth noting that Taft chose examples of 
territories under U.S. rule that were not likely to ever leave the union. The Filipinos, 
as has been shown in previous chapters, were, in Taft’s opinion, some way from 
having the all-important ‘capacity’ to govern themselves. To move too quickly to 
independence and to yield to the ‘easy’ option of the anti-imperialists would, Taft 
assured his audience, lead to ‘absolutism and tyranny, or a political chaos.’363  The 
theme of potential anarchy echoed Taft’s words of several years earlier, when he had 
warned that premature independence would result in a condition ‘worse than in 
hades,’ which suggests Taft’s views on independence had changed little during the 
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intervening years, even if his views on the eventual outcome of the Philippine 
experiment had grown more complex.364  
 Perhaps inspired by his new responsibilities as Secretary of War, Taft looked 
outside of the Philippines and the United States to Japan for further comparison in his 
model for self-government, as his speech continued. Taft explained that although 
Japan’s ‘marvelous development’ over the preceding half century might lead some to 
hope that a similar speed of progress might be seen in the Philippines, he argued that 
the Japanese ‘are a more industrious people and a more thrifty people than the 
Filipinos; and second, that they have always had an independent and natural 
government, proceeding from the feudal system and the continuance of the traditional 
governmental influence of the imperial household.’ In contrast, in the Philippines, 
following 400 years of Spanish colonial rule, there was ‘nothing but the dead-level of 
a people whose only hope is education up to popular self-government under the 
guidance of some power which meantime will secure to the people the inestimable 
benefits of civil liberty.’ This comparison is noteworthy because it dealt with Filipino 
and Japanese race and culture. The Japanese, although an Asiatic “race” comparable 
on some level with the Filipinos were, in Taft’s view, advanced in their progress with 
a long record of self-government. The important conclusion of this, as fit with Taft’s 
retentionist aims, was to show that, far from being an argument for early self-
government (and independence) for the Filipinos, such a comparison only served to 
show how far the Filipinos had yet to travel.365  
 The next section of Taft’s speech moved on to what was the main theme one 
would expect in an address to the Chamber of Commerce: money. Taft started by 
suggesting that when it came to the Philippines money should be no object, the U.S. 
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‘mission’ in the Philippines ‘ought to be maintained and encouraged by the people of 
the United States without regard to the question of its cost or its profitable results 
from a commercial or financial standpoint.’ This might have seemed slightly 
surprising from anybody but Taft. A few minutes later Taft revealed that despite such 
a proposition, the Philippines were so ripe for development, especially in agriculture, 
that they would have little problem financing their own development. What the 
islands needed were new merchants who would not complain about the civil 
administration and instead would take advantage of this ripe market of seven million 
(excluding the non-Christians) ‘imitative’ Filipinos who were ‘anxious for new ideas, 
willing to accept them, willing to follow American styles, American sports, American 
dress and American customs.’366 
 Nearing the close of his speech Taft turned his attention, once again, to 
independence, but this time even more directly. Taft began by explaining why he 
continued to oppose any promise of independence: 
It is not that I am opposed to independence in the Islands, should the 
people of the Philippines desire independence when they are fitted for 
it, but it is that the great present need in the Islands is the building up 
of a permanent well-ordered government, the great present need of the 
Islands is the increase of the saving remnant of conservative Filipinos 
whose aid in uplifting and maintaining the present government on a 
partly popular and strictly civil liberty basis, shall be secured.367 
 
 Although the idea that the people were not yet fit for self-government, was a 
familiar argument, there was new stress here on so-called conservative Filipinos; 
Filipinos who supported Taft’s ideas on postponement of a promise of independence. 
These so-called conservatives comprised mainly the remnants of the Federal Party 
that Taft had nurtured during his tenure as civil governor. Similarly, by Taft’s 
definition, a radical was any Filipino that proposed independence; and the sooner they 
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demanded it, the more radical they were. If independence were promised, Taft argued, 
the outcome would be to ‘frighten away’ the conservative Filipinos who were 
essential to the eventual success of the U.S. imperial venture. Taft believed that such 
conservatives were already timid for fear of being victimised by a potentially ‘violent 
and irreconcilable’ band that might come to prominence, on account of their previous 
support of the American regime. Thus, a promise of independence ‘helps no one.’ 
Independence was an issue for the future, when the Filipinos were suitably educated 
in labour, civil liberty, political responsibility and the principles of popular 
government. Taft believed that after all of this had been accomplished, and only then, 
‘we can discuss the question whether independence is what they desire and grant it, or 
whether they prefer the retention of a closer association with the country which, by its 
guidance, has unselfishly led them on to better conditions.’ There can be little doubt 
from the final sentiment, which eventuality Taft preferred as an outcome.368 Once 
again Taft ventured to suggest that in a distant future, following decades of U.S. 
imperialism, the Filipinos themselves might choose to remain in ‘closer’ dominion-
style relationship with the United States. 
 In the same speech to the New York State Chamber of Commerce, Taft 
concluded with reference to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition, more commonly 
known as the St. Louis World’s Fair, which would open on April 30, 1904. The 
World’s Fair was partly funded by the federal government, the states and private 
investors. The Philippine Commission, while still under Taft’s control in 1902, passed 
Act 514 authorising the islands’ participation in the proposed exposition. Taft 
appointed plant pathologist and museum head, William Powell Wilson, to chair the 
Philippine Exposition Board, which was largely peopled with those involved in 
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science, museums and entertainment.369 As historian Jose Fermin puts it, ‘the whole 
exhibition was conceived, approved and operated by top-ranking American officials, 
from the U.S. President down to the Secretary of War to the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs.’370 Taft referred specifically to the Filipino village that would be a 
centrepiece of the fair, which would, in Taft’s view, serve to ‘familiarize the people of 
the United States with the Philippine Islands and in order to bring the Filipinos closer 
to the United States.’371 The Philippine exhibit at the fair was organised with the 
‘cooperation of several prominent Filipinos and numerous United States colonial 
officials.’372 Although this particular speech was made on the eve of the fair’s 
opening, the War Department, the Bureau of Insular Affairs and Taft had been 
involved in the organisation of the Filipino exhibit at the fair for the last couple of 
years at some level. The Filipino exhibit was an opportunity for pro-colonialists to put 
across their case, and for Taft this message would be his continued theme of retention. 
Historians Robert Rydell, and more recently Paul Kramer and Jose Fermin, have 
given a good deal of attention to the Filipino exhibit at St. Louis.373 While Rydell 
explores events such as the expositions of the period more generally, Kramer and 
Fermin focus on the racial implications of the Philippine village at St. Louis in 
particular. Although it is important to address briefly these authors’ attention to the 
racial context of the exhibition, this thesis will also focus upon Taft’s attempts to 
promote a retentionist policy. 
 As early as 1902 Taft was involved in promoting the idea of a Philippine 
exhibit at St. Louis. Paul Kramer argues that the government agenda for the fair 
(represented by figures such as Roosevelt, Root and Taft) was to combat continued 
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anti-imperialism and the reluctance of Congress to enact preferential tariffs for the 
Philippines. Kramer quotes Taft’s summary of the government’s interest in St. Louis: 
‘This Exposition comes at a critical point in the history of the Philippines. We are at a 
point where there prevails misinformation, misunderstanding, and an unconscious 
misrepresentation regarding us. Nothing, I think, can bring the two peoples together to 
promote friendly and trade relations between the States and the Archipelago so well 
as such an exhibit.’ Kramer argues that Taft saw the exhibit as a way to put Philippine 
resources before the eyes of consumers and investors, as well as showing the progress 
of peace in order to encourage the lowering of tariffs.374 As was discussed in the 
previous chapter, Taft saw increased trade and investment as crucial to strengthening 
bonds between the two nations. In this way Taft believed he could illustrate to 
Filipinos and anti-imperialists the mutual benefits of the colonial experiment, with the 
important message to potential investors and businessmen in the United States that 
this imperial venture would indeed benefit them. In Taft’s mind, the exposition was 
an ideal opportunity to stress the idea that the Philippines and United States were 
better off together. As Robert Rydell notes, one exposition publication suggested that: 
‘the time is coming when the purchase and retention of the Philippine Islands will 
seem as wise to our descendents as does the Louisiana Purchase seem to us who live 
today.’375 This sentiment suggests entirely what Taft saw as the ultimate aim of the 
exposition. Preferential tariffs and investment were of undoubted importance, but the 
ultimate goal of both of these policies, as with the policy of attraction as a whole, was 
– at least for Taft – retention.  
The Filipino village proved a major hit with fairgoers, who were attracted by 
the “exotic” Filipinos. However, if the message of the fair was meant to demonstrate 
                                                
374 Kramer, Blood of Government, 237. 
375 Rydell, All the World’s a Fair, 167. 
 158 
the case for retention of the islands through the progress being made there, press 
attention suggests that most people were more interested in the spectacle of the 
savage. As Robert Rydell argues: ‘if the fairgoers perceived the villagers as utterly 
backward and incapable of progress, the displays would actually buttress the racist 
arguments used by the anti-imperialists to oppose annexation of the islands.’376 The 
problem that this represented was obvious. Taft, and others who wished to encourage 
the colonial venture through the fair, had to face the reality that although it might well 
illustrate the Filipinos’ need of the U.S., it might equally show why the U.S. should 
disengage from a hopeless cause. Paul Kramer sees the fair as the government’s 
attempt at a propaganda exercise, with supposedly both uncivilised and civilised 
Filipinos present to represent the ‘bifurcated path of Filipino progress.’377 For 
Kramer, the fair ultimately misrepresented Filipinos to an American audience and 
simultaneously the nature of the display alienated visiting Filipino elites.378 Rydell 
and Kramer point to the heart of the problem that the Filipino exhibit posed for 
retention advocates, and this was evident in various newspapers of the time. The 
Atlanta Constitution claimed that: ‘Of all the savages here, though, the head-hunting, 
dog-eating, naked Igorrote, in all his filth and barbaric ignorance, attract the most 
attention.’379 The New York Times attributed the fame of the exhibition similarly, as 
‘largely excited by the widespread publicity which Igorote [sic] dog-eaters and head-
hunters, the cannibal Moro, and the aboriginal Negrito have obtained.’380 The 
Washington Post reported that since the arrival of the ‘wild people,’ the ‘dog 
population of that part of the grounds has decreased considerably.’381 The attention of 
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fairgoers was to the spectacle and exoticism of the Filipinos, and this was not 
necessarily what was going to convince sceptics of the need to strengthen bonds with 
the Philippines. 
According to the World’s Fair Bulletin, Taft believed that ‘the proposed 
exhibit would have a “moral effect” on the people of the islands,’ and that it would 
help with the remaining pacification of the islands.382 Taft gave a speech on 
“Philippine Day” (August 13), which commemorated the fall of Manila to the U.S. in 
1898, setting out another supposed aim of bringing Filipinos to the United States: ‘It 
is a source of infinite satisfaction for me to look about the forty acres that embrace 
this Philippine exhibit and to think of the immense good that it has done and will do 
in making the people of the Philippines acquainted with the United States.’383 
The exhibit, in Taft’s mind, even if it presented a slanted view of the Filipinos as 
“uncivilised” peoples, would help acquaint Filipinos with Americans and show 
Americans why investment was needed in infrastructure and education. However, 
Taft also felt that by bringing in a small number of “civilised” Filipinos he could 
offset any imbalance caused by the exhibit at St. Louis. Taft supported the idea of a 
‘delegation of forty to fifty [prominent] Filipinos… in order that by going about the 
country and the different cities they may become acquainted with the institutions and 
appearances of this country, and at the same time the business and prominent men of 
the cities of the United States may have acquaintance with the best elements of the 
Filipinos.’384 Nevertheless, St. Louis, as Kramer and Rydell suggest, almost certainly 
backfired by alienating Filipino elites and proving to the American visitors that the 
Philippines were “uncivilised” and unfit for the United States. However, for Taft, the 
exhibit – in theory if not in realisation – still proved that the Philippines needed the 
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U.S. and were capable of improving with their help and guidance, as well as proving 
to American sceptics that Philippine resources were substantive and that retention 
could be profitable as well as humanitarian. 
 
The 1905 Voyage to the East, Part I: Japan 
 
Japanese-American relations did not originate with the annexation of Hawaii 
or the Philippines, but these events made the United States a Pacific power at just the 
time that Japan itself was becoming the pre-eminent non-European power in the Far 
East. Following on from Japanese victory in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-95), 
European powers and the United States were made to take note of the rise in Japan’s 
military strength and influence in the region during the Meiji period (1868-1912), and 
also the increasing fragility of China. Historian Akira Iriye positions Japanese 
participation in the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 as an 
important demonstration of the nation’s emergence as a great power.385 However, it 
was the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) that was to bring the United States into contact 
more intimately with Japan’s rise. Japan’s defeat of a white European power came as 
a surprise to many at the time, and President Roosevelt, an admirer of Japan, mediated 
the resulting Treaty of Portsmouth that concluded the war.386 However, despite 
Roosevelt’s admiration of the Japanese, the rise of Japan caused concern for the 
United States on a number of levels, for example, the security of the Philippines or the 
territorial integrity of China, and thus U.S. trade and investment opportunities 
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therein.387 However, it was the issue of Japanese immigration to the United States that 
was the root cause of the American concerns relating to Japanese threats to China and 
the Philippines.  
Historian William Neuman contends that an anti-Japanese movement had 
existed in the United States as early as 1887, but that it was not until 1905 when the 
Asiatic exclusion league was founded in San Francisco, that the movement began to 
wield political power.388 During Taft’s tenure as Secretary of War, relations between 
the United States and Asia reached a new level of tension. If Japan were to be a Great 
Power, the Japanese believed they should be treated as such by the United States, 
particularly in the area of immigration policy. Between 1891 and 1900, 27,440 
Japanese migrated to the United States, but in the period 1901-1907 these numbers 
increased to 42,457 (with as many as 38,000 more entering via Hawaii).389 However, 
the cause of most concern over this new influx of Japanese immigrants was to be 
found primarily, like the opposition to Chinese immigration before them, in 
California. 
President Roosevelt was a firm admirer of the Japanese as a “race,” but he 
objected to their immigration to the United States. Historian Thomas Dyer argues that 
Roosevelt’s objections to Japanese immigration ‘stemmed from the belief that the 
predominantly white population of the United States would be unable to absorb or 
assimilate Orientals, and that race difference between Orientals and whites loomed so 
high as to preclude even basic understanding between the two groups.’390 However, as 
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Dyer goes on to point out, although supporting exclusion of the Japanese, Roosevelt 
condemned attempts to segregate Japanese and the more outlandish schemes proposed 
by some on the West Coast.391 President Roosevelt and Secretary of War Taft were 
only too aware that the consequences of the West Coast enraging Japanese opinion 
against the United States could prove much more damaging than the anti-Chinese 
movement in California had with the boycott of U.S. goods. For Taft in particular the 
possibility of war with Japan could prove fatal to the U.S. imperial experiment in the 
Philippines. 
President Roosevelt wrote to one correspondent in March of 1905 about the 
growing rumours that the Japanese posed a threat to the Philippines: ‘It may be that 
the Japanese have designs on the Philippines. I hope not; I am inclined to believe not; 
for I like the Japanese, and wish them well, they have much in their character to 
admire.’392 Although it was the question of Japanese emigration to Hawaii and the 
United States that was at the heart of diplomatic wrangling, it was the issue of the 
Philippines and Far Eastern stability that was to be equally prominent among Taft’s 
thoughts on his visit to Japan in 1905.393  
 In the summer of 1905 Secretary of War Taft headed a congressional 
delegation on a tour of the Far East. Among the delegation were President 
Roosevelt’s daughter, Alice, seven senators and twenty-three House members.394 
Biographer Henry Pringle argues that Taft’s decision to take the trip to the Far East 
was largely because of a feeling that he needed to sort things out in the Philippines, as 
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he had received word during the previous year from concerned members of the 
Federal Party – that he had patronised so generously during his time there – that they 
were losing their authority.395 However, given his new role as a cabinet member and 
not a Philippine governor, and added to this the broad array of diplomatic duties 
Roosevelt assigned him, the mission would not be to the Philippines alone. The S.S. 
Manchuria departed San Francisco on July 8, 1905, stopping off in Hawaii en-route to 
the Far East, then visiting Japan, the Philippines and China before departing again for 
the U.S. in early September.396  
Historian J. M. Rowe Jr., in his 1977 thesis, rejects the interpretation that Taft 
was sent to Tokyo in 1905 on a ‘mission’ to come to an ‘agreement with Japan.’ 
Instead, Rowe argues that any agreements made were no more than reaffirmations of 
prior understandings.397 Historian Ralph Minger, writing at a similar time, also 
suggests that there is no evidence that Taft was given any specific instructions for his 
visit.398 However, although nothing particularly novel was agreed on Taft’s visit, the 
continuation of peaceful relations with Japan was a critical part of Taft’s imperial 
vision for the Philippines. If the Philippines were under threat they could potentially 
come to be seen as a burden by some in the United States, undermining Taft’s aims 
for a long-term commitment to a U.S. presence there. 
Taft wrote to his wife on July 25 detailing the grand reception they had 
received at Yokohama and Tokyo.399 However, aside from lavish diplomatic dinners, 
Taft’s main task whilst in Japan was to bring about more cordial relations with the 
Japanese, whether he had specific instructions to do so or not. Taft met with Japanese 
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Prime Minister Taro Katsura on the morning of July 27, and Taft forwarded a 
memorandum of this meeting to Roosevelt and Root.400 The details of the meeting, as 
set out in the memorandum, have become commonly known as the Taft-Katsura 
Agreement. The meeting dealt with various issues, including the Philippine Islands. 
The memorandum records a discussion about some pro-Russians in America who 
‘would have the public believe that the victory of Japan would be a certain prelude to 
her aggression in the direction of the Philippine Islands.’ In response to this Taft 
defended Japan, as his diplomatic role and desire for peace necessitated: 
Secretary Taft observed that Japan’s only interest in the Philippines 
would be, in his opinion, to have these Islands governed by a strong 
and friendly nation like the United States, and not to have them placed 
either under the misrule of the natives, yet unfit for self-government, 
or under the hands of some unfriendly European power. Count 
Katsura confirmed in the strongest terms the correctness of his views 
on the point and positively stated that Japan does not harbor any 
aggressive designs whatever on the Philippines; adding that all the 
insinuations of the yellow peril type are nothing more or less than 
malicious and clumsy slanders calculated to do mischief to Japan.401 
  
The remaining two sections of the memorandum dealt with: first, the joint 
desire of Japan and the United States to maintain peace in the Far East through an 
informal alliance; and second, the suzerainty of Japan over the Korean peninsula.402 
Taft’s role was not that of Secretary of State, and as a result he voiced the constraint 
he felt in making any concessions or agreements regarding Korea in particular, which 
he felt lay outside the limits of his remit. This perhaps also reflected the reluctance of 
the U.S. government to make any official agreements on the Korean issue either. 
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Nevertheless, when speaking of the Filipinos’ inability to self-govern, there was no 
indication that Taft felt himself so restrained by his position. Indeed, the above 
citation summarised Taft’s views, and that of Root and Roosevelt at that time, fairly 
succinctly. As the Republican administration saw it, the Philippines were best off 
under their rule, and it appeared that Japan accepted. In the most basic sense, the Taft-
Katsura agreement was a convenient acceptance of spheres of influence and an 
acknowledgement of the status quo: if Japan was free to exert its influence over 
Korea, then the United States were free to do likewise in the Philippines, without any 
interference from the other power.  
 Two days after this meeting Taft wrote to Nellie of his ‘historic’ visit to Japan, 
and summarised his trip up to that point.403 Taft told his wife of the meeting with 
Katsura, and bemoaned the expense of having to cable such a long memorandum to 
Washington. Whether Taft had specific instructions from Washington or not, he had 
treated his visit to Japan as more than a pleasant stopover en route to the Philippines. 
Taft used the Japanese visit, not to forge a new diplomatic agreement, but to reaffirm 
existing relations. The fact that this involved the reiteration of Japanese disinterest in 
the Philippines, as well as Japanese support of American sovereignty there, was 
something that Taft was glad to confirm before leaving to visit the archipelago itself. 
 
The 1905 Voyage to the East, Part II: The Philippines 
 
Taft told his wife, with only one day left in Japan, that he was preparing to 
leave for the Philippines ‘full of doubt and uncertainty.’404 It is unclear whether Taft’s 
concerns were over the meeting with the Japanese or the prospect of his first trip to 
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the Philippines since he had stood down as civil governor. In a letter written the 
following day, Taft’s concerns became clearer, as he wrote to Nellie: ‘I don’t know 
how we are coming out in the Philippines with our Democratic Senators and 
Representatives… I shall keep you advised as well as I can of every thing that 
happens.’405 As both the former civil governor and in his present position as Secretary 
of War Taft was closely associated with the successes and failures of U.S. policy in 
the islands, and his imperial vision required him to ensure the Philippine experiment 
was viewed as a positive venture. Therefore, as the head of the bipartisan visiting 
delegation of congressmen and other figures, Taft appeared to be somewhat nervous 
of whether he would be able to convince the anti-imperialist sympathisers among his 
group of the benefits of U.S. rule in the Philippines. Taft was proud of his 
achievements in the islands and although he had only been absent for just over a year 
and a half, what appeared evident in his correspondence on his return was a sense that 
he felt that his previous success might well have deteriorated in his absence. 
A week after arriving in the islands, Taft wrote Nellie that ‘we have had an 
interesting and very important week,’ and although he felt that the official welcome 
had been less ‘cordial’ than anticipated, he imagined this was down to their earlier 
than scheduled arrival. Taft continued: ‘I found a condition strongly in favor of 
Independence immediately. I found I had to sit on that idea immediately and my 
Friday night speech was directed against this heresy.’ Here Taft revealed that in 
addition to concerns about a desire to impress his visiting delegation with the U.S. 
imperial venture in the Philippines, Taft was equally concerned over the fate of his 
own imperial vision that called for a permanent imperial link and suppression of 
independence advocacy. The impression Taft gave was that he was confronted with a 
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situation that had been allowed to get out of hand, and it would take his knowledge 
and experience to quell such talk. Taft certainly thought that a clear expression 
against immediate independence, by himself, had a definite impact: ‘The expressions 
and manifestations in my favor are quite gratifying. Still my frankness will probably 
end all this for a year, and ultimately most of them will be reconciled. My problem 
now is to get Gen. Wright out of office, skip Gov. Ide and select a proper man – This 
is no small job.’406 Taft was evidently concerned with the perception that the 
independence movement had made significant headway since his departure from the 
islands, and it appeared that he lay most of the blame for this with the administration 
that succeeded his. 
When Taft had originally left the islands under the new Governor General 
Luke E. Wright, he had nothing but praise for his successor. Less than two years later 
Taft felt let down by Wright, and one of the key illustrations of his disappointment 
was the fact that talk in the islands was strongly in favour of immediate independence. 
Historian Paul Kramer recognises Taft’s departure from the islands and replacement 
with Wright – whose policies, particularly his support for ‘repressive measures’ by 
the Philippine Constabulary – triggered a ‘breakdown of the first Philippine-American 
alliance system.’ Kramer claims that Wright had ‘neither the tact, patience, nor 
understanding,’ of Taft in his methods of conciliating the Filipino elite, and argues 
that Wright broke with Taft’s policy of attraction toward Filipinos, both social and 
political, favouring instead a partnership with an even more conservative community 
of U.S. businessmen, Spaniards and friars.407 Historian Frank Golay, as noted in 
Chapter Two, suggests that Taft was critical to the survival of the pro-American 
Federal Party and that following his departure from the Philippines in 1903 the party 
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‘fell apart,’ due to lack of a rapport with most Filipinos and the gradual 
disillusionment with the party among American administrators, such as Wright.408 
The policy of attraction was critical to Taft’s success, whatever its shortcomings, and 
to the potential of Taft’s long-term imperial vision. Taft, seemingly with good reason, 
returned to the Philippines to see much of his public relations work with pro-
American Filipino elites undone, and for him it was this departure from his methods 
that had led to a rise in prominence of pro-independence advocates. 
 Daniel R. Williams, a Manila based lawyer, wrote a long letter to Taft which 
gave one interpretation of the rise in independence advocacy that so disappointed 
Taft: 
While the professional agitator is undoubtedly responsible for much of 
this [dissatisfaction] feeling, and has used the unfortunate material 
conditions of the country as a basis for sowing distrust among the 
people and for preaching ‘indepencia’, it would be a serious mistake 
to believe that the dissatisfaction is limited to Filipinos of this 
character. It is shared by Filipinos of almost every class, a great many 
of whom have no sympathy with a movement looking to immediate 
independence.409  
 
Williams, like Taft, saw independence advocates as ‘agitators,’ but also 
recognised that sympathy towards the independence movement was widespread 
throughout the Filipino population. The judge went on to explain that the reasons for 
such feelings were as many as there were special interest groups to be found. 
However, above all other factors Williams felt that the primary cause of 
dissatisfaction among Filipinos lay with the fact that ‘the authorities have failed, at 
least outwardly, to give due weight to the feelings or prejudices of the people.’ In this 
sense Williams was preaching to the converted, as anybody familiar with Taft’s time 
in the Philippines would know that he prided himself upon working with the Filipino 
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elites and acknowledging their sensibilities, crucial pillars of the policy of attraction. 
Williams also saw increased agitation for independence as a result of a departure from 
Taft policies: ‘Your speech at the Filipino Banquet was worth coming to the 
Philippines to make. It has clarified the atmosphere tremendously and will, I think, 
limit the ‘independence’ talk to a very small coterie of persons. It has also largely 
relieved the distrust of the people as to our purposes and intentions toward them.’410 
Taft’s return, rather than a trip aimed at showing congressmen and other guests the 
nature of U.S. rule in the Philippines, instead saw Taft keen to get back into the 
forefront of the day-to-day running of affairs in the Philippines. 
In Taft’s next letter to Nellie, the topic of independence came to the fore once 
again. Taft reported that he had heard that pro-independence spokespeople planned to 
make the delegation hear their ‘cries for independence,’ reporting that something 
along those lines had happened at Iloilo where he took the occasion to ‘wrap the 
speaker over his mental knuckles.’ In terms of Taft’s traditional allies, he reported 
that the Federal Party had approached him in relation to changing their party platform. 
Taft, reportedly, told the Federal Party representatives not to set out a policy towards 
independence: ‘an issue which would only arise long after they were dead,’ and added 
that any immediate change in platform would appear opportunist. He concluded that 
he was struck more than ever by the ‘shallowness’ of the political concepts of Filipino 
politicians.411 After all, Taft had supported and patronised the Federal Party primarily 
because they were pro-American and had rejected a pro-independence stance, and 
their adoption of a platform addressing independence – however distant – seemed to 
undermine much of what Taft had fought to suppress during his governorship. What 
this letter brings to light is Taft’s determined approach to keep independence off of 
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the political agenda in the Philippines, despite clear shifts in the political climate 
there. It was becoming clear to Taft that most Filipinos favoured independence, and 
those who favoured immediate independence were in the political ascendancy, while 
his erstwhile favoured Federalists were considering a significant alteration to their 
previously anti-independence platform. 
 While Taft recognised an evident rise of pro-independence political 
momentum, he remained equally sure it could be overturned. Taft had made clear his 
belief in the impressionability of the average Filipino, and his belief that only an 
“irreconcilable” few really sought independence, and that this latter group lacked the 
political understanding to truly conceive what they desired. However, despite 
mocking the weakness of pro-independence campaigners in the Philippines, Taft 
made it clear that those who were really to blame were the U.S. representatives he had 
left to maintain the anti-independence climate he had supposedly set in place. Taft felt 
that Wright was well-intentioned, but that the incumbent governor-general did not 
believe as strongly as him in the ‘policy of conciliation.’ He told Nellie that he had 
found ‘a great many expressions of affection from the Filipino people and have 
confidence that if you and I were to go back to Manila for two or three years, we 
could restore the old condition of things.’ Despite his disappointment at the 
commission’s efforts since his departure for Washington, Taft felt that his short visit 
was already reaping significant benefits. Taft told his wife that the Democrats 
journeying with them had done little in the way of undermining his speeches in the 
islands and that his own words were ‘more or less accepted as the speeches of the 
delegation.’ Once again, those who did speak in favour of independence were on the 
receiving end of Taft’s belief that such ideas were completely inadvisable: ‘…they 
had a day for complaints, and the wildest enemies of the irreconcilables could not ask 
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for a more pitiable presentation of the lack of knowledge of government and of its 
responsibilities and difficulties than was shown by the people that occupied the 
committee for a day in discussing the necessity for immediate independence. I have a 
copy of the evidence and I should like to have you read it over to see how foolish men 
can be without knowing it.’ However, this sentiment seems somewhat hopeful. Taft 
repeatedly found himself having to stifle and patronise talk of independence and to 
debate with pro-independence advocates. Regardless of how amateurish Taft found 
Filipino debating skills, it was not skilful debating in front of small audiences that was 
going to wipe out the popular calls for independence. Taft concluded disappointedly: 
‘I left the Philippines despondent somewhat because before me was the necessity of 
ultimately eliminating from the Government Wright and Ide and possibly Forbes.’412 
Taft’s solution to the rising tide of the independence movement was a wholesale 
change in the administration: he also believed that he was best-suited to return in the 
medium-term and restore order and tranquillity.413 
  On his return to the United States Taft’s correspondence backlog reveals some 
of his conclusions about the trip to the Far East. In reply to congratulations on his 
speech at the Metropole Hotel in Manila concerning the Philippines, Taft told Filipino 
Judge Ignacio Villamor that he particularly valued the support of ‘my conservative 
friends to understand my exact position,’ and reasserted his continued intention to 
‘help the Filipino people.’414 Taft’s diplomatic tour of the Far East in 1905 seemed to 
have achieved its aims, in terms of showing the representatives the situation in the 
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Philippines and re-establishing the U.S. sphere of influence over them in the Taft-
Katsura agreement. President Roosevelt praised Taft’s accomplishments with regard 
to Japan, telling Taft that the U.S. position ‘could not have been stated with greater 
accuracy. The statement about the Philippines was merely to clear up Japan’s attitude, 
which had been purposely misrepresented by pro-Russian sympathizers and is shown 
to have been entirely apart from your statements – that is, our statements – in 
reference to Corea [sic] and reference to our having the same interests with Japan and 
Great Britain in preserving the peace of the Orient.’415 
 Despite the success of Taft’s 1905 trip to Japan, the period following the visit 
saw significant upheaval in U.S.-Japanese relations. There are a number of works that 
deal with the Japanese immigration crisis of 1906-7, and as the focus of the chapter is 
Taft’s concern with Philippine independence, only a brief summary of the affair is 
given here for the sake of contextualisation.416 Anti-Japanese feeling had been 
increasing steadily on the American West Coast in the early twentieth century, but by 
1906 the situation in California had reached a head. According to historian Masuda 
Hajimu, following the San Francisco earthquake of April 18, 1906, ‘physical attacks 
and boycotts against Japanese and their stores increased in frequency.’417 On October 
11, 1906 the San Francisco Board of Education passed legislation to segregate 
Japanese children in primary schools; in response the Japanese issued a serious 
protest claiming the legislation violated the Japanese-American treaty of 1894, and an 
unintended escalation in the situation resulted. Initially, Root proposed a treaty of 
mutual exclusion in January 1907 on behalf of Roosevelt, who thought that such an 
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agreement would help him in California, but the Japanese rejected the legislation as 
humiliating. The Gentlemen’s Agreement of February 1907 saw the U.S. end 
Japanese labour immigration from Hawaii to the mainland, and Japan agreed to 
restrict labour immigration to the U.S. more stringently.418 However, in the late spring 
and early summer of 1907 further anti-Japanese demonstrations in California, and 
Roosevelt’s decision to deploy the Great White Fleet to the Pacific, saw fears of a 
Japanese-American war reach fever pitch.419 On this tense occasion, with Japanese-
American relations in the balance, Secretary Taft’s planned trip to the Philippines to 
attend the opening of the new assembly in October 1907 saw him include a trip to 
Japan to attempt to smooth over this ongoing diplomatic crisis. Once again, as in 
1905, Taft was very aware that peaceful relations with Japan were critical to any 
successful outcome to the future of the U.S. imperial relationship, and particularly to 
the potential success of his distinct imperial vision. If relations with Japan were to 
deteriorate into war, then the Philippines would surely be at the forefront of 
America’s security problems.  
 
The 1907 Voyage to the East 
 
Respected historians have pointed out that Taft seemed relatively unconcerned 
about a potential war with Japan when he left on his trip to the Far East in late 1907. 
Historian Charles Neu sees Taft as someone with first-hand experience with the 
Japanese, and notes that during this period Taft ‘presided phlegmatically over the 
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bitter inter-service debate on the defense of the Philippines,’ whereas Roosevelt was 
much more vocal on strengthening defences in the archipelago.420 Similarly, historian 
Raymond Esthus comments that Taft was ‘even more certain than Roosevelt that 
Japan did not contemplate war, and he did not betray any anxiety whatsoever.’421 
Historian Thomas Bailey suggests that Taft was not alone in thinking that the threat 
from Japan had been blown out of proportion, considering the substantial economic 
drawbacks such a conflict would have for Japan. However, in the same work, Bailey 
also remarks that Taft did submit a detailed report of steps that might be taken to 
defend U.S. Pacific possessions and the Pacific Coast, in the event of hostilities with 
Japan.422 Taft, as secretary of war, could not take the Japanese threat to the 
Philippines too lightly, but he also felt that an outbreak of hostilities was relatively 
unlikely to occur.  
On August 21, President Roosevelt wrote to Secretary Taft less than a month 
before Taft was to depart on his second trip to the Far East, this time ostensibly to 
inaugurate the new Philippine Assembly. Many historians cite Roosevelt’s letter as an 
important document on the nature of the president’s policy towards the Philippines.423 
However, as it concerns Taft and the main thrust of this thesis so greatly, it is worth 
citing it once more. Roosevelt revealed to Taft his seeming conversion to the idea of 
relatively expedited if not immediate independence:  
We have continually to accommodate ourselves to conditions as they 
actually are and not as we would wish them to be. I wish our people 
were prepared permanently, in a duty-loving spirit, and looking 
forwards to a couple of generations of continuous manifestation of this 
spirit, to assume the control of the Philippines for the good of the 
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Filipinos. But as a matter of fact I gravely question whether this is the 
case…Mind you I am not saying what I think our people ought to feel, 
but what I fear they do feel… I think we shall have to be prepared for 
giving the islands independence of a more or less complete type much 
sooner than I think advisable if this country were prepared to look 
ahead fifty years and to build the navy and erect fortifications which 
in my judgement it should. The Philippines form our heel of Achilles. 
They are all that make the present situation with Japan dangerous. I 
think that in some way and with some phraseology that you think wise 
you should state to them that if they handle themselves wisely in their 
legislative assembly we shall at the earliest possible moment give 
them nearly complete independence… it may be that you can as you 
suggest better use the simile of Canada and Australia… I think that to 
have some pretty clear avowal of our intention not to permanently 
keep them and to give them independence would remove a temptation 
from Japan’s way and would render our task at home easier. 
Personally I should be glad to see the islands made independent, with 
perhaps some kind of international guarantee for the preservation of 
order, or with some warning on our part that if they did not keep order 
we would have to interfere again…424 
 
 In many ways this letter must have been a crushing blow to Taft, although 
Roosevelt tried his best not to sound too pro-independence, by couching his phrases 
to Taft’s particular ideas of an Australian- or Canadian-type relationship with Britain. 
Nevertheless, Roosevelt, though doing his best to assure Taft that he agreed with him 
deep down about retaining the Philippines, gives as many reasons as he can muster to 
suggest why his hand was becoming inevitably forced to the policy of independence, 
most notably: domestic apathy and the threat of Japan. In this letter, Roosevelt makes 
the outright suggestion that Taft promise independence during his trip to the 
Philippines, and finishes by concluding that ‘I should be glad to see the islands made 
independent.’ Although trying his best to placate Taft, the President, in this private 
letter, was trying to bring Taft around to what, despite his protestations, was his way 
of thinking. Taft’s reply was far from positive about Roosevelt’s new direction: ‘I 
appreciate the difficulties you present, but I sincerely hope that you will make no 
public declaration on the subject until I return from the Philippines… It is not 
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necessary for me to make definitive statements to the Filipinos themselves. Indeed, I 
think it would be unwise to do so.’425 Taft went on to add that all he intended to 
convey to the Filipinos were the opportunities offered by self-government, and rather 
more vaguely, ‘that the American people are not anxious to retain control of the 
islands except as it may be necessary to do so in order to protect the Filipino people 
themselves.’426 Though Taft did not state directly to the president that his primary 
desire was to see the islands retained, and eventually turned into a U.S. Dominion of 
sorts, Taft made it known that he had no intention of promising independence. In a 
letter of September 5, 1907, a somewhat spurned Roosevelt reassured Taft that: ‘As 
for the Philippines, I shall do nothing until your return, but really I do not intend to do 
much more than state what you say you will state to the Filipinos themselves.’427  
 In a recent article, historian Stephen Wertheim suggests that Roosevelt would 
have preferred to stay in the Philippines, but was influenced by both domestic opinion 
– which Wertheim argues historians have overlooked – as well as strategic 
considerations when he moved toward accepting eventual independence and gradually 
abandoned the cause of imperialism.428 Roosevelt, ever more the politician than Taft, 
was moving with the flow of popular opinion in the United States regarding the 
islands, though as elected president, rather than an appointee like Taft, one might 
expect Roosevelt to take a somewhat wider view of affairs. Historian Charles Neu 
suggests that by September 1907, newspapers such as the New York Herald, as well 
as many Republicans and Democrats in Congress, favoured withdrawal from the 
Philippines in some manner.429 What is also clear is that Roosevelt took far more 
seriously the idea of a military/strategic threat to the United States if the country was 
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to remain in the Philippines in the long term. These factors indicate key divides 
between the general approaches of Taft and Roosevelt. Firstly, they reveal Roosevelt, 
unsurprisingly, to be the cannier politician, far more sensitive to shifts in public and 
political opinion than the judicially minded Taft. Secondly, this instance reveals 
Roosevelt’s far more geo-political and strategic view of world politics, in comparison 
to Taft’s somewhat more parochial instincts. Taft saw the question of Philippine 
independence as primarily an issue between the United States and the islands, and 
saw other interests as more incidental to his imperial vision. Roosevelt, one of most 
vocal advocates of Large Policy expansionism, demonstrated a more pragmatic view 
of world affairs and was willing to change his stance on Philippine retention in 
recognition of the importance of future U.S.-Japanese relations and American public 
opinion.  
 It was evident that, as Taft left for his second trip to the Far East as secretary 
of war, this trip would prove critical in helping to stem the tide of popular and 
political opinion, which, like the President himself, was turning against retention. As 
for Philippine popular opinion of the independence matter, Taft showed himself 
willing once again to cast a rather deaf ear to the majority, to concentrate rather on 
conditions not as they actually were – to paraphrase Roosevelt’s letter – but as Taft 
wished that they would be. In Taft’s case this wish was for a future in which the 
Philippines were not offered even a promise of independence until many decades had 
passed and there was more likelihood that such a proposition might actually be turned 







 On September 13, 1907, Taft set off on his second tour to the Far East, aboard 
the S.S. Minnesota headed once again for Japan. Whereas historians might have 
differed over whether Taft had a “mission” during his trip to Japan in 1905, it is clear 
that in 1907 he most certainly did. However, opinion is divided over the purpose of 
the mission. Biographer Henry Pringle suggests that Taft’s aim in Japan in 1907 was 
to assure President Roosevelt that Japan would not seek war with the United States, 
and he further argues that Taft saw this as ‘doubly important’ in order to keep the 
Filipinos safe.430 But, historian Charles Neu sees Taft as more of ‘a diplomatic 
messenger than as a creator of policy.’431 Neu suggests that Taft had a noticeable 
‘absence of ideas about American Far Eastern policy,’ and merely reflected the views 
of Roosevelt.432 Both historians are right to a degree. Though Taft, as in 1905, did not 
have a mandate to create policy, as a diplomat popular in Japan he was able to use his 
role to guide the way policy was both presented and perceived by the Japanese. 
In his conclusions on Taft, Neu neglects to include Taft’s views on the 
Philippines, which, as argued throughout this thesis, remained resolute and strong. 
Taft’s vision for the Philippines guided his ideas of U.S.-Japanese relations in a very 
different manner than Roosevelt’s thoughts regarding Japan. Taft did not fear war 
with Japan in the foreseeable future and saw the Philippines as a project of more than 
a century to come. Roosevelt had come to see the Philippines as an Achilles’ heel in 
recognition of the threat posed by an expansionist imperial Japan. As argued above, it 
was clear that Taft was keen to establish that the Philippines were not a cause of 
friction in 1905, but in 1907 there was additional pressure on Taft to present this 
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picture to Washington following Roosevelt’s clear expression of doubts over 
America’s long-term future in the islands. It must be conceded that Taft was pursuing 
reconciliation with Japan primarily for its own sake and not only due to its impact on 
Philippines affairs. However, the knock-on effects of reconciliation regarding Taft’s 
imperial vision certainly did not escape his notice. Taft’s 1907 Japanese visit gave 
him the opportunity to bring Japanese-American relations down from a crisis point, 
but in so doing, indirectly helped secure the Philippine-American relationship from 
both potential Japanese aggression and the more immediately threatening doubts of 
Roosevelt. 
 The press reported widely upon Taft’s second visit to Japan as Secretary of 
War, and in the main agreed that he was on a mission. The Times of London was an 
exception in that it reported Taft as stating that he had ‘no mission to Japan except to 
bear a friendly greeting and to visit old friends on the way to Manila.’ As a sign of the 
speculation over his journey, Taft was also forced to declare that the United States 
had no intention ‘to sell the Philippines.’ The Times went on to state its belief that 
Roosevelt’s transfer of the U.S. naval fleet to the Pacific was in preparation for a war 
with Japan, and added that the U.S. press was only serving to encourage such an 
eventuality.433 In August 1907 the general board of the navy had contacted President 
Roosevelt with its concerns over the strategic vulnerability of the islands, which 
might serve as pawns in U.S.-Japanese affairs.434 The Boston Daily Globe speculated 
that the purpose of Taft’s ‘mission’ was to set the groundwork for an entente on 
immigration.435 The New York Times pointed out that it was unsurprising that such 
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attention was being given to the fact Taft had met with his counterpart in Japan, 
General Masatake Terauchi on two occasions, given that they were both secretaries of 
war. The New York Times continued, however, that the Japanese widely saw Taft as ‘a 
peace envoy.’436 Aside from the U.S. and British press, the English language press in 
Japan also had a good deal to say on the nature of Taft’s visit to their country. A 
sympathetic article in the Japan Gazette saw Taft as the best person to disperse the 
‘war clouds,’ an opinion shared by the Japan Chronicle, which furthered its praise of 
Taft’s diplomacy by forecasting that a potential Taft presidency would further 
strengthen Japanese-American relations.437 Whatever the western or Japanese press 
speculated about Taft’s “mission” to Japan in 1907, it was evident that with the 
exception of the Times most commentators agreed, despite diplomatic assurances to 
the contrary, that Taft was indeed on a mission. 
Regardless of press speculation and diplomatic denial, in terms of issues on 
the political agenda in 1907, immigration was manifestly Japan’s main concern, and 
for the United States immigration and the Philippines were important factors. When 
one considers Roosevelt’s letter concerning Philippine independence, and the danger 
of Japan, it becomes clear that if Taft was to avoid promising independence he would 
need to weaken the perception that Japan was a threat to the Philippines and the 
United States. Indeed, in his most widely reported speech of the trip Taft declared to 
great acclaim that war between the U.S. and Japan would be ‘a crime against modern 
civilization and as wicked as it would be insane.’438 For Taft, the Philippines were 
more of a central issue than to most other parties involved, especially as the once pro-
imperial Roosevelt was growing, like many Americans (or so he felt), dubious as to 
the potential of the U.S. remaining in the islands for the long term. Taft, as has been 
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shown on numerous occasions, had clear long-term ambitions for the islands and if 
Roosevelt was wavering, and the threat of war with Japan was an important factor in 
his doubts, then Taft would certainly do all that was in his power to assuage such 
concerns. Ultimately, an agreement on Japanese immigration in any guise was 
important to Taft, primarily because it would improve the possibility of long-term 
links between the U.S. and the Philippines. 
Marquis Kinmochi Saionji, the new Prime Minister, met with Taft on his visit 
and expressed his full endorsement of all agreements reached during Taft’s meeting 
with his predecessor Taro Katsura, including the fact that Japan harboured no 
aggressive intentions toward the Philippines. Taft’s joking response was to suggest 
that Japan would not take the Philippines even if ‘accompanied with a dowry of a 
million dollars,’ but soon added more seriously that such a sale was nevertheless 
unthinkable and would have been a gross ‘violation’ of the United States’ obligations 
to the islands. Clearly, whether the talk over the idea of selling the Philippines to 
Japan was simply press speculation, Taft wanted to make sure that everybody was 
sure that there should be no doubt about the falsity of such a proposition.439  
Historian Ralph Minger cites Taft’s earlier speech before the Japanese 
Chamber of Commerce on September 30, at length in one article, in regard to Taft’s 
views on U.S.-Japanese relations. In relation to speculation on the Philippine 
situation, Minger relates and accepts Taft’s version of events: that Japan did not want 
the Philippines, and the U.S. could not in good faith sell the islands, calling the idea 
‘absurd.’440 ‘There is only a little cloud over our friendship of 50 years, and the 
greatest earthquake of the century could not shake our unity,’ Secretary Taft declared 
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at a banquet in Tokyo on October 1. Taft suggested that the immigration problem 
could be solved through diplomatic channels and he also went on to accuse the press 
as serving as agitators to the situation: The Times (London) concluded that the speech 
‘created a splendid impression.’441 The Washington Post reported Taft’s visit in detail, 
adding that whatever the immigration entente the United States might agree with 
Japan, it should be equally requested by Japan of Great Britain on behalf of 
Canada.442 Indeed, Baron Shinichiro Kurino, the Japanese ambassador in Paris, stated 
that Japanese relations with the U.S. ‘are in every respect excellent’ and that public 
opinion was ‘calmer than it has ever been,’ citing both the disturbances in Vancouver 
and the popular welcome of Taft in Tokyo.443 Taft’s conclusion on the possibility of 
war, as laid out in his Tokyo speech, was that it was media hype more than reality, 
and placed blame squarely at the feet of the American press.444 
In a long cable sent to General Frank McIntyre of the Bureau of Insular 
Affairs, Taft set out a detailed account of his Japanese trip.445 Taft informed McIntyre 
that the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs was among the first to ask Taft about 
rumours of a U.S. willingness to sell the Philippines and how he related his explicit 
denial of these rumours. Taft also assured the Minister of Foreign Affairs Tadasu 
Hayashi, that the anti-Japanese immigration sentiments in San Francisco were 
unrepresentative of Americans as a whole. In further meetings Japanese officials 
made it clear to Taft that what Japan most ‘resented’ was that Japanese were not 
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treated equally to Europeans, and that if such equality were achieved the Japanese 
would be happy to sign a reciprocal agreement restricting immigration of labour.446  
Taft summed up his ten-page cable by concluding that the Japanese 
Government and commercial interests in Japan were opposed to any conflict with the 
United States, the only dissent coming as a response to the idea that the Americans 
regarded the Japanese as inferior. However, Taft was not dismissive of popular 
discontent: ‘Popular voice is now so strong in Japan that the government could with 
difficulty resist pressure of war by the people should the immigration question be 
brought to direct issue by Act of Congress violating treaty.’447 Taft’s solution was to 
maintain the status quo in the United States confirming that emigration would be 
curbed by Japan in the future.448 The Japanese newspaper Yorozu Shoho was left 
without reassurance on the immigration question by Taft’s visit, though the paper did 
concede that in view of ‘Secretary Taft’s great speech we hope that there is no ground 
for the rumors now coming across the ocean.’449 If Taft genuinely had no mission and 
no diplomatic role as he claimed, then he had gone beyond his remit in Japan, 
assuaging Japanese fears of exclusion, as well as reassuring himself, and sending a 
message to Roosevelt, that the Japanese had no interest in the Philippines at all. On 
the latter point, such an assurance was sure to influence Taft’s actions in the 
Philippines as his Asian trip continued. Historian Ralph Minger concludes that Taft’s 
lack of concern over a war with Japan displayed his ‘lack of insight’ into Japan’s rise 
to power, as well as his ‘lack of historical perspective.’450 Perhaps in this instance, as 
in the matter of Chinese immigration or the establishment of free trade with the 
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Philippines, Taft revealed the narrowness of his vision when it came to Philippine 
affairs. Unlike Roosevelt, who admired and respected the power of the Japanese 
military machine, Taft downplayed the importance of such wider concerns when they 
conflicted with his imperial vision.  
Following his high-profile visit to Japan, Taft proceeded to China and was 
received ‘most royally’ by the Chinese, who, in Taft’s opinion, ‘were anxious to wipe 
out the memory of the boycott of two years ago.’451 Taft made an important address 
before the American Association of China during his visit, assuring them that the 
United States favoured the Open Door Policy and would ‘encourage this great 
Chinese Empire to take long steps in administrative and governmental reform.’452 He 
referred to the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905 as ‘a closed incident, a 
past episode.’453 As Willard Straight, the American consul general in Manchuria, had 
written to Taft in the previous month, the Chinese ‘rely greatly on the United States’ 
in regard to Japanese ambitions in Manchuria (a region rich in minerals and coal).454 
In the same address Taft mentioned the Philippines unsurprisingly in as much as the 
United States would ‘retain them permanently’ or turn them over to the Filipinos only 
when they were fit to maintain the required level of governance.455 Taft’s journeys to 
China, and more pressingly to Japan, were important precursors to his arrival in the 
Philippines. Taft had attempted as best he could to stabilise relations with two of 
Asia’s most important powers and, particularly in the case of Japanese-American 
relations, avert a potential threat to the future of his imperial vision. 
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 The Philippines were on Taft’s mind throughout his journey through East 
Asia, as they had no doubt been ever since he left the islands as civil governor. His 
trip in 1905 had left him dissatisfied with the civil government in general, Governor 
General Wright in particular, and the growing strength of the independence 
movement above all. In 1906 Wright had been replaced temporarily with Henry Clay 
Ide (an original member of the Taft Commission) and then in September 1906 with 
James Francis Smith.456 Historian Stanley Karnow suggests that Taft’s decision to 
replace the tactless and widely disliked Wright with a ‘devout Catholic’ was an 
attempt to try and salvage the ‘political edifice he had left behind.’ However, as 
Karnow notes, and others at the time also recognised, the rise of Filipino nationalism 
could not be solved as simply as this.457 Manila-based judge Newton W. Gilbert wrote 
to Taft before he departed for the Philippines: ‘The Philippine people are awaiting 
your coming with all their old-time regard, and I may say, love. The present is, in a 
way, a crisis, and your presence will do much to keep things right. General Smith is 
wonderfully adapted to his position, but the difficulties have been wonderfully 
increased by the various actions, or failure of action, of congress. If the progress and 
efforts of many of us here can avail, you will be the next President, and then we may 
hope for a definite pronouncement of policy on the part of the United States.’458 Taft 
was being welcomed back by supporters, something he seemed keen to emphasise. 
Gilbert’s letter also reveals the increased expectations by late 1907 that Taft would be 
a candidate for the Republicans in the 1908 presidential election. However, the main 
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purpose of Taft’s 1907 visit, that differentiated it from the trip of two years 
previously, was the opening of the Philippine Assembly. The assembly represented 
the culmination – as far as Taft had foreseen as civil governor – of the political power 
vested in Filipino hands for the sake of the policies of attraction and political 
education.  
 In April of 1907 Collier’s Magazine speculated on the Philippine question. An 
article in Collier’s suggested that many observers believed that Democrat William 
Jennings Bryan was still ‘secretly’ for ‘immediate independence.’ The magazine saw 
this state-of-affairs as something that had been a substantial ‘handicap’ to Taft for 
seven years.  ‘Consider the position of Canada, yet alone India, if her relations with 
England were to be changed by a change of administration! Or of Alaska, in our own 
case,’ the magazine stated, suggesting that the idea that Democratic victory in a U.S. 
election might bring about a U-turn on colonial policy was the main ‘stumbling-
block’ to progress in U.S.-Philippine relations. However, aside from the reporter’s 
own views on the situation, quotations from an interview with Taft provide further 
illumination to Taft’s own feelings about the perceived independence policies, which 
a Bryan administration might implement. Taft suggested that: ‘In one sense it would 
be a good thing as far as the Philippines are concerned… if Bryan were in. He would 
probably find that the Republican Senate would not permit withdrawal, even if the 
force of the situation did not convince him of its impracticability. We might have a 
repetition of our experiences with Hawaii in Cleveland’s Administration. When the 
Republicans returned to power we fixed a policy of definite occupation by 
annexation.’459 Despite the fact that the United States had already annexed the 
Philippines, Taft’s parallel with the Hawaii precedent seems to suggest Taft believed 
                                                
459 Collier’s Magazine, April 13, 1907, in: WHTP 17:623. 
 187 
that whether the Republicans retained the White House or not, the likely fate of the 
Philippines was that they would become closer to the United States: more like the 
status eventually conferred to Hawaii.  
The interviewer for Collier’s went on to ask Taft whether there was no 
possibility of the United States escaping their responsibility to the Philippines, ‘even 
if we are of the mind?’ Taft answered definitively: ‘I see none,’ citing once again the 
inevitable instability and potential for occupation by another great power. Taft argued 
that the islands needed to be able to ‘care for themselves,’ and the U.S were obliged 
to remain in the archipelago until that situation arose, finishing with the statement 
that, ‘It is not conceivable that our country will ever let them go except of our own 
will.’460 One can only assume that in this sense Taft felt that Philippine independence 
was a question that they would only put to the Filipino population when such a 
proposal could conceivably be rejected, a point some decades away at least, as Taft 
had suggested on numerous previous occasions. 
In his 1907 visit to the islands, Taft, as the figurehead of U.S.-Filipino 
relations, had returned to oversee the birth of the Filipino lower chamber and make 
the inaugural speech upon this significant occasion. The speech itself was, Taft told 
Root, ‘not as easy a task as it might be,’ suggesting that Taft was unsure of the focus 
of his message for the occasion. Once again it is useful to return to Roosevelt’s 
“Achilles’ Heel” instructions to Taft, suggesting that he might use the occasion of his 
trip to the Philippines to break his (and the Republican administration’s) silence on 
independence. There is little doubt that this concern weighed heavily on Taft. 
Roosevelt, for so long an arch-imperialist and a chief ally of Taft, had reneged on his 
support for Taft’s policy of indefinite retention.  
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 On October 16, 1907, Taft gave his address inaugurating the Philippine 
Assembly that, following the elections held in July, comprised a majority of 
representatives calling for immediate independence.461 Historian Stanley Karnow 
described the speech as: ‘a stale and tiresome lecture that showed him to be badly out 
of date,’ primarily due to its inattention to the fact that many Filipino politicians were 
ambivalent to independence, and that many used the issue more as a bargaining tool 
for greater autonomy and aid from the Americans than from any great conviction.462 
This is a useful point, as it was clear that Taft was relatively uninterested in the 
reasons behind the now widespread calls for independence among politicians who had 
once shied from the issue, but was overwhelmingly focused on stemming the tide of 
such advocacy among Filipinos. As Karnow also points out, many Filipino politicians 
privately feared the consequences of the realities posed by independence.463 However, 
Taft’s reasoning for many years had been that even promising independence would 
prove disastrous, and he reverted to form in his speech: ‘How long the process of 
political preparation of the Filipino people is likely to be is a question which no one 
can certainly answer. When I was in the Islands the last time, I ventured the opinion 
that it would take considerably longer than a generation. I have not changed my view 
upon this point.’ He went on to suggest that the U.S. experiment was unique, and as 
such, ‘to fix a certain number of years in which the experiment must become a 
success and be completely realized would be, in my judgement, unwise.’464  
The closest Taft came to suggesting a future independence came in typical 
Taft fashion: ‘As this policy of extending control continues, it must logically reduce 
and finally end the sovereignty of the United States in the Islands, unless it shall seem 
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wise to the American and the Filipino peoples, on account of mutually beneficial 
trade relations and possible advantages to the Islands in their foreign relations, that 
the bond shall not be completely severed.’465 As on previous occasions Taft suggested 
that the time for independence was a good way in the future, but then at that 
indeterminable point the Philippines would have a choice on independence, and, 
importantly, might choose to remain connected to the United States. Also, though put 
much more diplomatically, this was in line with his comments to Collier’s magazine, 
cited earlier, that the United States would be the judge of when such a decision should 
be made.  
Taft was under no illusions that if a vote were taken within a year, there would 
be very little possibility of the Philippines remaining in a long-term relationship with 
the United States; Taft’s ideal needed at least a generation or two for the Filipinos to 
become accustomed to the association. Finally, Taft concluded on this issue, the 
decision was not his but a decision for the United States Congress. Taft’s conditional 
and vague suggestions of a distant decision on the question of independence were in 
line with what he, rather than President Roosevelt, advocated. Roosevelt had 
suggested to Taft that a promise of independence should be conceded, and for Taft 
this would have all but ended the possibility of the future dominion-style relationship 
that he desired. Historian Charles Neu, despite arguing that Taft was not a policy 
maker but was instead guided by the stronger opinions of figures such as Roosevelt, 
does at least concede that in opposing a declaration on the future of the Philippines, 
Taft served to delay any hasty action by Roosevelt and allowed matters to calm down 
in the coming months so that Roosevelt’s ‘mood passed.’466 Indeed, Taft’s decision to 
not promise independence ultimately secured more than five further years without 
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such a promise being made, during which time he continued to control policy in this 
area securing this status quo. Surely, one must concede then that this in itself can be 
considered a fairly important example of Taft himself shaping Philippine policy in a 
significant way. Roosevelt’s pro-independence letter of August 1907 is cited as a 
‘milestone’ in the history of American imperialism.467 However, it was Taft’s 
diplomacy and careful language in Japan and the Philippines during this period that 
helped avert Roosevelt’s concession of a promise of independence, and allowed the 
possibility of long-term imperialism to survive for the time being. This action was 
critical to Taft’s imperial vision and the fact he went against the advice of Roosevelt, 
whom he respected enormously, evidenced how important the issue was to him. 
One might consider that Taft’s concern over his speech before the assembly 
was some form of consternation about the devolution of limited political power to the 
Filipinos, especially to those who were calling for immediate independence. On the 
contrary, Taft assured President Roosevelt that the assembly promised ‘to be a 
conservative body, and I think that it will help instead of interfering with the success 
of government.’ This being despite the fact that the assembly elections had delivered 
a huge majority for parties calling for immediate independence in their platforms, and 
a disappointing result for Taft’s more conservative (pro-American) Filipino 
politicians. However, as an example of Taft’s grudging acknowledgment of the 
election results, he did go on to add the following caveat: ‘The Assembly may ask 
Congress to define the relations between the United States and the Islands by some 
promise. I think it would be wiser not to have any definite promise or any definitive 
statement.’468 As a final reply to the Philippine elections of July and Roosevelt’s 
August message, Taft had responded in the negative to all parties who favoured a 
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promise of independence. Roosevelt wanted Taft to reveal the president’s changing 
views on retention and Taft had refused to do so – Taft would not act as an apostle of 
independence even for his political career-maker. The next chapter in this thesis looks 
in more detail at the nature and composition of the assembly, and how Taft reacted to 
the new structure of government and the political ascendancy of pro-independence 




In a banquet held for the Secretary of War in the Hotel Metropole in Manila, 
on October 21, 1907, some prominent Filipinos made speeches commenting upon 
Taft’s address before the assembly with their own readings of Taft’s seemingly 
ambiguous take on Philippine independence. Antonio Regidor, a former revolutionary 
leader, concluded his remarks by expressing his hope that the U.S. and the Philippines 
‘may live forever imperishably united… but free, each with its independent juridic 
personality.’469 Filipino politician Vicente Singson Encarnation felt that Taft’s wise 
words about the need for the United States to remain in the islands for the foreseeable 
future, would see him remembered as ‘the good angel of the Philippines at a critical 
time and that he was the skilled artificer and molder of our future Nationality.’470 
Both of these speakers praised Taft, and both saw in Taft’s speech some implicit 
guarantee of future independence. However, Regidor seemed to embrace Taft’s 
ultimate vision more closely: a permanent union of sorts, but with some form of legal 
autonomy for the Philippines. In a newspaper report later in the month Regidor told 
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readers that: “Mr. [William Jennings] Bryan himself, in answer to a question 
propounded by me through a mutual friend, advises the Filipinos not to create 
obstacles for America, and to follow Mr. Taft, who’s the only one who can lead us to 
the realization of our ideals.’471 Regidor, clearly a devout Taft supporter, was stating 
things just the way Taft saw them: he was the only man with a plan that was good for 
the Philippines and the U.S., and further, he was the only one with the ability to carry 
it out. Indeed, rather than representative voices of the majority of politicians in the 
Philippine Assembly, the figures who spoke so gushingly of Taft were the remnants 
of his favoured conservative pro-American elites. According to Regidor, even the 
Great Commoner thought that the Great Postponer had the right idea for the 
Philippines, however unlikely this seems. Nevertheless, what Taft’s speech to the 
assembly had shown was that Bryan was right, Taft wanted postponement. He desired 
postponement of increased self-government, postponement of a promise of 
independence and postponement of independence itself. What Bryan failed to note 
was that Taft did have a plan beyond mere postponement: some form of permanent 
colonial connection, for the attainment of which Taft saw postponement as the key.   
Taft informed his brother Charles that the Americans in Manila were 
beginning to see ‘first, the advantage of the policy that I have always pursued, and 
that it has not been antagonistic to American business interests, and second, they 
begin to realize that if I am the Republican nominee and elected, nothing could 
happen in the politics of the United States which would more direct the profitable 
attention of Congress and the people to the Philippines.’472 With Taft among the 
frontrunners for the Republican presidential nomination in 1908, Taft and those who 
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supported him had every reason to believe that his opinions on the future of the 


















































The Reluctant President: Maintaining the Status Quo and the End of the Taft 





In January of 1908, Secretary of War Taft sent a special report to President 
Roosevelt detailing the findings of his recent visit to the Philippines. In the published 
version of Taft’s report there was an additional introductory letter from the president, 
which offers a good example of how Roosevelt felt about Taft’s decision to delay the 
promise of independence and continue the policy of retention. Roosevelt argued in his 
letter that the U.S. had treated the Philippines with ‘wisdom and disinterestedness,’ 
and that, had they turned the islands ‘loose’ or submitted them to absolute U.S. rule, 
they would have done the Filipinos a great injustice. Roosevelt called attention to the 
‘admirably clear showing made by Secretary Taft’ against going too fast towards 
giving the Filipinos self-government, and – instead – continuing the ongoing gradual 
approach to preparing the Filipinos for self-government. Roosevelt felt that although 
the Filipinos had ‘made real advances in a hopeful direction,’ they still had ‘a long 
way to travel before they will be fit for complete self-government, and for deciding, 
as it will be their duty to do, whether this self-government shall be accompanied by 
complete independence.’ In this sense, Roosevelt echoed the thoughts Taft had 
expressed at the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly, and appeared to be 
backtracking from the idea of promising the Filipinos independence sooner rather 
than later.473 Perhaps this is the best example of Taft having a significant influence on 
Roosevelt’s Philippine policy, which had only the previous year advocated promising 
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the Philippines independence due to lack of public support for retention and the 
strategic weakness of the islands in a potential scenario of war with Japan.474 Taft had 
held firm in his retentionist stance and this introductory letter suggests that the usually 
stubborn Roosevelt underwent a change of heart on the Philippine issue. Whether 
Roosevelt had truly changed his opinion, or simply felt it prudent to endorse his 
cabinet member’s words as set out at the inauguration of the Philippine Assembly, the 
set of events is clear: Roosevelt suggested a change of policy, Taft rejected this 
change and Roosevelt endorsed Taft’s policy. 
Following on directly from the previous chapter and Taft’s return from the 
opening of the Philippine Assembly, this chapter begins by analysing Taft’s final 
months as Secretary of War in 1908 and his Philippine policy after the opening of the 
new Philippine Assembly. However, 1908 was also the year in which Taft ran for the 
presidency and won against anti-imperialist William Jennings Bryan. This chapter 
analyses what the party candidate and presidential election campaign debates revealed 
about what a Taft presidency would mean for the Philippines. The next part of the 
chapter explores how, on assuming the presidency, Taft was able to maintain his 
favoured status quo in the Philippines without the fear of a sudden change in 
executive policy. However, as the latter part of the chapter explores, the Philippine 
issue only really came to the fore in late 1912 and early 1913 when Taft was a lame 
duck president on his way out of the White House. This section examines Taft’s last 
days in office and his stand against the Democrats and their proposed policy of 
                                                
474 As historian Charles Neu suggests, Taft did not ‘succumb to any of the fear that had agitated 
Roosevelt during the crisis of 1906-1908’ with Japan, and he continued to remain calm and passive 
toward the Japanese issue during his presidency. Despite Taft’s personal feelings, military and naval 
advisers began a more ‘systematic consideration of war with Japan’ during Taft’s presidency and 
‘fretted over the vulnerability of the Philippines.’ However, strategists were divided over whether 
Germany or Japan represented the biggest threat and the navy refused to move the fleet to the Pacific. 
Neu sees the Taft presidency as a time of slowly simmering antagonism between Japan and the United 
States – where U.S. attempts to interfere in Manchuria caused further friction – that climaxed under 
Wilson’s presidency with yet more immigration-related aggravation. See: Neu, Troubled Encounter, 
75-77. 
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promising Philippine independence and expediting the process of Filipinization. This 
key period was Taft’s last chance to try and define Philippine policy, and represented 
the redefinition of his position as a figurehead for retentionists that would characterise 
his post-presidential activities. Overall, throughout the entire period examined here 
Taft maintained his stance on Philippine retention consistently, whether as Republican 
presidential candidate, sitting president, or lame duck. This chapter illustrates that in 
the period when Taft had the greatest ability to guide U.S. foreign policy in the 
islands of his entire career, his attitude against Philippine independence remained 
resolute, and to the best of his ability Taft tried to maintain a retentionist policy until 
his departure from federal office and then, perhaps, beyond.  
 
The Aftermath of the Assembly Elections 
 
 Following its inauguration in October 1907, the Philippine Assembly became 
the representative lower house in the administration of the Philippines. The Philippine 
Commission, headed by the U.S. Governor-General comprised the upper house. 
Although the upper house was appointive, a “popular” election was held for the 
assembly with 104,000 (Christian) voters electing 80 Filipino assemblymen.475 Taft 
reported the results of the election as follows: 
 
Progresistas   16   
Catolico   1 
Independientes  20 
Nacionalistas   31 
                                                
475 The distinction between Christian (primarily Catholic) and non-Christian (Muslims and those with 
indigenous beliefs) is the focus of significant attention from historian Paul Kramer. Kramer argues that 
the U.S. built a ‘bifurcated state’ that was ‘built upon an imperial indigenism, one of whose 
fundamental features was a racialized construction of religion, specifically an account of the radical, 
typological differences between Hispanicized Catholics and what were called non-Christians.’ Kramer 
argues that the Catholics were seen as ‘partly civilized’ by centuries of Spanish rule, the non-Christians 
were viewed as especially savage and backward. See: Kramer, Blood of Government, 208-209. 
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Inmediatistas   7 
Independistas   4 
Nacionalista Independiente 1476 
 
Although at first glance there were a number of political parties presented in 
Taft’s report, in reality the largest by far was the Partido Nacionalista (Nationalist 
Party). The Nationalist Party was a combination of pro-independence groups that 
together won a commanding fifty-nine of the seats in the assembly (though only one 
third of the popular vote).477 Taft’s favoured party, the Progresistas (Progressive 
Party), captured only sixteen (despite receiving one quarter of the total vote).478 
Although the American-led commission had a majority supporting the Republican 
administration in relation to the U.S.-Philippine relationship, the assembly now posed 
a tangible and vocal opposition to retention. 
Although is it not of central relevance to this thesis to deal with the election 
and composition of the assembly in detail, it is useful to establish the main 
composition and state of Philippine politics after the opening of the assembly. The 
Progressive Party was essentially the reincarnation of the former Federal Party and 
comprised, in Taft’s words, ‘the ablest and most conservative of the Filipinos,’ 
representing ‘conservatism on the issue of independence.’479 Taft continued to put his 
faith in so-called conservative Filipinos, by which he meant those not in favour of 
immediate independence and rather more in favour of a continued American presence 
in the islands. The Federalist Party had, in its earlier days, stood on a platform that 
supported the idea of statehood for the Philippines. However, as historian H. W. 
                                                
476 “Special Report,” 45. As one historian notes, the Assembly represented the first parliament ‘ever 
freely elected in Asia,’ but was voted for by only landowners, taxpayers and the literate, accounting for 
only three percent of the population. Karnow, In Our Image, 238. 
477 Historian Paul Kramer notes that despite the seeming ‘radical break’ in the political makeup of the 
Philippines, ninety percent of the new assemblymen had already held office at some level under an 
American administration. Kramer, Blood of Government, 300. 
478 Golay, Face of Empire, 124. Golay accounts for the disparity between the popular vote and the 
proportion of seats won in the Philippine Assembly as due to the large number of independent 
candidates who ‘scattered the vote.’  
479 “Special Report,” 43. 
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Brands argues, disillusion about the attractiveness and potential of statehood, coupled 
with the lifting of the ban on advocating independence in the islands, had changed the 
party’s fortunes and outlook since Taft left the islands.480 The Sedition Act had stalled 
the formation of pro-independence parties, which had attempted to give voice to the 
popular call for independence while Taft had been governor, as explored in Chapter 
Two. Therefore, partly as a response to the rise of opposition parties rallying around 
the independence issue, in 1905 the Federal Party removed the statehood plank from 
their party platform and substituted instead a call for eventual independence, a move 
reaffirmed in the name change that followed a year and a half later.481 Despite its 
seemingly substantial shift in platform, the Progressive Party was still the closest 
political party in the Philippines to the imperial vision Taft advocated and its 
membership comprised most of the Filipino elite still openly sympathetic to Taft’s 
policy of gradualism. Taft claimed that the party ‘took the position fully and flatly 
that the people of the Philippines were not fitted for immediate independence.’482 So 
keen were Taft and Philippine Governor-General James F. Smith to keep the pro-
American elites in influential positions that Benito Legarda (a Progressive) was 
elected by the American-dominated commission as one of the two new resident 
commissioners to Washington.483 The second resident commissioner was Pablo 
Ocampo, nominated by the assembly and a Nationalist advocate of immediate 
                                                
480 Brands, Bound to Empire, 86. Brands highlights the visit of members of the Federal Party to the St. 
Louis World’s Fair, where they witnessed the reality of racial segregation and Asian exclusion in the 
United States, as a turning point. He suggests that this chastening experience helped convince the party 
that statehood was not necessarily all that desirable and that those in the United States would be 
unlikely to accept it anyway. 
481 Ibid. 
482 “Special Report,” 44. 
483 When it came to appointing new resident commissioners in 1910, Taft was determined to have 
Legarda appointed again, despite continued rejections of such an appointment by the Philippine 
Assembly, to the end that even his own party deserted his candidacy. Legarda’s pro-U.S. stance and his 
belief that the Filipinos were not ready for self-government made his candidacy, in the words of Frank 
Golay, ‘anathema to the Nacionalistas.’ Taft’s wishes were achieved by the passage of legislation 
allowing the existing commissioners to remain in place until their successors were elected. See: Golay, 
Face of Empire, 150. 
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independence, reflecting far more realistically the shift in political power. However, 
not everybody in the administration was so sure of Taft’s continued faith in the 
Progressives. As historian Stanley Karnow suggests, Commissioner William Cameron 
Forbes and other U.S. officials in the islands considered the party ‘a spent force.’484 
Taft’s report was trying to present the fact that his favoured party had clearly lost in 
the most positive light, but the election results were clear: a promise of independence 
was favoured by the vast majority of assemblymen and Taft’s Filipino allies could no 
longer dominate affairs in the islands on patronage alone. 
In contrast to the Progressives, the Nationalist Party was a ‘fusion of several 
smaller groups’ all favouring immediate independence.485 As discussed in the 
previous chapter, Taft saw calls for immediate independence as a vote winning slogan 
rather than a truly held conviction for most of the Filipino elite, and felt that the long-
term strategy he favoured was a far more difficult option to sell. Taft described the 
situation thus:  ‘As a shibboleth – as a party cry – immediate independence has much 
force, because it excites the natural pride of the people, but few of their number have 
ever worked out its consequences, and when they have done so they have been willing 
to postpone that question until some of the immediate needs of the people have been 
met.’486 Taft argued that if given a popular vote on whether to become independent, it 
was not surprising the Filipinos would vote for independence, and that this was, on 
one level, an encouraging sign: 
Another logical deduction from the main proposition is that when the 
Filipino people as a whole, show themselves reasonably fit to conduct 
a popular self-government, maintaining law and order and offering 
equal protection of the laws and civil rights to rich and poor, and 
desire complete independence of the United States, they shall be given 
it. The standard set, of course, is not that of perfection or such a 
governmental capacity as that of an Anglo-Saxon people, but it 
                                                
484 Karnow, In Our Image, 237. 
485 Brands, Face of Empire, 86. 
486 “Special Report,” 46. 
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certainly ought to be one of such popular political capacity that 
complete independence in its exercise will result in progress rather 
than retrogression to chaos or tyranny. It should be noted, too, that the 
tribunal to decide whether proper political capacity exists to justify 
independence is Congress and not the Philippine electorate. Aspiration 
for independence may well be one of the elements in the make-up of a 
people to show their capacity for it, but there are other qualifications 
quite as indispensable. The judgement of a people as to their own 
political capacity is not an unerring guide.487  
 
Taft felt that even if the majority of the people did favour immediate 
independence, then such convictions would not be ‘an intelligent judgement based on 
a knowledge of what independence means, of what its responsibilities are or of what 
popular government in its essence is.’ Despite the changing conditions in the politics 
of the Philippine Islands and the ascendancy those advocating immediate 
independence, Taft’s message had not changed. Unlike a more canny politician such 
as Theodore Roosevelt who had sensed the changing winds in U.S. and Filipino 
opinion on independence leading him to question the idea of retention in 1907, Taft 
was determined that in the long run he would be proved to have been right in his 
constancy. In line with his long-standing emphasis on education, Taft felt that 
political judgement was something the uneducated majority of the Filipino population 
needed to be taught to understand the nature of democracy and civil rights.488 In order 
to achieve this, Taft suggested the U.S. Congress should contribute ‘a permanent 
appropriation of two or three millions of dollars for ten or fifteen years to the primary 
and industrial education of the Filipino people,’ with the Filipino government 
matching the amount.489 Far from taking a reactionary stance to the rising calls for 
immediate independence, Taft’s alternative was a plan that he had advocated since the 
beginning of U.S. civil government in the islands: education centred and gradualist.  
                                                
487 Ibid., 8. 
488 Ibid., 7. 
489 Ibid., 30. 
 201 
 Historian H. W. Brands sums up the political change, especially the 
transformation of the Federalistas into the Progresistas, as indicative of an 
acceptance among Filipino politicians that the political narrative had shifted 
decisively from whether the Philippines should be independent to when.490 By 
contrast, historian Bonifacio Salamanca points out that the Americans were ‘slow in 
admitting that a real change in leadership had taken place,’ seeking to claim that the 
assembly elections were an ‘inconclusive index’ of party political strengths.491 
However, Taft was not in complete denial of the political power of the independence 
movement and despite not wishing to promise independence, it was unrealistic to 
expect Taft to sidestep the issue entirely. Taft conceded in his report that the gradual 
policy of increased self-government for Filipinos ‘necessarily involves in the ultimate 
conclusion as the steps toward self-government become greater and greater the 
ultimate independence of the islands.’ However, as he had done time and again in 
previous speeches and reports, Taft suggested that ‘although of course if both the 
United States and the islands were to conclude after complete self-government were 
possible that it would be mutually beneficial to continue a government relation 
between them like that between England and Australia, there would be nothing 
inconsistent with the present policy in such a result.’492 Thus, given his suggestions of 
a continuing imperial bond, Taft had not really accepted independence, but instead 
suggested that it was one of two possibilities as the ‘ultimate conclusion’ of U.S. 
policy, both involving complete self-government. The fact that he used the word 
“ultimate” twice in one sentence, once again suggested that this perceivable option of 
independence was a great distance in the future.  Taft went on to conclude that: ‘If the 
                                                
490 Brands, Bound to Empire, 86. 
491 Salamanca, Filipino Reaction, 161-162. 
492 “Special Report,” 74. Here again Taft draws a comparison with the relationship between Britain and 
its dominions in Canada and Australia, discussed in the introduction to this thesis. 
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American government can only remain in the islands long enough to educate the 
entire people, to give them a language which enables them to come into contact with 
modern civilization, and to extend to them from time to time additional political rights 
so that by the exercise of them they shall learn the use and responsibilities necessary 
to their proper exercise, independence can be granted with entire safety to the people.’ 
Taft saw this policy as markedly different from Britain’s dealings with its non-white 
colonies, and rebuked British criticisms of the U.S. for educating the masses and 
moving too fast, where the opposite policy had worked for the British.493 Such a view 
is supported by historian Glenn May who suggests that despite ‘the restrictions 
imposed on the franchise and the supervision to which Filipino officials were 
subjected, the Americans gave their subjects more experience in self-government than 
Europeans did to theirs.’494  
 One might conclude from Taft’s report that Taft had shifted position on 
independence. Taft had definitely acknowledged independence as one of the ultimate 
options in the distant future, but suggested that an imperial relationship of some kind 
might be a mutually agreeable alternative. Again, this was not really new, but simply 
a different way of stating the idea Taft had been trying to promote since at least the 
hearings before the Philippine Committee in 1902. If there was a shift in Taft’s 
rhetoric, it was provoked by the realities of the assembly elections and the popular 
mood in the Philippines towards the issue of immediate independence. The policy of 
attraction was based on compromises with the Filipino elite and concessions over 
devolved government. However, the culmination of this policy always posed a 
danger, in that the opening of the assembly meant that Taft could no longer dictate 
who would be elected to office. As a result Taft’s Filipino political allies had accepted 
                                                
493 Ibid., 75. 
494 G. A. May, Social Engineering, 181. 
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independence as an ultimate goal for their own good, albeit in the long term, and Taft 
had to accept that the nature of his discourse on independence had to follow suit. Taft 
could not alienate his so-called “conservative” Filipino allies by suggesting 
independence was not an option – ever – if he was going to be able to pursue what 
had always been his ultimate goal: a dominion-style relationship between the U.S. and 
the Philippines. During his time as civil governor, Taft had been able to suppress talk 
of independence with the excuse of ongoing guerrilla warfare, but now the tide of 
political discussion had turned against him decidedly. Taft believed that if the 
Philippines were to remain under U.S. rule for a couple of generations the mood could 
shift once more and his aim of a permanent link could be achieved in time. The 
Progressive Party was still Taft’s best hope, and the threat to his designs now lay not 
so much in mere discussion of independence, but rather in the discussion of 
immediate independence. If the Philippines were to be won over to U.S. rule under 
decades of education, investment and trade, time was required. The vague promise of 
the gradual turnover of power and a far off decision on independence was not so far 
removed from his original aims – there was still no firm promise or timetable, and as 
such time would be allowed for a shift in popular opinion.  
 
The Philippines, the Nomination and the Election of 1908 
Part I – The Nomination 
 
Returning from the Philippines to become Roosevelt’s Secretary of War had been an 
important step for Taft, one that not only allowed him to maintain oversight of 
Philippine affairs, but also to further his political career as his family had suggested. 
Theodore Roosevelt’s somewhat rash declaration in 1904 that he would not accept 
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another nomination in 1908 ruled out the favourite for the position and Taft’s was 
among the names raised as a potential successor along with Secretary of State Elihu 
Root and Charles Evans Hughes. As early as 1906 Roosevelt, for want of a figure 
more fitting (and as he saw it, more malleable), had been considering backing Taft for 
the presidency in 1908.495 On January 2, 1908 The Independent of New York 
suggested: ‘Thruout [sic] the year Mr. Taft has… remained the leading candidate for 
the Republican nomination.’496 Therefore, despite his professed reluctance to become 
president, just as he had been reluctant to go to the Philippines, Taft began the year 
1908 as the frontrunner for the nomination. In a letter to Philippine Commissioner 
William Cameron Forbes in November 1907, Taft had suggested that interest in his 
candidacy for the presidency was already waning. Taft told Forbes: ‘it is not 
particularly disappointing or surprising to me for I had anticipated it, and it will mean 
that I can continue at the head of the War Department at any rate until a year from 
next March, which will still leave something of the Philippine problem in my hands 
for a solution.’497 Whether or not Taft truly was so indifferent to his presidential 
potential, what is more pertinent in his sentiments is his aim to use the remaining time 
as Secretary of War to deal with the Philippines. The phrase ‘in my hands’ is 
particularly telling, as it suggests that even as early as 1907 Taft was afraid that his 
ability to shape Philippine policy might be coming to an end. Such a fear was to be 
relived four years later in a far more significant manner.  
New York Times journalist Oscar King Davis spends a great deal of time 
stressing the importance of the Philippines as the basis for Taft’s qualifications for 
executive office in his campaign biography William Howard Taft: The Man of the 
                                                
495 J. I. Anderson, An Intimate History, 90-92. As Anderson suggests, Root was Roosevelt’s first 
choice, but the Secretary of State showed an even greater reluctance than Taft to put himself forward. 
496 The Independent (New York), January 2, 1908. 
497 WHT to Forbes, November 30, 1907, WCFP, File No. 291. At this point Forbes was not yet 
Governor-General. 
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Hour.498 As a presidential candidate Taft was not an experienced politician, nor had 
he ever been elected to office, but he had an impressive record in foreign affairs. 
Similarly, biographer and historian Donald Anderson sees Taft’s foreign affairs 
experience as ‘perhaps his biggest asset as a potential presidential candidate.’499 
Historian Akira Iriye goes so far as to state that Taft’s experience and expertise in 
foreign relations meant that he ‘was ideally fitted to provide the leadership that was 
required of the country as it entered the second decade of the post-1898 era in its 
foreign affairs.’500 If Taft had any credible claim to being prepared to assume the 
presidency, then it was to be found in his executive experience as Civil Governor of 
the Philippines and in his multiple foreign assignments as Secretary of War. Mr. 
Dooley summed up the candidacy of Taft in the following sketch of Taft the “Jollier” 
in his own inimitable style: 
An’ thin ther’s me frind Taft. Sthrongly ricomminded be th’ captain iv 
th’ Cincinaty Reds, he is said to be good prisidintyal timber…. 
Oh, he’s called Sicrety iv War, but he don’t pay anny attention to that. 
Not he. If War had a sicrety like Taft, it wudden’t dictate anything to 
him but mashed letters. But he hasn’t been to his office f’r I don’t 
know how long. His rale position in the cabinet is Official Jollyer. 
He’s the Happy Hand. Whin there’s a ruction anywhere Taft starts out 
an’ cleans it up… 
Wan day he’s down in th’ Flippeens tellin’ our little brothers that in 
th’ coorse iv cinchries, if they’ll on’y have patience to wait, they’ll get 
a chance to cheer th’ movin’ pitchers in front iv th’ newspaper offices 
ivry foorth Novimber.501 
 
 On March 31, William Jennings Bryan, the frontrunner for the Democratic 
nomination for presidency attacked Taft’s record, suggesting that, unlike himself, Taft 
failed to offer reform, and that under Taft imperialism would remain.502  On April 8, 
in a similar vein, Bryan focused on the cost of imperialism and the fact that Taft had 
                                                
498 Davis, Man of the Hour. 
499 D. Anderson, Conservative’s Conception of the Presidency, 24. 
500 Iriye, From Nationalism to Internationalism, 213.  
501 Finley Peter Dunne, “Mr. Dooley on the Presidential Candidates,” 1908, WHTP 623:17. 
502 New York Times, March 31, 1908. 
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never made a promise of independence to the Filipinos despite having had the chance 
to do so.503 What Bryan suggested was not that Taft’s Philippine administration had 
been a failure, as it was widely regarded as a success, but rather that a continuation of 
this policy reneged on unwritten agreements concerning independence and came at a 
considerable cost to the U.S. taxpayer.  
It was not only Bryan who tried to characterise a vote for Taft as a vote for 
imperialism. In a letter to the New York Times of June 1908, Erving Winslow, of the 
Anti-Imperialist League, quoted former president Grover Cleveland in suggesting that 
once the Philippines were fit for self-government the U.S. should stop their 
‘interference.’ Winslow went on to state: ‘Imperialism is an attitude which contradicts 
this position. Such attitude [sic] is that of William H. Taft, and among all the citizens 
of the United States he is the one and only person fully committed to it with his belief 
that it cannot be attained in any case for a “generation” or “generations” – better that 
it should not come at all; and that the ideal ultimate relation should be such as exists 
between Canada and Australia and Great Britain.’504 Although the Anti-Imperialist 
League was clearly biased against Taft’s plans for the Philippines, this summary was 
remarkably accurate, and recognised that despite the appearances of the 1908 Special 
Report and its rhetoric of ultimate independence, what Taft really desired was that 
independence ‘should not come at all.’505 What is also noteworthy is that Winslow 
regarded Taft as the ‘one and only person’ who was ‘fully committed’ to a long-term 
imperial relationship. This suggests that those who most opposed Taft’s plans also 
most clearly recognised how distinctly committed he was, among leading political 
figures, to such an imperial vision.  
                                                
503 Washington Post, April 8, 1908. 
504 New York Times, June 28, 1908. 
505 Ibid. 
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On June 18, 1908, the Republican National Convention selected Taft as their 
presidential nominee for the election and secured Taft’s Philippine policy as that of 
the Republican campaign.506 Most contemporaries and historians agree that Taft’s 
nomination was a result of Roosevelt’s endorsement and that the only way Taft could 
have lost the nomination was if Roosevelt had stood again himself.507 However, 
although the “Roosevelt factor” was the main reason for Taft’s nomination, his 
candidacy, and opposition to it from anti-imperialists such as Winslow, had focused 
upon his record in the Philippines and his imperial vision. The Republican National 
Platform, as adopted at the Chicago convention on this same day, had the following to 
say upon the issue of the Philippine Islands: ‘In the Philippines insurrection has been 
suppressed, law is established and life and property made secure. Education and 
practical experience are there advancing the capacity of the people for government, 
and the policies of McKinley and Roosevelt are leading the inhabitants, step by step, 
to an ever increasing measure of home rule.’508 The platform, as one would expect, 
stressed progress under Republican rule, and used the term ‘home rule’ to describe the 
increased self-government in the Philippines, suggesting the sort of imperial 
relationship that Taft advocated: something along the lines of a British Dominion.509 
The platform also proposed free trade (with certain restrictions) between the U.S. and 
the Philippines, which Taft had advocated for many years, seeing it as essential in 
                                                
506 The results of the convention nominations were as follows: Taft, 702; Philander Chase Knox, 68; 
Charles Evans Hughes, 67; Joe Cannon (Speaker), 58; Charles Warren Fairbanks (Roosevelt’s Vice-
President), 40; Robert LaFollette, 25; Joseph Foraker, 16. Pringle, Life and Times, vol. 1, 353. 
507 Summing up Roosevelt’s hand in Taft’s successful nomination, historian Judith Anderson cites the 
Times of London which called the Republican Convention ‘the greatest and most striking of all 
Roosevelt’s many victories.’ J. I Anderson, An Intimate History, 102. 
508 “Republican Party Platform,” July 16, 1908. 
509 ‘Home Rule’ is often related in a British context to the debates of the time surrounding the issue of 
Irish independence. The first Irish Home Rule Bill had been defeated in 1886, a second was defeated in 
1894 and a third would be passed and subsequently postponed by World War I in 1914.The parallels 
between the Irish and Filipino situations are discussed in Chapter Six, where the issue came more 
directly to the fore in the Wilsonian vision of self-determination of nations in the aftermath of the Great 
War.  
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tightening the imperial links. This chapter goes on to discuss the issue of free trade 
with the Philippines in a later section. These two portions of the platform had far 
more pertinence for Taft, who had spearheaded both initiatives, than for Roosevelt for 
whom the Philippine issue was far from a primary concern. 
Leading anti-imperialist Erving Winslow, in the same New York Times article 
quoted above, interpreted the Republican platform as a promise of imperialism: ‘Mr. 
Taft now stands on the Republican platform, which has substituted boldly for the 
indefinite and misleading word “self-government,” formerly employed in party 
utterances, “home rule,” as the goal for the Filipinos, not independence at all.’ 
Winslow even stated what is argued here to be Taft’s goal from his time as civil 
governor onwards: ‘the candidate knows after the “generation” or “generations” of 
preparations which he exacts, or even after a very few years of American exploitation 
which he encourages, relinquishment would be practically impossible.’ He closes 
with a stern warning that voters must remember that ‘Mr. Taft is to them the 
candidate of imperialism.’510 To Winslow, Taft’s well meaning words and 
suggestions of a distant agreement on relations were transparent and he suggested that 
it was only too clear that Taft’s ultimate goal was some form of lasting imperial bond. 
Of course, Winslow was not looking at Taft’s plan from a disinterested viewpoint and 
was actively trying to advance a negative construction of Taft’s imperial vision. 
However, for the Democrats, a party that had stood against imperialism with Bryan as 
their candidate in 1900, and lost, the issue of imperialism was perhaps their weakest 
hand against Taft, who was regarded as perhaps the kindest and most successful face 
of benevolent U.S. imperialism. Although the Philippine issue was not the central 
issue of the election campaign by any means, with Taft and Bryan so closely linked to 
                                                
510 New York Times, June 28, 1908. 
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such differing viewpoints regarding Philippine policy, it was certain to play a role in 
the debates that followed their respective nominations. 
 The Democratic platform, as one would imagine, had quite a different outlook 
for the Philippines than its Republican counterpart. The section dealing with the 
islands stated:  
We condemn the experiment in imperialism as an inexcusable blunder 
which has involved us in enormous expense, brought us weakness instead 
of strength, and laid our nation open to the charge of abandoning a 
fundamental doctrine of self-government. We favor an immediate 
declaration of the nation’s purpose to recognize the independence of the 
Philippine Islands as soon as a stable government can be established, such 
independence to be guaranteed by us as we guarantee the independence of 
Cuba, until the neutralization of the islands can be secured by treaty with 
other powers. In recognizing the independence of the Philippines our 
Government should retain such land as may be necessary for coaling 
stations and naval bases.511 
 
In stark contrast to Taft’s aim to maintain a colonial connection, through a 
gradualist approach towards home rule and increased cultural and financial exchange 
through free trade, the Democrats, likely under the anti-imperialist talisman of Bryan, 
were offering independence. The Democrats saw the Philippine experiment as an 
aberration in U.S. doctrine and proposed expedited self-government and 
independence – far more like Cuba than Puerto Rico.  
 
Part II – The Election 
 
In July 1908, an editorial appeared in the New York Times in support of Taft’s 
stance towards the Philippines: ‘Anti-imperialism is not an issue in this country, it is 
only a whine.’ It stated that even if people did compare the platforms of Taft and 
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Bryan on the Philippines, it would be unlikely they would choose Bryan.512 The 
article went on to argue that even if Bryan were elected, ‘he would be obliged to treat 
the Philippines precisely as Mr. TAFT would treat them, except that Mr. TAFT is 
much wiser and more competent for the task. Independence for the Filipinos is for the 
present a dream, and no Administration would negotiate or any Senate ratify an 
international treaty guaranteeing the neutrality of the Philippines as Mr. BRYAN’S 
platform recommends.’ The Times then went on to contend that as soon as Bryan 
‘finds that the people do not like one of his improvised issues, he retires it.’ The 
article suggested that a firm and consistent stance on the issue was the mark of ‘great 
statesmen’ whereas shifting opinions were characteristic of a ‘demagogue.’513 The 
editorial in itself suggested that the Philippine issue would not be overlooked entirely 
as the election campaign began. 
 Despite the fact that Taft had consistently deferred any promise of 
independence, even at the behest of Roosevelt in 1907, and that the Republican Party 
Platform endorsed home rule, a special report in the Times published in August 1908, 
suggested both Roosevelt and Taft favoured independence. According to the Times, 
Roosevelt met with National Party leader Manuel Quezon at his summer home in 
Oyster Bay and suggested that he was ‘in favor of granting independence to the 
Filipinos within the next twenty years.’ However, the direct quotations from Quezon 
do not specify a guarantee of independence in twenty years, but rather a suggestion 
                                                
512 New York Times, July 20, 1908. In terms of political views, the New York Times in the nineteenth 
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that if the conditions were good enough the President hoped to see the islands 
independent in twenty years. The article implicates Taft in its suggestion, by alleging 
that as he set up the meeting between Quezon and Roosevelt via a ‘direct wire’ 
between Oyster Bay and Taft’s residence in Hot Springs, it somehow forecasted ‘the 
attitude of the Taft administration toward the Philippines.’514 Overall, what the article 
might suggest is that the assumption that a Taft presidency would simply be a 
surrogate Roosevelt presidency was already clear in the minds of the press. It was also 
possible that Roosevelt still believed, as he had in 1907, that the party would 
ultimately promise independence sooner rather than later. However, both assumptions 
were to prove wrong. Whether Roosevelt wanted to promise the Philippines 
independence, or indeed realise it in two decades, Taft did not want to do either of 
these things and as his presidency would prove, much to Roosevelt’s chagrin, his time 
in office was not about to be Roosevelt’s third term.  
The previous article did, in its summary, also touch upon a different angle of 
the debate over the Philippines and the election, and that is the question of whom the 
Filipinos preferred to win in 1908. The Times quoted Manuel Quezon, leader of the 
Nationalist Party in the Philippine Assembly, as favouring the election of Taft, 
because he knew the needs of the Filipinos and was well acquainted with Filipino 
politicians.515 The Washington Post had, earlier in the year, reported that the 
Philippine delegation to the Republican Convention favoured Taft for similar reasons, 
as he ‘understands the conditions in the Philippines.’516 However, Bryan claimed that 
Alberto Barretto, leader of the governing body of the Nationalist Party, assured the 
Democrats that their victory was preferred in the upcoming U.S. elections. Bryan 
argued that as the Nationalist Party was the largest single party in the assembly and 
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was unanimously behind him and the Democrats, Taft’s claims that those who 
advocated independence also supported the Republicans were unfounded. ‘If Taft 
wants to defend his policy on the ground that it ought to be adopted whether the 
Filipinos want it or not, he can do so, but he cannot bring to the support of his 
position any authoritative declaration by any considerable portion of the Filipinos,’ 
Bryan finished.517 
On September 19, 1908 in an address to the citizens of Norwood, Ohio, which 
was confined to the subject of the Philippines, Taft stated that his claim in a prior 
interview, that ‘even the Independistas – that is, those in favor of immediate 
independence for the islands – prefer Republican victory to Mr. Bryan’s promises,’ 
was based on a personal conversation with Manuel Quezon. Taft further elucidated 
the claim: ‘Quezson [sic] … told me that although the Independistas liked Mr. 
Bryan’s platform they preferred my election, as a friend of the Filipino, to Mr. 
Bryan’s promises,’ and that Quezon had repeated these comments in a published 
article evidencing a difference of opinions among the Independistas.518  
Moving on from this Taft, whom Bryan had characterised as someone who 
was sticking to his imperialist policy, told an audience at the National League of 
Republican Clubs in Cincinnati that, unlike himself, Bryan had no proven track 
record. Taft continued: ‘Has he [Bryan] ever done anything but formulate 
propositions in his closet of an utterly impracticable character, largely with a view of 
attracting votes by their plausibility and very little with a view of their operation.’ 
Taft went on to dissect Bryan’s record, first his futile 1896 campaign on free silver, 
and then his 1900 campaign on anti-imperialism: ‘His agitation of this question 
continued the war in the Philippines against the authority of the United States for 
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nearly two years longer, and many a poor fellow who lost his life in the service of his 
country in those far-distant islands owes it to the inspiration which the opposition of 
the Democracy under Mr. Bryan made to the policy of Mr. McKinley in the 
Philippines. He was beaten in these issues, and we continue to celebrate the Fourth of 
July with fervor.’ Here Taft was widening the debate out to a larger discussion of the 
issues surrounding the imperial experiment and what he regarded as Republican 
practical progress in the face of cynical Democratic politicking. This was surely 
because the idea of overall Republican success in pacifying and establishing a civil 
government in the islands was a stronger rallying point than the specific policy of 
denying the islands a promise of independence. By 1904, Taft claimed, the 
Philippines had ceased to be a ‘paramount issue’ and that Bryan joined Alton B. 
Parker (the Democratic nominee in that year) to denounce the tyranny of Roosevelt.519 
In essence, Taft attempted to denounce Bryan as pandering to the masses by declaring 
his support for whichever issue appeared to be in vogue, in contrast to himself, whom 
Bryan had characterised as a candidate of the status quo.  
However, although the focus of this chapter, the Philippines were not a 
decisive issue in the presidential election campaign and what really won the election 
was the message that Taft was the chosen successor of the popular incumbent. 
Historian Judith Anderson suggests that during Taft’s campaign the press generally 
expected a Republican victory and presented Taft as a safe pair of hands, with the 
exception of the New York Times which, she notes, felt he should be submitted to at 
least some measure of further scrutiny. However, she goes on to note that the Times 
and many other newspapers supported Taft primarily because they saw him as 
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Roosevelt’s successor and representing Roosevelt’s policies.520 Although Taft staged 
a limited campaign in 1908, most of the work to win over voters was done on his 
behalf, and not a little of this was choreographed by Roosevelt who, historian Paolo 
Coletta argues, gave Taft ‘vital support.’521 Coletta sees Taft’s journey to the 
presidency as less of a campaign than an ‘apostolic succession,’ and Taft’s continued 
suggestions that he was initially reluctant to run and remained uncertain as to his 
abilities were testimony to the pivotal role of Roosevelt’s support and advocacy in his 
winning the presidency.522 However, historian Lewis Gould’s more recent presidential 
biography criticises those who see Taft as merely a ‘supporting player’ in 1908, 
arguing instead that Taft actually campaigned quite well, though he still recognises 
the importance of Roosevelt’s activism.523 In the November election, although failing 
to retain all of the states won by Roosevelt in 1904, Taft won the electoral vote by a 
margin of 321 to 162, and the popular vote by 51.6 percent to Bryan’s 43 percent.  
In an article of January 1909 in Outlook, Charles Edgar Wheeler, recently 
returned from transportation-related business in the Philippines, claimed that he was 
ready to accept a remark recently accredited to Taft in the press, which claimed the 
president said, ‘I am glad I am elected for what I can do for the Philippines. I can’t 
forget my first love.’524 Even if Roosevelt’s popularity had been the primary reason 
for Taft’s nomination and election, it is certain that the Philippines were, in Taft’s 
opinion, a central difference between the parties. Both parties claimed to want what 
was best for the Filipinos, and both campaigned on their opposing platforms in regard 
to Philippine independence. Although there is no evidence to suggest that the issue 
influenced the voters to any great extent, what the campaign for party nominations 
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and the subsequent election campaigns of Taft and Bryan did elucidate were the stark 
differences in the future of the Philippines depending on the victor – just as sharp, if 
not more so, than in the election of 1900. With Taft’s victory in November, not only 
was a continuance of the status quo on the cards but also, with Taft himself in the 








Although biographies and other works dealing specifically with the Taft 
presidency do analyse Taft’s policy in the Far East, there is almost no attention given 
to Philippine policy. The most comprehensive work on Taft’s presidential foreign 
policy, The Foreign Policies of the Taft Administration, does not take the Philippines 
on as an issue of foreign policy and thus the issue of Philippine dimension of Taft’s 
foreign policy is left largely unexplored.525 Biographical and other general works 
looking specifically at the Taft administration tend to focus more on domestic U.S. 
policy and his deteriorating relationship with Theodore Roosevelt, largely excluding 
the Philippines and spending far less time on foreign affairs. Historian Akira Iriye 
argues that despite Taft’s experience in foreign affairs, he was a strict constitutionalist 
and when it came to his presidency he was not keen to be nearly so hands on a 
president in relation to foreign affairs as Roosevelt had been.526 In the main this was 
true, and even in the case of the Philippines Taft did not and could not direct as much 
attention to the islands as president as he had before. Historian Lewis Gould argues 
that Taft delegated foreign affairs to his Secretary of State Philander Knox such an 
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extent that Knox became ‘almost autonomous’ in foreign policy making.527 
Nevertheless, Taft did keep close tabs on the situation in the islands and when 
opportunities to further his Philippine vision offered themselves he became closely 
involved.  
The notable exceptions to this tendency to overlook Taft’s Philippine policy 
during his presidency are works that focus primarily on the U.S.-Philippine 
relationship rather than specifically on Taft. This latter group gives light to some of 
the initiatives Taft spearheaded during his presidency to further his aims of increasing 
the potential for a long-term imperial presence, particularly in the economic arena. 
The most notable instance of Taft’s advocacy of his imperial vision during his 
presidency came with proposed new tariff legislation and the potential for bringing 
about free trade between the U.S. and the islands, a policy which Taft had been 
advocating for many years. 
Historian H. W. Brands links Taft’s advocacy of free trade between the U.S. 
and the Philippines to his and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox’s so-called “dollar 
diplomacy.”528 Indeed, as historians such as Foster Rhea Dulles and Scholes and 
Scholes reveal in their analysis of Taft’s Asian policy, the Taft administration’s policy 
in the Far East was directed almost entirely at maintaining the Open Door and making 
the U.S. a ‘leading financial and commercial power in Asia.’529 Brands thus positions 
the Philippines as part of a wider move to create economic spheres of influence 
outwith American borders. Taft, as was argued in the first chapter of this thesis, was 
not a natural expansionist and he did see that economic investment and not a large 
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formal empire was the best route for the United States to increase its presence in the 
world. However, although “dollar diplomacy” was an integral part of Taft’s outlook 
in foreign affairs, Taft’s idea of increasing U.S. investment in the Philippines – 
already part of a formal empire – was long-standing and went well beyond just 
economic dependency.  
The tariff situation between the United States and the Philippines had been a 
thorn in Taft’s side since his arrival in the islands back in 1900, as discussed in 
Chapter Three of this thesis.530 Following the Supreme Court’s classification of the 
archipelago as an “unincorporated territory,” the Philippines were not included within 
the defined domestic sphere and were thus liable to pay rates in the same manner as a 
foreign country. This punishing rate was lowered in March of 1902 when Congress 
voted to set a duty at seventy-five percent of the Dingley rates on Philippine goods 
entering the United States.531 One of the main hindrances to further tariff reform came 
in Article IV of the Treaty of Paris, which specified that the United States would 
admit Spanish ships and merchandise to Philippine ports on the same terms as the 
U.S. for ten years.532 Since the reduction of the tariff in March 1902, all of the 
subsequent attempts to further reduce the tariff wall with the Philippines had come to 
nothing.533 However, as historian Stephen Wertheim points out Taft was not alone in 
his efforts to eliminate the Philippine tariff in the years after 1902. Wertheim notes 
that President Roosevelt also wrote to numerous congressmen in favour of further 
                                                
530 See: Chapter Three, 103-108. 
531 G. A. May, Social Engineering, 156. See Chapter Three for more on the tariff controversy. 
532 Kirk, Philippine Independence, 57. 
533 For full details see G. A. May, Social Engineering, 156-157. Two further votes in 1902 to lower the 
tariff to 50 and 25 percent of the Dingley rate failed largely due to the Senate and the influence of sugar 
and tobacco interests, renewed efforts in 1905 also failed.  
 218 
tariff reduction but he, like Taft, was unable to win over Republican protectionists to 
the endeavour.534 
Taft had consistently favoured and advocated a reduction in tariffs between 
the United States and the Philippines from his time as civil governor through to his 
presidency, as various historians have shown. Paul Kramer points out that during the 
St. Louis World’s Fair, Taft hoped that a representation of the islands as a pacified 
place and a good area for investment would illustrate the need for lower tariffs.535 
Donald Anderson points out that Taft’s efforts to lobby for lower tariffs on tobacco 
and sugar as Secretary of War had caused an early rift with President Roosevelt.536 
Lewis Gleeck Jr. suggests free trade was the last remaining aim of Taft dating back to 
his time as civil governor that had yet to be achieved when he assumed the 
presidency.537 All of these examples serve to illustrate how Taft had consistently 
advocated lower tariffs, or free trade with the Philippines, and that such a policy was 
an extension of his “policy of attraction” aiming to bring the two nations ever closer 
together. Indeed, in January 1908, the year of the election, Taft had once again called 
for tariff reform in his Special Report on the Philippines, advising that ‘legislation be 
adopted by Congress admitting the products of the Philippine Islands to the markets 
of the United States, with such limitations as may remove fear of interference with the 
tobacco and sugar interests in the United States.’538 
The fact that Taft came to the presidency in 1909 was fortuitous for the 
potential success of tariff revision between the U.S. and the Philippines. Although 
objections from many in the U.S. agricultural sector, who feared the competition of 
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cheap and plentiful Filipino produce, still existed, the passage of time had helped 
alleviate some other obstacles to tariff revision. Firstly, the Treaty of Paris provision 
that Spanish ships would be treated equally to U.S. ships in the islands for ten years 
had now lapsed. Secondly, many of the concerns about wider constitutional 
implications that had arisen in earlier efforts to revise both the Puerto Rican and 
Philippine tariffs had been answered by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in the 
1901-1905 Insular Cases. By 1909, the fear that free trade might mean the 
Constitution would end up following the flag, had been largely eradicated – the 
Supreme Court had decided that the Constitution only followed the flag in some 
cases. Therefore, by the time of Taft’s presidency the potential for successful tariff 
reform with the Philippines had increased markedly. 
Before moving on to look at the tariff itself, it is useful first to look briefly 
beyond Taft’s personal opinions on free trade, to how such a policy was perceived in 
the Philippines. Historian Glenn A. May claims that many in the Philippines prior to 
1909 recognised that there would be benefits from reductions in the tariff, especially 
in serving to stimulate agriculture and helping the islands to recover from recent 
drought and pest problems.539 However, historian Bonifacio Salamanca remarks that 
many Filipino politicians, such as Manuel Quezon, argued initially that free trade 
would create an economic dependency on the U.S. and delay Filipino independence 
further.540 Quezon put it thus: ‘We believe that, as a consequence of free trade, more 
American interests would be created in the Philippines, and that the bonds of union 
would be far stronger.’541 Nevertheless, Salamanca goes on to argue that although 
outwardly many of the Filipino elites opposed free trade, much of this rejection was a 
face-saving tactic and that many opposed it in the full knowledge that their opposition 
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would ultimately be futile.542 Those in favour of free trade, such as Governors-
General Smith and Forbes, helped to convince those who opposed it by arguing that 
tariff reduction would lead to increased prosperity that, theoretically, could in turn 
bring the Philippines to a state of being fit for independence far sooner than if high 
tariff walls remained intact.543 Whether the governors-general believed this is another 
matter. As historian Peter Stanley notes, Taft mentioned unashamedly, and on 
numerous occasions, that one of the chief benefits of a tariff reduction would be to 
create a lasting economic bond between the United States and the islands.544 Even if 
Forbes believed that free trade might hasten the potential for independence, which 
seems unlikely given his outspoken retentionism in subsequent years, Taft certainly 
hoped that the economic bond created by free trade would make independence both 
less desirable and less achievable.  
As the year 1909 arrived and with an incoming president who favoured free 
trade with the Philippines, there was every expectation that a reduction in Philippine 
tariffs would come quickly. The Republican Party Platform of 1908 had called for 
free trade: ‘Between the United States and the Philippines we believe in a free 
interchange of products with such limitations as to sugar and tobacco as will afford 
adequate protection to domestic interests,’ in a similar vein to Taft’s Special Report of 
the same year.545 On March 4, 1909 Taft made his inaugural address as President of 
the United States, taking time to mention the passage of the tariff bill: 
The governments of our dependencies in Porto Rico and the 
Philippines are progressing as favorably as could be desired… The 
business conditions in the Philippines are not all that we could wish 
them to be, but with the passage of the new tariff bill permitting free 
trade between the United States and the archipelago, with such 
limitations on sugar and tobacco as shall prevent injury to domestic 
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interests in those products, we can count on an improvement in 
business conditions in the Philippines and the development of a 
mutually profitable trade between this country and the islands.546 
 
Although Taft’s inaugural address suggested that concessions would likely be 
made on sugar and tobacco, as he had also stated in his 1908 Special Report, the new 
president was still calling for the most substantial reform in the Philippine tariff for 
seven years. This might be noted by a critic as partial backtracking by Taft on the 
issue, but in reality, without concessions to such powerful special interest groups, the 
1902 status quo would remain, which Taft would have considered far more damaging 
than such concessions. 
The Payne-Aldrich Tariff was passed in July 1909 and made specific 
provisions for the Philippines.547 The act provided that: ‘all articles, wholly the 
growth or product of, or manufactured in the Philippine Islands from materials wholly 
the growth or product of the Philippine Islands and of the United States, upon which 
no drawback of customs duties has been allowed therein, coming into the United 
States from the Philippine Islands shall hereafter be admitted free of duty,’ with 
notable exceptions and limitations in rice, sugar and tobacco products.548 Likewise, an 
act passed by the Philippine Legislature and Assembly provided that, with the 
exception of rice, U.S. products might enter the islands duty free, with similar 
provisions to those in the Payne-Aldrich Tariff.549 Former member of the Philippine 
Commission and now resident commissioner in D.C., Benito Legarda congratulated 
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Taft on the passage of the tariff and expressed a hope that ‘in the near future we will 
all see the wisdom of such a measure.’550 Historian Glenn A. May regards the 
Philippine provisions of the Payne-Aldrich tariff as a victory for Taft, and one that 
was wrought from tough personal bargaining, especially on matters relating to 
members of Congress with strong links to sugar and tobacco interests in their 
states.551 Indeed, this was a very important victory for Taft’s imperial vision. Taft was 
sure that substantial U.S. trade and investment in islands would follow and help 
secure the long-term growth of American-Philippine economic connections. Although 
critics might regard the concessions as a retreat from fully fledged free trade, the 
substantial reductions in the tariff that were obtained were so crucial to Taft’s policy 
towards the Philippines that they were a realistic price for passage of the bill.  
Taft wrote to Governor-General Forbes in June of 1910 expressing his delight 
that the Payne bill was ‘bringing such benefit to the Philippines’ in response to an 
earlier letter from Forbes.552 Forbes responded by praising Taft, telling the president 
that ‘the Payne Bill… is your contribution to the cause.’553 Historian Peter Stanley 
claims that the tariff did fulfil the administration’s hopes, seeing a marked increase in 
trade between the Philippines and the United States.554 Despite his success in 
reforming the Philippine tariff during the first years of his term, the Payne-Aldrich 
tariff was widely regarded as a disappointment by most parties in regard to the 
domestic United States. As historian James Chace puts it, ‘By signing the Payne-
Aldrich tariff bill, Taft seemed to have broken the promises made in the Republican 
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platform of 1908, when the party had pledged tariff revision, which was understood to 
mean a reduction in the high levels established a decade earlier,’ when, in fact, many 
of the tariffs in the heavily amended bill ultimately increased.555  As a sign of the 
growing disillusionment with the Taft administration, the 1910 U.S. Congressional 
elections saw the House move to a Democratic majority, although the Senate 
remained in Republican hands.  
The idea of commerce and trade being a key element in binding the 
Philippines to the United States in the long term has been mentioned in previous 
chapters with Taft’s earlier, if less successful, efforts to reduce or abolish entirely the 
tariffs between the two. In Taft’s eyes, with increased U.S. trade and more American 
capital invested in the islands, it would become all the more likely that more people 
would come to see the benefits of maintaining and strengthening the union, rather 
than moving further along the road to separation. As political scientist Grayson Kirk 
observed in 1936: ‘Two decades and a half of free trade have produced in the 
Philippines an exceedingly valuable market for American exports and they have 
caused the Islands to develop a commerce that is almost exclusively limited to the 
United States,’ reflecting an ‘ever-closer integration with the American economic 
system.’556 In one sense Taft would have been very encouraged by such a prospect of 
“integration,” but by 1936 the Philippines had also been set firmly on the road to 
independence, and it was with the end of Taft’s presidency that this abrupt turnaround 
really began.  
 Another instance regarding Taft’s encouragement of economic investment in 
the islands during his presidency, which is also commented upon by historians 
looking at the Taft Era in the Philippines and is worthy of consideration is that of the 
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sale of the friar lands. In 1908 the Philippine Commission passed a bill, approved by 
the Philippine Assembly, which allowed for the friar lands to be excluded from the 
rules restricting the sale of public lands.557 In addition to this, as noted above, the 
Payne-Aldrich tariff had allowed for a limited amount of duty-free sugar to enter the 
U.S. from the Philippines, making the purchase of such lands all the more attractive. 
In 1909 a scandal arose that reached all the way to the presidency and lasted until 
1911, when Commissioner Dean Worcester, the Philippine Secretary of the Interior, 
negotiated a series of deals with U.S. sugar interests and, more controversially, with 
public officials to sell-off the remaining friar estates.558 Historian Frank Golay 
suggests Taft was tarred by the scandal particularly because of the involvement of 
those close to him in the some of the deals, such as his brother Henry W. Taft and 
Attorney General George Wickersham whose positions in interested legal firms 
linked them to the purchases.559 Nationalist Filipinos denounced large-scale U.S. 
investment as evidence of exploitation by the United States, and the U.S. House 
Committee on Insular Affairs investigated the controversial sales keeping the issue 
public for months.560  Despite the controversy, the friar lands sales were ultimately 
upheld, but not until much bad blood had been created and not until spring of 1911.561  
The tariff reductions and the friar lands scandal illustrated different faces of 
the same Taft policy that had always suggested that his imperial vision hinged upon: 
attracting the U.S. to the potential of the Philippines in order to draw the islands into a 
permanent relationship. However, for Taft neither of these cases was fully successful 
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and in fact left him open to accusations of exploiting the islands rather than improving 
them, only helping to further the calls for independence among the Nationalist elite.  
In July 1910 Governor-General Forbes informed Taft that little had changed in 
regard to calls for independence, despite the success of the tariff reductions: ‘the 
Nationalist platform is opposed to the American administration and it is true that the 
vast majority of Filipinos want independence.’562 Forbes was, if not more so than 
Taft, keen on developing the Philippines and increasing U.S. investment in the islands 
and to this end Taft had put the right governor-general in place. However, whatever 
Forbes’ strengths and weaknesses at the head of the Philippines, surely any figure 
supporting Taft’s firm retentionist line would have struggled to maintain consistently 
good relations with a Philippine Assembly set firmly against it. Forbes informed Taft 
that the nationalist press in the islands was ‘stirring up a general antipathy among the 
Filipinos to the Government,’ though he also suggested that the frostiness of the 
Nationalists in the assembly was inevitable as they would want to prove their 
independence from the commission.563 In confirmation of the difficulty in working 
with an assembly set against the commission’s line, Forbes wrote to Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson in late 1911: ‘The Assembly are getting a little out of hand… I find 
some feeling in the Commission that we have conceded too much.’564 Forbes 
concerns that working with the assembly was not getting easier and his belief that the 
demands for independence were not getting any quieter would grow all the more 
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The Jones Bill and 1912  
 
 Most books analysing the run up to the 1912 presidential election have little if 
anything to say about the Philippines.565 As historians Garel Grunder and William 
Livezey put it, the Philippines in 1912 were simply not ‘one of the issues of the 
election.’566 As discussed earlier, although the Philippine issue had been raised during 
the 1908 campaign it was hardly a crucial factor in the election results, and it was the 
backing of Theodore Roosevelt that proved equally important in securing Taft’s 
victory. Conversely, in the 1912 election, Roosevelt proved just as decisive in 
securing Taft’s defeat.  
During his presidency, Taft, as Roosevelt’s anointed successor, had proved a 
disappointment to the colonel by allying himself with the conservative Old Guard of 
the Republican Party and alienating its more progressive elements. After an 
increasingly bitter campaign of criticism Roosevelt, rejected by the Old Guard as their 
candidate in 1912, stood as an independent to run against his former friend. In 
addition to the challenge of Roosevelt and the now formal division of his own party, 
Taft was running upon an unenviable record as the incumbent and by 1912 there was 
a widespread acceptance that Taft’s presidential record was one composed largely of 
failures.567 As historian Lewis Gould puts it, even if Taft had been running on his own 
against Roosevelt with a ‘reasonably united Republican Party’ behind him he would 
still ‘have been an underdog going into the race.’568 Taft’s record as president was a 
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far riper target for his opponents than the Philippine issue and the future of the islands 
was accordingly sidelined as an issue in this unusual multi-party battle for the 
presidency.569 
The lack of focus on the Philippines as an election issue was evident in the 
Republican Party Platform of 1912, which gave only one line to the issue: ‘The 
Philippine policy of the Republican party has been and is inspired by the belief 
that our duty toward the Filipino people is a national obligation which should 
remain entirely free from partisan polities.’570 The Democratic Party Platform 
seemed to pay more attention to the issue, but really just reiterated the sentiments 
of 1908, once again condemning the experiment in imperialism and promising ‘an 
immediate declaration of the nation's purpose to recognize the independence of 
the Philippine Islands.’571 With the retentionist and independence stances already 
taken, the Progressive Party chose not to mention the Philippines at all in their 
platform.572  
Taft was resigned to defeat long before the election took place and the result 
when it came was as bad as he had imagined. On November 5, 1912, Taft returned the 
worst result for an incumbent seeking re-election in U.S. history, receiving the vote of 
just over 23 percent of the electorate and carrying only the eight electoral votes of 
Vermont and Utah. Roosevelt, whose Progressive campaign had split the 
Republicans, garnered more than 24 percent of the popular vote and 88 electoral 
votes. However, with just under 42 percent of the popular vote, and a sweeping 435 
electoral votes, former Princeton professor Woodrow Wilson returned a Democrat to 
the White House for the first time since Grover Cleveland. Despite being low on the 
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priority list of the main parties’ campaigns in 1912, the Philippine debate had gained a 
little attention in Congress as the 1912 election approached. However, with a 
Democratic clean sweep of Congress and the presidency in November, the time had 
arrived for the Philippine debate to gain some very rapid momentum. 
During the run-up to the 1912 election, a bill that would later become the 
focus of the Philippine debate between Democrats and Republicans was making its 
debut before Congress. The main sponsor of this new Philippine bill was 
Representative William Atkinson Jones, the Democratic chair of the House 
Committee on Insular Affairs since 1911. Although he had made minority reports on 
the subject of Philippine independence since 1902, Jones’s name was about to become 
far more prominently associated with the debate over the islands’ future.573  
In March 1912, Jones introduced the first of two ‘Jones bills,’ drafted by 
Filipino Nationalist Manuel Quezon, setting out a timetable for independence after 
eight years, and a U.S. military presence for twenty.574 However, as historian Paul 
Kramer notes, at this early stage, with the Republicans still controlling the Senate, the 
bill was very unlikely to succeed.575 Therefore, although the Philippines might not 
have played much of a role in the outcome of the 1912 election, there seemed to be 
little doubt that the Democratic clean sweep would herald the most significant change 
of direction in Philippine policy since the islands were annexed. The results of the 
1912 election in November gave a new vitality to the dormant Jones proposals, and 
caused some Democratic congressmen to call rapidly for the ‘speedy enactment’ of 
the Jones Bill.576  
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In his fourth and final Annual Message, given on December 3, 1912, Taft 
spoke at length about the Philippine question. The message allowed Taft a chance to 
express his views one final time on an auspicious stage, even if he would not be in 
office beyond March 4, 1913. The focus of much of Taft’s ire was, not surprisingly, 
the Jones Bill. Taft argued that the bill ‘revolutionizes the carefully worked out 
scheme of government under which the Philippine Islands are now governed.’ He 
stressed that the belief that the Filipinos were ready for total self-government and 
national sovereignty was ‘absolutely without justification,’ and that the Filipino 
people would be among the biggest losers from such a change in policy. Taft’s 
warnings over the incoming Democrats’ plans echoed many of his speeches from the 
previous decade. He argued that a ‘present declaration even of future independence 
would retard progress by the dissension and disorder it would arouse. On our part it 
would be a disingenuous attempt, under the guise of conferring a benefit on them, to 
relieve ourselves from the heavy and difficult burden which thus far we have been 
bravely and consistently sustaining. It would be a disguised policy of scuttle. It would 
make the helpless Filipino the football of oriental politics…’577 Taft was not breaking 
new ground with his message, but it did reinforce the fact that he had held a consistent 
line on the issue of Philippine independence for more than a decade and that he was 
intent to remain constant on this issue for years to come. 
 Following Wilson’s election, Manuel Quezon, recently re-elected as resident 
commissioner in Washington D.C., pledged to fight for a promise of independence in 
Congress adding that he believed Wilson was ‘exceptionally committed to the 
carrying out of the independence policy.’578 Political scientist Grayson Kirk suggests 
that Quezon had had prior contact with Wilson as early as March 1912 and argues that 
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this was ‘canny foresight’ on Quezon’s part, as Wilson ‘had previously not known or 
cared a great deal about the Philippine question.’ 579 In August 1912, Wilson accepted 
his party’s nomination for the presidency with a statement that the United States was 
keeping the Philippines ‘in trust’ for the Filipinos.580 In a speech at Staunton, 
Virginia, in December 1912 the president elect stated that ‘the Philippines are at 
present our frontier but I hope that we presently are to deprive ourselves of that 
frontier,’ leading some to read into this Wilson’s endorsement of a Jones-style 
independence policy.581 On December 28, 1912, the Boston Daily Globe offered a 
different interpretation of the president elect’s Philippine policy, suggesting that 
although Jones was sure Wilson ‘heartily indorsed’ his bill, it appeared that Wilson 
was less than desirous of putting this opinion on the record.582 
Just under a week after Taft’s final annual message, the New York Times 
reported: ‘Despite President Taft’s vigorous disapproval in his message to Congress 
of the pending bill proposing immediate autonomy for the Philippines and absolute 
independence in eight years, several prominent Democrats are preparing for its 
consideration in the House.’ The Times also noted that Taft had ‘made no secret of his 
intention to fight the Jones bill with all his might, whether in Presidential office or out 
of it. He has said that he would veto it should the bill be passed by both houses before 
his term ends… he would direct a propaganda with the object of preventing the 
Filipinos from obtaining independence,’ in his ‘desire to take a foremost part in 
keeping the Philippines under the control of the United States.’ This article illustrates 
the way Taft made clear his intention not to leave the Philippine question when he left 
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the White House, although quite how he would seek to influence matters after March 
4, 1913 was yet to become clear.583 
 In January 1913, press reports suggested a sense of unity among Filipino 
politicians in support of the Jones Bill with Quezon denouncing Taft’s opposition to 
the Jones Bill at a luncheon in his honour held by the Anti-Imperialist League, and 
former Filipino leader Emilio Aguinaldo calling for ‘peace and mutual help’ during 
the period of changeover provided for in the bill.584 As the end of Taft’s presidency 
approached, the outgoing president did not drop the issue of the Philippines in the 
face of such pressures, but maintained his stance firmly against the proposed 
Democratic policy. In a speech before the Ohio Society of New York, Taft declared 
that the passage of the Jones Bill would be a boon for Republicans, and for the party’s 
future success. Taft argued, ‘I could ask nothing better than the pasage [sic] of the 
Jones bill, but I have the interest of the Islands at heart, and I do not believe that the 
United States should separate from the Philippine Islands at least within two or three 
generations, and then only if the Filipinos desire the separation.’ In conclusion, Taft 
claimed that the Filipinos had ‘no desire to have their independence. So let us wait 
until they have that desire, and by so doing fulfill the promise we made when Admiral 
Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet.’585 
 On January 28, Representative Jones made a speech in Congress denouncing 
Taft’s criticisms of Democratic plans for Philippine independence. Jones questioned 
the constitutional appropriateness of Taft’s denouncing pending legislation and 
argued that a declaration of future independence would in no way subject the masses 
to oligarchical exploitation, and that such a supposition was ‘opposed to the 
enlightened opinion and best judgement of a vast majority of the American people.’ 
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Jones then went on to attack Taft’s imperial vision for the Philippines and the idea of 
a future dominion-style relationship, suggesting Taft had only recently come up with 
such an idea and that it bore no resemblance to the existing relationship between the 
U.S. and the Philippines. Jones argued that it was futile to bow to the suggestions of a 
man ‘whose administrative policies have been so emphatically discredited and 
repudiated by the voters of every State of the Union, save only those of Utah and 
Vermont… But whilst I recognize President Taft’s great ability and most cheerfully 
concede the purity of his motives, it must be admitted, I think, by his most ardent 
political followers that he has not achieved great success as a political prophet.’ 
All of this was not surprising coming from a man who had staked his name on 
backing Philippine independence, especially against a president who was equally 
attached to retention. In his attempting to undermine Taft’s views on the Philippines, 
Jones was acknowledging Taft as the leading voice on Philippine retention. Jones 
dismissed those who supported Taft’s imperial vision as figures solely interested in 
saving their jobs: he reasoned they supported Taft for ‘purely personal reasons,’ 
fearing a reduction in the size of the armed forces, navy or a reduction in the need for 
U.S. administrators if the Philippines were given independence.586 Governor-General 
Forbes, who was also criticised sharply by Jones, publicly defended his and Taft’s 
policies in direct response to Jones. Forbes claimed that Jones had been ‘a willing and 
credulous listener’ to ‘soreheads,’ or people who bore personal grievances against 
Forbes or the administration that influenced their opinions. Forbes accused Jones of 
attempting to discredit the Philippine administration with ‘misrepresentations’ that 
were ‘plainly malicious.’587 
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 Overall, both Jones and Forbes were clearly arguing from partisan positions, 
neither man particularly concerned about presenting a balanced appraisal of the 
Philippine relationship and both were attempting to secure the future for the 
Philippines that would best serve themselves. Governor-General Forbes sought to 
defend his record and his future career and Jones sought to further the prospects of the 
bill that bore his name.588 However, Taft, as an outgoing president, did not have any 
immediate political gain to make from embroiling himself further in the Philippine 
question. Nevertheless, upon handing over the presidency – and much of his political 
influence – to Woodrow Wilson, Taft did not so freely hand over the issue of 





During his presidency Taft had sought to maintain a status quo in relation to 
Philippine independence. His key policy initiative in the islands was not a new idea, 
but one he had supported for many years. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff, although 
disappointing many in the United States with its limited reforms, successfully secured 
for the Philippines a substantial shift towards free trade with the United States. 
However, as mentioned above, conditions in 1909 were more favourable for tariff 
revisions than they had been in previous years when Taft had sought them. The 
controversial sale of the friar lands was not a canny political move, but illustrated 
once again Taft’s determination to spur on U.S. investment in the islands wherever 
possible. In many respects Taft’s Philippine policy – given so little attention from 
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critics of his presidency as the absence of the issue in the 1912 campaign shows – was 
one of his most successful. Taft’s constant policy had been the forging of lasting 
bonds with the Philippines, and his presidency not only continued to deny the 
Philippines a definitive promise of independence, but with increased free trade, as 
many Filipinos observed, Taft was drawing the Philippines into an ever closer 
relationship with the United States.   
 With the Democrats recapturing the House in 1910, and then the Senate and 
the presidency in November 1912, Taft lost the initiative on Philippine policy, which 
he had influenced since 1900. With his resounding defeat at the hands of Roosevelt 
and Wilson, the Taft Era in the Philippines came to a formal close in March 1913. 
However, as Taft had vowed in the last weeks of his presidency, he would not just 


































 In his final State of the Union Address on December 3, 1912, President 
William H. Taft warned that Democratic plans for Philippine independence 
constituted a ‘policy of scuttle’ that would make the Philippines the ‘football of 
oriental politics.’589 With only three further months in the White House, Taft was 
aware that his ability to influence Philippine policy was coming to what he considered 
a premature end. This chapter explores Taft’s continued involvement in the Philippine 
debate after his presidency and up until Republican President Warren G. Harding 
appointed him Chief Justice of the United States in 1921. During these wilderness 
years Taft involved himself politically in a continued fight against the Jones Bill, 
which proposed a promise of Philippine independence, becoming a figurehead for a 
movement aimed at retaining the Philippines. During the same period Taft played a 
high profile role in the post-war League of Nations debate, a debate which touched 
upon the key issues of self-determination and decolonisation, which had played such 
substantive a role in the Philippine debate during the period 1900-1912. This chapter 
analyses the way in which Taft sought to influence Philippine policy during his time 
in the political wilderness and to what extent, if any, his reputation and ideas had any 
impact on Philippine policy during the period 1913-1921. It also looks at the way in 
which Taft’s new status as an elder statesman affected his role in the Philippine 
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debate and whether his reputation as an authority on Philippine affairs appeared to be 
waning. 
 
A Post-Political Career 
 
 Taft was not alone in his quest to maintain a form of U.S. control over the 
Philippines, though following his departure from the White House and the subsequent 
arrival of the Democrats in March of 1913, Taft became perhaps the most prominent 
figure in this retentionist movement. Calls to keep the Philippines under U.S. control 
came from various interest groups with differing aims and with different visions of 
what the relationship should entail. The previous chapters have discussed the 
evolution and gradual solidification of Taft’s ideas on retention and the nature of the 
continuing relationship that he envisioned. However, despite differing views as to the 
nature of the relationship, when the Democrats came to power with a platform 
promising independence for the islands, Taft, along with other key figures from the 
previous, Republican-appointed, colonial governments in the Philippines, became a 
rallying point for the diverse groups that favoured an ongoing imperial relationship. 
Having been so long at the forefront of the governing majority on the issue of 
Philippine affairs, Taft happily fell into the role as leader of the opposition in 1913, 
and until 1921 he fought against Democratic plans to undo his carefully laid plans for 
a continuing colonial and eventually dominion-style future for the islands.  
Historian Peter Stanley sees figures such as Taft and Governor-General 
William Cameron Forbes as stubborn to the point of delusion: ‘Having committed 
themselves to a policy, they refused to be budged from it even by the most manifest 
evidence that it would fail to achieve its ends.’ Indeed, Stanley picks out Taft for 
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particular criticism, arguing that his persistence ‘in the conceit that Filipinos could be 
attracted more successfully by evading the issue of independence than by facing it 
was to ignore the last two years of Philippine history.’590 Although it is evident that 
the Filipino people and even the Filipino politicians were united in calling for 
independence, it might therefore have appeared that Taft simply wanted to wish 
reality away in a fit of self-delusion. However, as the end of the previous chapter 
discussed, Taft was not as out of touch with reality as his contemporary opponents 
and some historians might present him. Granted, Taft would have liked to avoid the 
issue of independence altogether, but in this he had failed. Although he was slow in 
recognising this, Taft was a skilled operator and did eventually come to terms with it, 
and focused instead upon the next best thing, and that was not to evade the 
independence issue, but to attack the subject head on. Taft’s last months in office saw 
him focus his efforts on what he set up as the most crucial aspect of policy: not to 
promise independence. Taft may have recognised that the policy of attraction had 
failed to kill talk of independence in the islands, but this did not prove to him that, 
were the policy given a full two generations to come to fruition, the situation might 
not alter. To this end, Taft had even conceded that independence was one of a number 
of possible options for the Philippines’ future, just not the one he would recommend. 
As a figurehead of the post-Taft-era retentionist movement, Taft stood at the 
head of a diverse band of special interest groups. Historian Paul Kramer breaks down 
the bulk of the retentionist movement into three main distinct groups: U.S. colonial 
officials, the Philippine-American business lobby, and the Catholic Church in the 
United States. Kramer sees the ‘former high-level colonial officials’ as the centre of 
the movement, and among them he specifically mentions Taft, W. Cameron Forbes 
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and Dean Worcester, ‘whose transfer, hiring, or resignation returned them to centers 
of media and public opinion in the United States, full of resentment for Democratic 
Filipinization and independence legislation.’591 Where Kramer’s observations are 
largely fair, Taft’s situation and profile were markedly different from either Forbes’ 
or Worcester’s. Taft, unlike the others, had left the Philippines a decade previously. 
As Secretary of War and President he had associated himself with issues beyond the 
narrow scope of Philippine affairs in the eyes of the American public, although as is 
argued here, he always kept a keen eye on the Philippines throughout these years. His 
role in Roosevelt’s cabinet, and especially his term as Commander in Chief, meant 
that his profile easily surpassed those of other former Philippine commissioners and 
governors, such as Worcester and Forbes, in the eyes of the American public. The fact 
that the period from 1901 to 1913 is commonly labelled the “Taft Era” by historians 
of the Philippines is testimony to the fact that Taft’s influence was paramount during 
these years. So, even if Taft represented to many the archetypal partisan on the 
Philippine question, there can be no doubt that his stature and prominence differed 
markedly from that of other retentionists.  
For anti-imperialists at the time, such as the president of the Anti-Imperialist 
League, Moorfield Storey, it best suited their needs to present Taft as simply another 
retentionist: 
We can not expect that the defeated party will cease to argue, to 
protest, and to prophesy all manner of evil, but we have no right on 
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that account to falter. Those men like President Taft are responsible in 
large measure for the retention of the islands, and who like him have 
been especially prominent in their administration, naturally will not 
admit that they have been wrong… but we must remember that they 
are not impartial. They are pleading their own case, they are insisting 
that they have succeeded, and their own reputations are at stake. All 
their arguments must be taken with that allowance.592   
 
Much of what Storey said was true. Taft saw his reputation at stake in the 
Philippines, and had committed himself to the policies of the previous years, in most 
cases policies that he had initiated or guided directly. Taft was not blind, however, to 
attacks such as those from Storey that aimed at painting him as an embittered partisan. 
The former president spent much time in the following years, presenting a picture of 
himself as something of a post-political statesman. After all, unlike many of the 
Republican appointees ousted from the islands by the incoming Democratic 
administration, Taft was unlikely to seek a place back in Philippine or American 
political office. Taft’s ultimate goal, as was explored in previous chapters, had always 
been a Supreme Court justiceship, and the nature of his defeat in 1912 meant that 
running for the presidency in 1916, or afterwards, was virtually out of the question. 
The Supreme Court target might have been expected to moderate Taft’s behaviour, 
especially in trying not to appear overtly partisan, but when it came to the issue of the 
Philippines this often did not prove to be the case.  
The possibility of a position on the Supreme Court was going to have to wait 
at least until the Republicans regained the White House, and Taft retired from politics 
to become a Yale Law Professor on leaving office. During this period, Taft devoted 
part of his time to supporting various interest groups, not only retentionist groups, but, 
for example, the League to Enforce Peace, a group aimed at advocating what would 
later become the League of Nations. Such behaviour fit with Taft’s attempt to present 
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himself as a post-political elder statesman, whose words and ideas could be vented 
through political pressure groups that supported his worldview, rather than directly 
through political office. Although the Philippines were not Taft’s sole interest after 
the presidency, they did prove to be the one that took precedence when clashes of 
interest occurred, as the later part of this chapter explores. 
 
The Retentionist Campaign 
 
Three days after the press reported Taft’s vow to fight against Philippine 
independence during his lame-duck presidency, an Episcopalian bishop from 
Chicago, the Reverend Samuel Fallows, wrote to Taft in reference to this subject. 
Fallows declared himself ‘thoroughly in accord’ with Taft’s policies and that in 
Fallows’ opinion there was ‘no more important question before our country today, for 
which you have offered the only solution.’ In this sense Rev. Fallows was one among 
many citizens that agreed with Taft as to a continued American presence in the 
Philippines. However, the Rev. Fallows was more noteworthy than most because his 
son, Edward, had recently organised a ‘commercial club of leading business and 
professional men in different parts of the country…for the development and for the 
uplifting of the Filipino people,’ and, Rev. Fallows noted, not for ‘exploitation.’593 
This company was called the American-Philippine Company and the Rev. Fallows 
enclosed a brochure about the organisation for Taft’s perusal.594  
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Historian Paul Kramer describes the American-Philippine Company as ‘an 
umbrella organization created to develop subordinate companies in specific 
commercial areas in the Philippines,’ that was ‘meant to provide a revolving door 
between the colonial state and private enterprise.’595 Such a company would appear 
even to neutral observers in the imperial debate as an example of an organisation that 
had aims based entirely around American commercial exploitation of the Philippines. 
The pamphlet drawn up by the American-Philippine Company recorded members’ 
speeches given at a dinner held by the company on October 14, 1912. The speeches 
varied in content, but generally provided a picture of the American-Philippine 
Company that had an undeniably imperialist bent. For example, one member, John M. 
Spitzer of the Pacific Commercial Company, argued that: ‘Cecil Rhodes made an 
empire out of South Africa. It is up to you fellows to make an empire out of the 
Philippines.’596 If Taft had any doubts about the imperialistic leanings of the 
Company, the pamphlet and its overt use of the term empire should have left him in 
no doubt.  
 Edward Fallows was keen to develop a relationship with a figure of such high 
profile as Taft with his openly retentionist views, not to mention a keen supporter of 
U.S. investment in the islands. In the months that followed the letter from his father, 
Edward Fallows wrote frequently to Taft reassuring him that he was not alone in his 
retentionist beliefs. During December of 1912, Fallows claimed that the American-
Philippine Company had located ‘sixty-one geographically dispersed newspaper 
editorials on the independence issue,’ claiming that only nine supported Wilson’s 
intention to withdraw eventually from the Philippines.597 Although Taft was 
politically astute enough to realise the potential pitfalls of publicly endorsing a 
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primarily economically driven venture such as the American-Philippine Company, he 
maintained regular contact with Fallows during this period. In September of 1913 Taft 
wrote to Fallows thanking him for his recent hospitality and added that he hoped he 
would see Fallows during his travels to ‘talk over Philippine matters.’598 Taft seemed 
to realise that an organisation such as the American-Philippine Company was a useful 
resource, which he might want to utilise in the future. 
Although Taft was not a member of the American-Philippine Company, he 
was a member of another retentionist organisation of the time, the Philippine Society. 
A New York Times article of November 1913 noted that the Philippine Society was 
formed ‘to diffuse among the American people a more accurate knowledge of the 
islands and their people’ and was seeking additional members ‘interested in the 
welfare of the inhabitants of the Philippines.’599 When the Society was formed in 
April of 1913, Taft was named as the honorary president, Luke E. Wright as acting 
president, and Forbes as honorary vice president.600 The first secretary of the society 
was Richard E. Forrest, who was also the vice president of the American-Philippine 
Company and, as historian Paul Kramer remarks, this illustrated ‘close ties’ between 
the two organisations.601 Unsurprisingly, the similarities in the membership lists of the 
two groups were quite substantial, and the organisational letterheads contained similar 
executive committee members.602 Taft corresponded regularly with Forrest on the 
issue of the Philippines in the period during and after the formation of the Philippine 
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Society, as well as Martin Egan, the former editor of the Manila Times, who was also 
closely associated with both of the organisations.  
Forrest consulted Taft regularly regarding the evolution of the Philippine 
Society and there were instances where Taft appeared keen to make sure the society 
did not veer too far from his retentionist outlook. In April 1913, Taft wrote to Forrest 
asking whether he felt it was really appropriate to have Manuel Quezon on the 
Executive Committee as it might ‘interfere… with the position of the Society against 
separation.’603 In June, Taft restated his ‘doubts about the wisdom of having [Quezon] 
in the Society,’ illustrating his interest in making sure that retention remained an 
unquestioned tenet of the society.604  Two days later in a handwritten postscript Taft 
assured Forrest ‘Don’t regret Quezon. He is not worthy. You dignify him too 
much.’605 In Taft’s view the Philippine Society was to be a forum of individuals who 
believed at least broadly along the same lines as he did and the pro-independence 
Quezon was not within that spectrum.  
Martin Egan’s correspondence with Taft increased markedly in late 1913 as 
the intentions of the Democrats in the Philippines began to become clear. When 
preparing to travel to Washington in early October, Egan told Taft he aimed to 
‘ascertain what has been determined so far,’ regarding the Democratic 
administration’s Philippine policy.606 Taft wrote Egan the next day relating his recent 
discussions with Edward Fallows on the ‘Philippine matter’ and the aims of 
Democratic policy, arguing that the Democrats ‘were not going to promise freedom to 
the Philippines in 1920 or at any other time,’ but would focus on Filipinization.607 The 
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policy of Filipinization – or gradually replacing American officials with Filipinos – 
was a policy that dated back to Taft’s time as civil governor. Though Taft would have 
preferred to keep the number of Filipinos in government to a minimum, until, as he 
saw it, they were properly prepared, he accepted the practice on a small scale as a 
pragmatic attempt to win over the support of pro-U.S. elites in the islands. Taft 
disagreed with taking ultimate control out of U.S. hands in the foreseeable future. 
However, when Francis Burton Harrison became the new Governor-General replacing 
Forbes in 1913, the Democratic appointee moved quickly to speed up the process of 
Filipinization. Historian H. W. Brands, suggests that Wilson’s appointment of 
Harrison was largely down to the machinations of resident commissioner Manuel 
Quezon, who had recognised early on Harrison’s sympathy with Filipino moves 
towards independence.608 On his arrival Harrison promised immediately to ‘give to 
the native citizens of the Islands a majority in the Appointive Commission,’ handing 
control of both houses in the Philippine legislature to Filipino majorities.609 In 
addition, just as Taft and Forbes had expected and feared, Harrison replaced 
Americans with Filipinos in many bureaucratic positions, as well as replacing a 
number of able Republican appointees with Democrats.610  
Taft told Egan that, although unfortunate, increased Filipinization was surely 
‘better than promising freedom, because if we left the Islands, we would have to go 
back there and do the work over again.’ Nevertheless Taft felt that Harrison’s rapid 
Filipinization scheme was ‘heaping up trouble for us’ and that the Democratic 
platform, the appointment of Bryan as Secretary of State, and the Jones Bill, among 
other actions, had seemingly all but promised independence to the Filipinos. The end 
result, Taft assured his colleague, was that the Filipinos would feel ‘deceived.’ Taft 
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also related a discussion he had with Secretary of War Lindley M. Garrison, in which 
apparently Garrison had told Taft that ‘he did not believe in independence but that 
they must do something,’ which Taft, in reply, claimed was unnecessary as the 
Republicans would support a maintenance of the status quo.611 Taft seemed keen to 
stress the possibility that the Democrats were not necessarily going to promise the 
Philippines independence, even though the Democrats would need to make some 
moves that Taft deemed unwise. Taft’s words seemed to suggest that he was already 
looking to a future where the Republicans would return to power and have to undo 
what the Democrats had done, and he expressed his earnest hope that this would not 
include undoing a promise of independence. 
Taft wrote a similar letter to Forrest a week after his correspondence with 
Egan, with a few differences worth noting. Taft told Forrest that the rumours of 
Democratic policy were ‘an indication that [the Democrats] will never promise 
independence, and that they are doing exactly what we did, but in a way much more 
calculated to mislead the Filipinos.’ Taft summed up the key difference between the 
Democratic policy and his own: ‘The Filipinos now think that independence is near at 
hand. They did not think so with me… If this substitution of Filipinos in the 
Commission [the policy of appointing a Filipino majority in the commission] is to 
sidetrack the Jones bill, so much the better, because it will leave to future 
administrations, which we hope may be Republican, and with more sense on the 
Philippine questions, to retrace the improvident steps now taken.’612 In this letter Taft 
suggested that the issue of independence could be delayed even though the Democrats 
were in control. Taft believed most changes could be rolled back and the damage to 
his imperial vision could be repaired after an interlude of Democratic control. 
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However, Taft saw the promise of independence, and even more so a date or timeline 
for independence, as something approaching irreparable damage to the Philippine 
relationship he desired. Such convictions are key to understanding his later attempts 
to derail Democratic policy. It appears at the early stage in the change of 
administration, Taft was led to believe, by his understanding of Democratic policy, 
that it might be possible to quash the independence promise until the Republicans 
returned to office. Once again Taft was acting out the moniker given him by Bryan 
many years before: the “Great Postponer.” 
Taft consulted Egan regularly on his articles and other writings on various 
subjects, often in the hope of getting them published in influential journals. On 
October 28, 1913, Taft wrote Egan about a speech he was preparing on the 
Philippines and how he would be ‘Glad for suggestions on it.’613 Egan replied:  
May I suggest that you sound a general warning in your Brooklyn 
address about the new administration at Manila? [Governor-General F. 
B.] Harrison is going very fast and his course has further broken 
confidence there. He does not know conditions and rides to a fall with 
both Filipinos and Americans. He has demoralised the civil service by 
ruthless removals and seems quite in the hands of Quezon. Everything 
out there depends on American stability and confidence is broken. I 
believe you can sound an effective warning. I believe you should let 
the Associated Press and United Press have advanced copies of your 
Brooklyn speech.614 
 
Taft’s response echoed Egan’s concerns about Democratic removals of 
members of the Philippine civil service: ‘Harrison and Quezon seem to be following 
Tammany principles in respect to the patronage in the Philippines, and I intend to say 
something about that.’615 These concerns were certainly evident in Taft’s address 
delivered two days later on November 19, which is analysed below. On November 18, 
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Taft wrote to his long-time friend Mabel Boardman and touched upon the upcoming 
Brooklyn speech. Taft informed her that he wanted to ‘infuse into the address the 
spirit of complete friendliness with the [Democratic] Administration and only 
manifest anxiety lest they are tending in a direction which will result in some bitter 
experiences for them.’ Nevertheless, Taft did lament that ‘a machinery that has built 
up with such care should receive such a serious blow as this is, but if he does not 
make the capital mistake of giving too much power to the Filipinos, the Americans 
can learn, although it is at the cost of the effectiveness of the government while they 
are learning.’616 Here is an example, within Taft’s private correspondence, of his 
professed desire to appear non-partisan and the difficulty he had doing this even in 
one letter; his address would prove an even less convincing example of non-
partisanship. 
Taft’s address at the Brooklyn Institute of Arts and Sciences, New York, was 
the most high profile speech of his retentionist campaign since leaving the White 
House. The New York Times noted that, in Brooklyn, Taft ‘took the attitude of a man 
who was seeing his own work endangered…for thirteen years with hardly a break he 
had built up a civil service in the islands, and now he saw Governor-General Harrison 
refusing to take advice from those who knew the country.’ This hardly seemed like a 
summary of non-partisan speech. Indeed, Taft’s speech was overtly critical of 
Wilson’s appointees and policy in the Philippines, as well as Secretary of War 
Garrison, and a far cry from the non-partisanship that he had suggested he was 
seeking to provide. Taft warned listeners that the ‘penalty for mistakes in the 
Philippines is always severe jolts,’ and that he was not simply being a political 
partisan but rather knew ‘so much more about the Philippine problem and its 
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difficulties than any of the gentlemen in this Administration that I have a duty and a 
right to call their attention to some of the dangers that beset them.’ Taft focused his 
attacks upon Democratic policy in terms of inexperience, a theme that would prove 
recurrent in future discourse, and argued that he had a genuine desire to create a 
dialogue with Democrats and to share with them the lessons of his own experience. 
However, such utterances merely added intensity to the criticisms, rather than giving 
any real credibility to the idea that this was more of a discussion of – rather than an 
outright attack upon – Democratic policy. 
Taft’s speech in Brooklyn addressed the issue of Philippine independence in a 
slightly different manner from that of previous speeches: ‘The present declaration of 
the Administration that they are looking forward to ultimate independence has been 
accepted by the politicians of the Philippine Islands as a great boon, although Mr. 
McKinley, Mr. Roosevelt, and I have always promised it; but we were always a little 
more definite in saying that we did not think it was coming for a generation, and 
probably not for more than that time.’ Here Taft was claiming that the Republicans 
had promised independence and this, as previous chapters have illustrated, was simply 
not accurate – Taft was always keen not to make any specific promises. Taft had, 
during the previous thirteen years, campaigned ardently against a promise of 
independence. Here again, Taft was careful to note that no specific promises had been 
made, which to him was a critically important factor in the independence debate. 
Although he had conceded belatedly that independence was a possibility, he stressed 
that it was only one of a number of options when the time was right, not a guaranteed 
conclusion of Philippine policy.  
In his Brooklyn speech Taft argued that the Filipino people viewed 
Democratic promises of ultimate independence ‘as a promise of early independence’ 
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and suggested that such promises would only lead to disappointment and discontent. 
Taft then went on to bemoan the increase in Filipino political appointments and the 
increase in their powers, as well as the dismissal of experienced colonial officers on 
what he saw as a partisan basis. Taft concluded his speech by arguing that despite 
‘disturbing reports’ from the islands, he was still optimistic that existing structures in 
the Philippines would not be ‘permanently injured under President Wilson,’ and that 
he had ‘confidence that he will direct them to retrace any steps which may have led 
them away from the course marked out a decade ago by McKinley and Root.’ The 
speech contained many of Taft’s previous themes regarding the dangers of Philippine 
independence, but differed in the way he expressed his disapproval. In this speech 
Taft placed far more stress on his personal experience in contrast to the inexperienced 
Democrats. Taft listed what he saw as remediable mistakes being made under the 
Democrats and he was keen to emphasise the fact that the incoming Democrats were 
not completely undoing what he had sought to achieve.617 
Taft’s younger brother Horace wrote to him following the speech: ‘I see that 
you are after Wilson and Harrison on the Philippines. That is a subject on which I 
cannot forgive Wilson… [he] must understand thoroughly down in his heart what an 
idiotic and destructive course he is inaugurating there.’618 Taft’s own opinion 
becomes clear in a letter to his son Robert written on the same day, where although 
his patience for the Wilson administration seems limited, his anger at the betrayal of 
Roosevelt in 1912 still seemed far more prominent in his mind: 
There is nothing I take more pride in than what has been done in the 
Philippines, and to have the result of thirteen years of hard work botched 
with an axe by a conceited pedagogue and an opportunist in politics, a 
one track mind that is so bent on getting his legislation through that he 
thrusts aside other important issues that deserve his full attention, is a bit 
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trying. I want to maintain a friendly attitude toward the Administration, 
because I prefer its success so much to the danger of Rooseveltism that I 
sincerely hope Mr. Wilson may be reelected if the Orthodox Republicans 
are not to come in, but when they make such asses of themselves as they 
are now making in the Philippines, I have to speak out in a mild way, but 
I should think myself derelict in duty if I did not give a friendly 
warning.619 
  
 Evidently Taft felt even more strongly in private against Wilson’s policy 
in the Philippines than he allowed himself to illustrate in his Brooklyn speech, 
despite its critical tone. Even Taft’s dislike for Roosevelt was not enough to 
really temper an attack on Wilson – where this letter shows his feelings better 
than the speech – but it is also evident that only the Philippine issue was enough 
to rouse his passion against Wilson so fully.   
The address was widely reported in the national press, but Taft’s 
correspondence reveals a further avenue of opportunity through which Taft wished to 
press home his message. Taft’s address was published in full in the Brooklyn Eagle 
and he was happy to encourage the ever-willing Edward Fallows to help further 
disseminate the article as a retentionist pamphlet to his membership.620 Taft was keen 
to have his attack on Democratic policy in the Philippines, couched in terms of a hope 
for greater non-partisanship, distributed to as many willing readers as possible. 
Without the pulpit of the presidency Taft knew that he had to find new ways to try 
and influence policy and he recognised that the American-Philippine Company and 
likeminded, well-funded organisations, were a good opportunity to achieve this end – 
even if he had to keep relations largely informal to avoid being tarred with the brush 
of exploitation.621 However, there were obvious limits to such a letter campaign as it 
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was primarily preaching to the converted. With Taft in such aroused passions 
regarding his vision for the American imperial experiment, he would surely have been 
cheered when the following day he received a receipt for his pre-paid order of the 
Works of Rudyard Kipling.622 
The press reports of Taft’s speech and the distribution of the Brooklyn Eagle 
article drew a raft of responses from his associates and like-minded individuals. The 
Taft-nominated Associate U.S. Supreme Court Justice Mahlon Pitney commented that 
it was ‘particularly distressing to observe the readiness of the new Governor-General 
in committing this country to a radical change of policy.’623 Henry Stimson, former 
Secretary of War, informed Taft: ‘Almost everyone I meet speaks of it and has read it, 
and it really seems to awaken again our sleeping national interest in the Philippines. 
More power to your elbow.’624 The indication that the speech was widely talked about 
would certainly have heartened Taft. Taft himself sent copies to correspondents he 
saw as likely to sympathise with his point of view and among the main figures whose 
opinions Taft respected most was Elihu Root.625 On sending Root the speech, Taft 
warned the senator that ‘It is sufficiently long to consume a year in its reading, but 
you ought to be primed on the subject with reference to the latest phases of it, because 
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I expect it will be made the subject of discussion by the introduction of something like 
the Jones bill.’626 
On December 26, 1913, Taft wrote confidentially to Dean Worcester 
regarding the latter’s ongoing lectures on the Philippines. Taft hoped that Worcester 
would stress the ‘disaster to the Philippine people and the disgrace to [the Democratic 
administration] that would be brought by giving the Philippines independence short of 
two generations or probably a century.’627 The following day Taft wrote again to 
Worcester, expressing his frustrations. Taft traced the beginning of the unravelling of 
his carefully laid plans as far back as his immediate successor as Governor-General, 
Luke E. Wright. Taft suggested that Wright’s criticism of Pardo de Tavera and the 
pro-American Federalistas, and his concessions to the ‘irreconcilables,’ constituted a 
‘great mistake.’ Taft argued that before Wright’s change in direction, sympathetic 
pro-American Filipinos ‘were really in favor of the theories of government that we 
sought to put into force. They did not in their hearts believe in independence, but the 
minute our sympathy with them was withdrawn, it destroyed altogether any living 
nucleus for the maintenance of the ideas that we would have been glad to spread 
among the Filipinos and form a party among them.’  
As the letter continued, Taft went on to explain that he believed the reasons 
for Wright’s poor choices was that he was a Southerner and thus it was ‘not natural 
that he should be as optimistic in respect to any class of Filipinos as I was because of 
that inborn lack of confidence that a Southerner has in a race of any color.’ This 
sentiment gives a useful insight into the way in which Taft saw himself as more 
enlightened in racial matters than other Americans. However, Taft did not end his 
regrets there, adding: ‘I believe we made a mistake in giving them a National 
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Assembly,’ explaining that at the time it seemed necessary to give some evidence ‘in 
support of our declaration that we were anxious to educate the Filipinos by political 
experience…’ In conclusion Taft supposed that, although the situation would 
‘probably’ have ended up roughly the same as it did, there would still have been 
stronger ‘Philippine support’ for the U.S. had Wright, and also Forbes, not been so 
‘contemptuous’ of sympathetic Filipinos.628 This letter, perhaps more than any other 
of the period, was an example of Taft’s frustration at having been taken away from 
control of Philippine affairs and even shows Taft admitting regret for some moves 
taken whilst he was in charge. Taft blamed others for the popular will of the Filipino 
people regarding independence, the Democrats particularly, but here even his 
retentionist allies such as Forbes. Nobody, it seemed to Taft, understood the 
Philippine situation like he did, and since he had left the islands as civil governor 
things had only ever deteriorated. 
Shortly before writing the above letter, criticising Forbes, Taft had spoken at a 
dinner on December 19, 1913, to honour him. The dinner was organised by the 
Philippine Society and the Harmony Club of America; the latter group containing 
numerous overlapping administrators with the former. In his speech Taft claimed, as 
he had in Brooklyn, that his criticisms of the administration were in no way to be 
construed as ‘partisan,’ but that they were to help ‘make the public acquainted with 
the problems and opportunities of the islands.’ He went on to claim that by ‘going in 
and doing the good we have done, we are pledged to stay there until that good shall 
become not only substantial but permanent.’629 This is evidence again of Taft’s 
apparent efforts to stress the non-partisan nature of his criticisms of Governor-General 
Harrison’s administration. Taft’s speech sought to stress retention, at least until the 
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U.S. mission was accomplished, but the Bulletin’s coverage pointed to Taft’s greatest 
fear: the possibility that the Democrats would promise independence before the 
Republicans has a chance to regain control of policy. Taft’s greatest focus in this 
regard was surely the Jones Bill, the bane of his last days in office, and it was in mid-
1914 that the bill would once again return to the fore, much to Taft’s vexation. 
 
The Last Crusade against the Jones Bill, 1914-1916 
 
 By July of 1914 the Jones Bill, now back before the House of Representatives, 
was one of the primary concerns on the minds of Forrest and his fellow retentionists. 
Forrest informed Taft that there was ‘nothing new’ in this new Jones Bill, but rather it 
was ‘the same policy in a different binding.’630 The following day Martin Egan sent 
Taft a copy of the new Jones Bill, warning him that ‘it has several glaring defects and 
I am hopeful we can induce our friends to change or modify the measure to put it in 
better shape,’ adding, ‘I shall treat your comment as confidential.’631 Taft replied to 
Forrest a couple of days afterwards, stating resolutely that he was ‘opposed to the 
Jones bill,’ and described it as ‘only another deceit of the Filipinos’ who would ‘take 
the promise as something immediate.’ Taft’s concern, as ever, focused on the question 
of promising independence and the too-rapid pace of Filipinization. He also indicated 
that he could no longer trust the Democrats to see sense: ‘I have no confidence that 
working with the present administration will do any good. They have injured the 
cause most seriously by their present course, and the only thing that I can hope for is 
that we will knock them out at the end of four years, and laboriously retrace our steps 
to the path they have so recklessly abandoned. I hope your call will accomplish 
                                                
630 Forrest to WHT, July 16, 1914, WHTP 3:141. 
631 Egan to WHT, July 18, 1914, WHTP 3:142. 
 255 
good.’632 The new Jones Bill, it seemed, had destroyed what limited hope Taft had 
that the Democrats might drop the promise of independence once in power. 
 Later in July, Forrest sent Taft some press clippings from the Philippines 
pertaining to the Jones Bill, pointing out that most of them ‘indicate that the editors 
believe Quezon and Osmeña are traitors to the cause, and that the bill is not far 
different from the former attitude of the Republican party.’ This comment also 
suggests, of course, that the same editors were hostile to Republican policies. Forrest 
noted that in terms of the society working with the Democratic administration ‘no 
steps in this direction will be taken without referring them to you in detail, for our 
Executive Committee, of course, rely upon your judgement.’633 The Philippine 
Society’s journal, the Philippine Bulletin, gave substantial coverage of the new Jones 
Bill, including a review of press coverage and its reception by the American and 
Filipino public. Among those cited in criticising the measures in the Jones Bill, and 
favouring a more Taft-like approach, were the Outlook, the New York Herald and the 
Brooklyn Eagle, though there is an element of selective quotation that is readily 
apparent. In the Filipino press it appeared most criticism took the opposite position, 
being concerned generally, in the eyes of the Bulletin, with the lack of a ‘definite 
date’ for independence.634 The Bulletin presents a view that reaction to the bill was 
decidedly mixed, but generally critical: the nature of the criticism was very different, 
however, split between those who favoured immediate independence and those who 
disagreed with the idea of independence at any time in the foreseeable future. Such a 
reaction, although predictable, suggested that as extreme as Taft and his supporters 
saw the changes proposed in the Jones Bill, to many in the Philippines it was regarded 
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as a document of disappointing compromises, though of course this was a vision of 
Filipino sentiments through a U.S. lens.  
At the end of October, Taft told Forrest that he saw the best chance for an end 
to the Jones Bill in the Senate and he advocated a lobbying operation aimed at both 
Republican and Democratic U.S. Senators.635 This correspondence illustrates that the 
retentionists were waging more than a simple propaganda campaign, and also shows 
the importance of figures like Taft to the hopes of the movement. As a figure of high 
profile, with an impressive list of contacts, Taft provided the retentionist movement 
with hopes of influence among Congress to delay the Jones Bill until the Republicans 
regained power. In early 1915 Taft was given an opportunity to influence the Senate 
in a far more direct way than letters or private chats with senators. Given his stature as 
and experience in Philippine affairs, Taft was summoned to speak before the Senate 
Committee on the Philippines on January 2, 1915.636 The purpose of these hearings 
was to gather information to help decide upon H.R. 18459, which aimed to declare the 
U.S. purpose to recognise Philippine independence eventually and increase the level 
of autonomy in the islands.637 The Senate certainly could not have found a more 
willing speaker on such an issue than the former president. 
In these hearings, Taft told the Senate Philippine Committee that he saw three 
paths as the potential future course of U.S. policy in the Philippines. The first was the 
policy of leaving entirely; the second, the policy of remaining in control indefinitely; 
and the third, his preferred policy of gradual devolution over the course of decades 
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with the ultimate option of a permanent dominion-style link in the end. This was 
familiar territory indeed, though on this occasion Taft cited a selection of President 
Wilson’s own words to support the third option, where the Democrat spoke of ‘the 
long apprenticeship of competence.’638 Wilson’s phrase was a citation from his 1908 
work Constitutional Government in the United States, where Wilson stated that ‘Self-
government is not a thing that can be “given” to any people, because it is a form of 
character and not a form of constitution… Only a long apprenticeship of obedience 
can secure them the precious possession, a thing no more to be bought than given.’639  
Historian Lewis Gleeck, Jr. notes, to this end, that Wilson’s ‘formula for achieving 
Philippine independence, as expressed in his textbook… was stricter than any 
proposed or exercised by President Taft or his successors. Wilson’s view however, 
was one to which Harrison paid utterly no heed,’ though of course this view is open to 
interpretation.640 However, the point of the Senate hearings were in reference, as Taft 
was only too aware, to a bill that would provide for a concrete promise of 
independence for the Philippines, supported by the administration and far more akin 
to option one than option three.  
In his testimony, Taft recapped Republican policy in the islands over the 
previous fourteen years, declaring that the Democratic Party’s promise of 
independence had always been ‘the great obstruction to the carrying out of our plans,’ 
and that were independence granted, anarchy would ensue (367-372). Here, once 
again, Taft’s intent to avoid partisanship – which he had stated at the beginning of 
proceedings – seemed to be disappearing rapidly. Taft also argued that the Philippines 
might be in a more suitable economic state than Cuba for self-government (not 
independence), and that if the U.S. had not been bound (by the Platt Amendment) to 
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give Cuba only partially restricted control of its own affairs, ‘a different policy would 
have been wiser’ (385). Presumably Taft was suggesting that Cuba would have also 
been better off as a U.S. Dominion rather than a pseudo-protectorate, just as he felt 
was the case in the Philippines.  
 When questioned on the nature of desire for independence in the islands, Taft 
reasserted his old adage: that most people wanted it, but did not understand what it 
would entail or its possible negative consequences (374). However, Taft went on to 
point out that there were a number among the very Filipino elites that advocated 
independence who did fear its consequences, and among such he included Manuel 
Quezon. As he had for many years, Taft held – with some foundation – that many 
Filipino politicians secretly feared immediate independence but were unable to 
express this view publicly for it would mark the end of their careers (374).     
 Taft’s primary criticism of the bill before the Senate was, as was to be 
expected, that it promised independence. He felt that the Democratic platform’s 
policy of proclaiming ultimate independence would ‘hit with an ax’ the policies of 
education and reform that had garnered the Republican administration much praise in 
the Philippines, and heralded, in Taft’s mind, ‘one of the grandest works that the 
United States has ever undertaken’ (376). Taft argued that promising ultimate 
independence was the same as promising immediate independence, and that once the 
issue was in the government’s agenda, it would dominate all: ‘In other words, they are 
constantly thinking of the government to come and not the government that you are 
using for the purpose of fitting them for self-government’ (384).  
Taft summed up his commitment to long-term involvement with the 
Philippines with the following reworking of previous speeches on the issue: ‘if we 
take the time, if we do not think we can accomplish everything the next morning for 
 259 
breakfast, that we can make this experiment a success out there, so that the people 
will rise up then, and not until then, to call the United States blessed’ (386). This last 
phrase had been used by Taft before in speeches and was in fact repeated as the final 
line of his testimony some time later (400). Taft said again later in his testimony that 
time was the key, ‘let us try the experiment of waiting,’ again giving a hint of Bryan’s 
Great Postponer (388). He reiterated in his conclusion that only a consistent policy, a 
continuation of his policy at that, could bring about a fitting end when the Philippines 
would call the United States ‘blessed.’ (400) Taft’s arguments, as he pointed out when 
citing and asking for previous speeches to be put on the record, had remained 
consistent over time. What changes there were in Taft’s rhetoric were largely as a 
result of changing conditions brought about by Democratic policy in the islands. 
These changes saw a rapid increase in the numbers of Filipinos in office in line with 
Governor-General Harrison’s embrace of Filipinization and moves towards promising 
independence. 
 Following on from the committee hearings, Forrest assured Taft that ‘the 
testimony you offered in Washington has been filling the newspapers… The reports 
we now have as to the effect of your and Mr. Worcester’s hearings before the 
Committee indicate the effectiveness of your attack on the Jones’ Bill, and I am 
among the hundred million Americans who owe you a deep gratitude for being a 
capable executioner. I surmise with regret, however, that I am only one of a few 
thousand in the country who appreciate what a great service will have been done 
when the villain has finally been executed.’641 Forrest, an undoubted Taft supporter, 
seemed to believe that Taft’s testimony might have a positive effect in the mission to 
delay or even kill off the Jones Bill. The newspaper reportage of Taft’s comments 
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would certainly have helped spread the message of retention among both citizens and 
politicians, though whether most would agree with him was another matter altogether.  
Later in January of 1915, Forrest related to Taft the details of a dinner he had 
attended at which Manuel Quezon, the prominent Filipino politician, had been 
present. Forrest claimed that ‘Mr. Quezon practically admitted that he felt just this 
same way about [independence], but made a good point in this: He said that, so long 
as arguments against Philippine independence were primarily based on that the mass 
of people were ignorant and incompetent to govern themselves, and that those who 
govern them consist of a handfull [sic] of half-breed politicians who were dishonest, 
both of these classes would continue to urge independence.’ Forrest added that 
another diner, Judge Ross, ‘said that Mr. Jones had made the threat that, if this bill did 
not pass, he would propose a worse one next year – somewhat humorous!’642 Taft, 
who would probably not have been heartened by such humour, replied that he had 
recently heard, from Washington, that Quezon thought the Philippine Bill would fail 
in the present session of Congress.643 When Congress amended the Jones Bill, Forrest 
sent Taft a copy, praising ‘the excellent marksmanship of the big guns which shot to 
pieces the original bill.’644 Taft agreed to some extent, commenting that the bill was 
‘improved,’ but adding that ‘it still needs a great deal of amendment to make it in any 
degree useful.’645 Taft wrote to Henry Stimson the same day, confessing that he was 
still ‘sad all over about Philippine policy.’646  
A further indication that, as the Jones Bill looked increasingly likely to 
succeed, Taft was beginning to lose the guarded optimism of 1913 and 1914 came in 
a letter to Mabel Boardman on February 17, 1915, when he claimed the Democrats 
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‘have produced a condition which I think will lead to disturbance whatever happens 
whether the [Jones] bill passes now or not, but it is a great deal better not to pass the 
bill and take what disturbance may come than to pass it and put ourselves in a 
permanent condition of helplessness.’647 On March 1, Taft, keeping Boardman 
updated on the Jones Bill, noted that he had learned from acquaintances that some 
Republicans in Congress might be willing to compromise on the Jones Bill in order to 
defeat a shipping bill. Taft told Boardman that he had sent telegrams to congressmen, 
informing them of his hope that ‘the Philippine bill will not be allowed to come up. It 
will be a vicious step,’ and had also telegrammed Elihu Root that morning noting that 
if the bill had to be amended until Taft would advise its passage then ‘there would not 
be anything left in the bill.’648 
 On September 6, 1915, Taft addressed the Commonwealth Club of California 
in San Francisco, where he criticised the administration of Governor-General 
Harrison. Historian Lewis Gleeck, Jr. sees this speech as the major blast of the ‘last 
Republican offensive’ against Harrison and the Jones Bill.649 Taft suggested – in line 
with his testimony to the Senate Committee earlier in the year – that the continuation 
of Harrison’s policies would only lead to the need for  ‘intervention’ of the American 
government in the future and that passage of the Jones Bill ‘would make the work of 
deterioration complete.’ Taft did concede, somewhat uncharacteristically, however, 
that ‘I am in favor of turning the islands over to their people when they are reasonably 
fitted… but this will not be for two generations.’650 Again, it is useful to bear in mind 
that Taft had, since the fall of the Federalist Party in the Philippines, suggested that he 
supported the idea of independence as a possibility, but with the conditions that it 
                                                
647 WHT to Mabel Boardman, February 17, 1915, WHTP 8:529. 
648 WHT to Mabel Boardman, March 1, 1915, WHTP 8:529. 
649 Gleeck, American Half-Century, 198-199. 
650 Los Angeles Times, September 7, 1915. 
 262 
should come only when the islands were ready, and only as one of a number of 
options for their future.  
Following Taft’s California speech, Harrison replied to his criticisms, unfairly 
suggesting that Taft was anything but a model of consistency. As the New York Times 
reported: ‘Governor Harrison declared that when Mr. Taft was in the Philippines he 
was the most prominent among those advocating Filipino independence, but was “the 
leader of the retentionists” when in America.’651 Secretary of War Garrison showed 
that he was no more impressed with Taft’s words than the Governor-General, when 
he issued a statement in November. Garrison called Taft’s statements on the 
Philippine issue ‘mendacious in character and mischievous in intent,’ and he went on 
to charge that ‘Republican politicians are attempting to lay the foundation for 
campaign material with respect to the Philippine Islands.’652 Garrison criticised Taft’s 
introduction to a pamphlet critical of the Democratic policies in the Philippines, 
whose present unhappy conditions Taft attributed to the ‘blind and foolish policy of 
President Wilson and Governor-General Harrison.’653 In his introduction to the 
pamphlet in question, Taft had addressed the issue of the politicisation of 
independence as he saw it: ‘The independence campaign was only political. What the 
Filipino politicians want is the offices. Now that they are dividing these with some 
Democratic politicians, equally inefficient, they are not quite so eager for 
independence.’ Taft warned that if the Republicans regained control of government, 
then the system that had been in place prior to Wilson’s presidency would have to be 
retraced and slowly rebuilt, which in turn would incite the anger of Filipinos who had 
been given office too hastily. The ‘evil effects’ of Harrison’s policy in the islands, 
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Taft warned, would ‘take years to remedy.’654 Garrison accused Taft of double 
standards and ‘blind partisanship,’ alleging that the pamphlet's author had written an 
equally powerful account praising the Democratic administration in the islands, but 
which he had found no luck in getting published. Garrison concludes that Taft had 
illustrated his blind partisanship by failing to check corroborating evidence for the 
charges in the pamphlet, a clear sign of unrestrained ‘partisan zeal.’655 Whether or not 
Taft truly made an effort to be non-partisan on the Philippine issue rather than simply 
claim that he was non-partisan, it was clear that his opponents certainly did not 
believe he was anything of the sort and this was closer to the truth than Taft’s 
relatively empty claims. 
 In January of 1916 the Washington Post printed a set of correspondence 
between Taft and former Secretary of State Elihu Root. The letter from Root to Taft, 
dated January 20, read:  
It appears to me that you are engaging in a damnable scheme to get 
hung for treason… when I contemplate the recent government of the 
Philippines and reflect that our control of the islands may continue to 
be the sport of American politics, I doubt whether we can really do 
them much more good… If Democrats are to turn out Republicans in 
order to put in deserving Democrats, deserving Democrats before very 
long will be turned out to make way for deserving Republicans, and so 
on. If things are to be done in that way, we’d better give the islands 
their independence promptly; not promise it in the future, but give 
notice of an election and turn it over as we did Cuba. 
 
In response the newspaper published Taft’s reply: ‘I don’t think we can let go 
in the way you suggest. We have got hold of the bear, and it isn’t easy to let go of its 
tail… I think they [the Philippines] will be with us after you and I are gone, and we 
might as well make our plans accordingly.’656 This exchange was not indicative of 
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Root’s long-standing views on Philippine policy. For example, a prefatory note to a 
book published about U.S. Philippine policy, written in August of 1916, Root claimed 
that ‘we can not relive ourselves from them [the Philippines] except in one way, and 
that is by carrying our performance to such a point that our cestuis que trustent 
[beneficiaries of the trust] will be competent to take care of themselves… but not until 
then.’657 In this exchange, Taft illustrated once again, that for all his posturing about 
the potential for some distant option on independence, really he thought present 
policy should be preparing for a long-term relationship between the U.S. and the 
Philippines.  
 In early August Taft wrote to Republican presidential candidate Charles Evans 
Hughes to vent his frustrations with Wilson over the Philippine situation and offer 
them as a potential issue for the campaign. In the letter, Taft criticised Wilson as 
performing ‘somersaults on the subject of the Philippines,’ representing his 
‘vacillating inconsistency’ on the issue. Taft cited various changes in Wilson’s ideas, 
from his comments in his book, Constitutional Government, to subsequent support for 
expedited independence.658 However, just as Hughes’ presidential campaign would 
meet with disappointment, ultimately Taft’s campaign against the Jones Bill failed to 
keep the Philippine question unanswered until the election.  
On August 29, 1916, Congress finally passed the Jones Act (Philippine 
Organic Act), complete with its controversial preamble. Taft’s campaign of the last 
three years to delay the bill until the Republicans could return to power was at an end. 
Historian Kendrick Clements suggests that the passage of the Jones Act represented 
the Democrats making good on an ‘old promise,’ and this was the promise Taft had 
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hoped would never be made.659 By contrast, from Taft’s point of view, as historian 
Peter Stanley recognises, the preamble ‘seemed an almost irredeemable error: a 
promise of independence.’660 The part of the preamble, to which Taft objected most, 
read as follows: ‘it has always been, the purpose of the people of the United States to 
withdraw their sovereignty over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their 
independence as soon as a stable government can be established therein,’ and to 
accomplish this end ‘it is desirable to place in the hands of the people of the 
Philippines as large a control of their domestic affairs as can be given them.’661 
 Taft would no doubt have been unsurprised, though not encouraged, by the 
reaction in the Philippines to the news that the bill had finally passed. Historian 
Stanley Karnow gives details of a huge party being thrown by Manuel Quezon, while 
in Manila ‘forty thousand people marched through the streets, and the city sent 
Wilson a silver tablet inscribed with words of gratitude.’662 With the passage of the 
Jones Bill, and the victory of Wilson in the Presidential election of 1916, Taft’s hopes 
that postponement could save his vision for the Philippines were left in tatters. 
However, Taft did not concede defeat entirely and over the following years, before 
the return of the Republicans to power in 1921, Taft continued to address the issue of 
Philippine retention.  
 
The League of Nations and Self-Determination 
 
During the years between Wilson’s assumption of office in 1913 and the end 
of the Great War in 1918, and despite his dismal showing in the 1912 election, as an 
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ex-president Taft had proven himself not to be an outright political partisan. With the 
exception of the Philippine issue, Taft had shown his willingness to support Wilson 
on a number of occasions where both men’s views coincided: Taft had backed 
Wilson’s anti-war stance prior to 1917, then served on the War Labor Board during 
the conflict, and strongly advocated U.S. membership in the League of Nations, a 
cause very close to Wilson’s heart. At the end of the First World War, Wilson and 
Taft together envisioned a new world order organised around arbitration and 
international negotiation to ensure the previous conflict really was a war to end all 
wars.663 As historian David H. Burton notes, Taft’s enthusiastic support of the League 
to Enforce Peace – an association calling for the establishment of an organisation 
similar to the eventual League of Nations – summed up the post-war vision of Taft 
and those like him: ‘pious hopes for peace, the appeal of negotiated arbitration, and 
the vision of international lawyers.’664 However, such ideals jarred with Taft’s views 
on the American empire and the future of the U.S. relationship with the Philippines.  
In terms of the Philippine situation, the Great War brought about an unwritten 
truce for the duration of the conflict, especially in the Philippines themselves, with 
Filipino demonstrations of support for the U.S. and Filipino leaders declaring their 
allegiance to the United States. However, the Filipino truce was short-lived, as was 
the war itself. At the end of the war, Filipino independence advocates entered a 
renewed phase of campaigning against continued U.S. imperialism. Indeed, the nature 
of the rhetoric surrounding U.S. entry to the Great War was used as further 
propaganda to meet the ends of the independence lobby. The Great War was seen as a 
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victory for the democracies of the United States, France and Great Britain against the 
more autocratic regimes of Kaiser Wilhelm and his allies. President Wilson saw the 
end of the war as heralding a new era of democracy and at the heart of the change 
would be a commitment to self-determination for the people of Europe, as set out in 
his Fourteen Points. Wilson’s focus upon the doctrine of self-determination, in the 
opinion of historians Grunder and Livezey, ‘partially contributed to renewed Filipino 
agitation for independence.’665 For Taft, Wilson’s self-determination doctrine was yet 
another setback for his imperial vision: the United States could hardly be seen to 
support the suppressed masses of the world while retaining the Philippines against 
popular consent. 
Though the question of self-determination for the peoples of Europe was an 
integral part of President Wilson’s vision, it only really applied to the defeated nations 
in the Great War. The United States had been an ally of Great Britain and France 
during the war and self-determination – for the victorious European empires – was a 
policy best consigned to the former German and Ottoman empires; after all, the vast 
majority of the British and French empires lay outside of Europe. However, the most 
notable exception to this rule was Ireland, at this time part of Britain, but with a 
strong independence movement that had been growing ever stronger since Britain has 
halted talks on the status of Ireland during the war.666 Many Americans had a 
traditional sympathy towards Irish independence, given America’s own history and its 
substantial Irish population.667 Following the end of the war hopes for American 
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intervention on behalf of Irish nationalists began to resurface. Irish-American leaders 
urged President Wilson to ‘use his influence… to bring about the realization of Irish 
nationalist aspirations.’668 However, Wilson, even with his doctrine of self-
determination, was not keen to support Irish independence.669 Wilson, like Taft, was 
only too aware that Britain was a key ally and would be needed if his League of 
Nations proposals were to gain international standing. Unlike Wilson, who had 
already sped up the progress for a Philippine path to independence, Taft saw an 
additional concern in the Irish question relating to the U.S.-Philippine relationship.  
In October 1918, Taft wrote on the issue of self-determination in the 
Philadelphia Public Ledger: ‘“Let the people themselves decide,” it is said. Every one 
agrees that this general rule should prevail in post-war arrangements. But how large 
or how small shall the unit of a people for such a decision be? Shall the units be racial 
or geographical? Suppose a people as small in number as the Belfast Orangemen 
compared with the whole population of Ireland insists in a separate government, 
though geography, trade conditions and every consideration but religious difference 
and tradition require that the whole islands be under one Government?’ Having made 
this case, Taft went on to point out the many problems of ascertaining the will of the 
majority: ‘an ignorant people without the slightest experience in the restraints 
necessary in successful self-government and subject to the wildest imaginings under 
the insidious demagoguery of venal leaders may well not know what is best for 
them.’670 These sentiments suggested that Taft saw the Irish question much as he saw 
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the Philippine question: where the best route was to be found in a continuing imperial 
relationship, rather than the civil disorder that would follow independence.   
Taft had always been something of an Anglophile and he was only too aware 
that the United States needed to remain close to Britain after the war and encourage 
British membership of the League of Nations. That Taft was of the opinion the British 
should retain control of Ireland became even clearer when he wrote to British Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Balfour in December 1918, at the urging of a friend, to recommend 
the continuation of the British Pictorial Service Bureau, which had conducted British 
propaganda in the United States during the war. Taft felt that its abolition would be 
unwise as the bureau helped in ‘welding America and England together.’ Taft also 
mentioned the Irish question, writing, ‘We are going to have an ebullition of Irish 
Sinn Fein sentiment, and it is well to neutralise these extremists who would stir up 
difficulty between the two countries by such quiet and attractive exhibitions as that of 
the Bureau of which I write.’671 In February of 1919, Taft attacked a resolution before 
Congress to urge President Wilson to take steps to secure a government in Ireland 
independent of the government of Great Britain. Taft described the issue as ‘a British 
domestic question’ and one that ‘cannot properly be made otherwise by the 
intervention of the United States.’ The reason Taft gave was that hopes of world 
peace would ‘have to be abandoned if the great powers were to look into and discuss 
the internal affairs of one another.’ Here, Taft was noting the danger posed to the 
League of Nations project, if empire became too prominent an issue. Taft also listed 
further examples – in addition to Ireland – of “internal affairs,” that included Japanese 
and French interests as well as the Philippines.672  
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Though its relevance to the Philippines might appear somewhat minor, the 
following section of Taft’s article, in reference to Ireland and Great Britain, is almost 
verbatim of what he had stated time and again in relation to the Philippines and the 
United States: ‘If she could have been made a dominion like Canada, with hardly 
more than nominal union to Great Britain except in international matters, Ireland 
would certainly have been satisfied before Sinn Feinism was fanned into flame by the 
delay in Home Rule.’673 Taft’s suggestion was that perhaps Britain had offered to 
compromise too late, with the inference being that the situation in the Philippines, 
despite the Democrats’ disruptively provocative promises of independence, could 
perhaps still be salvaged. In response, the Boston Daily Globe reported that President 
Wilson had been swift to deny that the Irish question was a “domestic issue” for 
Britain and the newspaper questioned how Taft would reconcile his difference with 
the president on this issue, considering his overall support for Wilson’s post-war 
policies.674 Rev. G. S. Treacy, a Boston College philosophy professor, stated that if 
the Irish question was a domestic one, then ‘those of Poland and the other countries, 
which are looking for their independence must be domestic.’675 Taft’s words certainly 
met with criticism, though from Democrats, Irish-Americans and Catholics, such 
criticism was hardly unexpected.676 Nevertheless it was clear that it was difficult for 
Taft to square his commitment to Wilson’s post-war worldview and its promises of 
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self-determination with his own desire both to secure British membership of the 
League and to retain the Philippines. When speaking about the League of Nations in 
1919, Taft said that ‘it would be as foreign to the subject at issue to include freedom 
for the Philippines as to force the issue of Ireland upon an ally.’677 
The comparison between self-determination for Ireland and the Philippines 
was not the preserve of Taft’s imagination, however, but was also evident in the press 
bulletins of the Philippine Commission of Independence – an organisation 
campaigning on behalf of Philippine independence – during 1919 and 1920. ‘The 
United States does not want another Ireland in the Philippines,’ stated one 
commentator on October 22, 1919, while another suggested that ‘Filipinos looking for 
independence should apply to the House of Lords… as many looking for 
independence for their lands in Europe are making their appeal to the United States 
Congress.’678 In March 1920 an editorial pointed out that: ‘For the second time in a 
period of nine months the United States Senate … went on record as being in 
sympathy “with the aspirations of the Irish people for a government of their own 
choice”.’ The editorial went on to argue that a more ‘impressive argument’ on this 
point could be made thus: ‘[Philippine] independence would be likely to be accepted 
by Great Britain as even stronger proof of America’s belief in self-determination than 
the passage of Irish resolutions, because Great Britain’s councilors [sic] of state could 
not then successfully make the point the American Congress is asking Great Britain to 
do something that the United States itself has been asked to do and has not done.’679 
As was the case when it came to conciliation with Japan in 1905 and 1907, the 
Philippines were not Taft’s only concern in his approach to foreign affairs. Taft was 
an Anglophile and was well aware of the fact that in the post-war period it was 
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important to maintain strong relations with Britain, America’s wartime ally. As a keen 
advocate of the League of Nations, Taft knew that any suggestion that joining the 
League would jeopardise Britain’s imperial power would certainly count against the 
potential success of such an organisation. However, there is compelling evidence that 
the Philippine issue was certainly among Taft’s considerations when approaching the 
Irish issue. If the U.S. were to press for increased Irish self-determination, then the 
immediate-independence advocates in the Philippines and anti-imperialist U.S. 
politicians, who already controlled the government in their respective countries, 
would have had even more reason to call for hastening the United States’ exit from 
the Philippines. Although the Jones Act of 1916 had secured a promise of future 
independence and the Democrats would remain in power until 1921, Taft did not 
draw back in his public endorsement of retention, despite the fact it problematised his 





With the election of Warren G. Harding in 1920, a Republican and a former 
chair of the Senate Committee on the Philippines, came a reprieve for the retention 
campaign. Historian Gerald E. Wheeler writes that Harding’s ‘known antipathy 
toward independence’ was a matter of record from his days in the Senate, and that this 
change in the White House was ‘generally accepted’ as making the realisation of 
Philippine independence very unlikely. Taft and his supporters had hoped in vain for 
a Republican victory in 1916 to help stem the tide of increased Filipinization and 
movement towards independence. With Harding’s sweeping victory they could now 
be certain that the new administration would be more sympathetic to their views than 
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Wilson and Harrison had been. Indeed, as Wheeler states, Harding looked to 
prominent retentionists for counsel on Philippine matters, and particularly the last 
Republican governor-general W. Cameron Forbes.680 Taft wrote optimistically to 
Forbes on November 21, 1921: ‘I suppose the policy in respect to the Islands will not 
be determined upon until Mr. Harding has selected his Secretary of War, but I am 
delighted to know… you are willing to give the benefit of your experience to setting 
things to going in the right direction out there, after the disastrous treatment of the 
situation by Wilson, Harrison, et al.’681 Forbes was soon appointed, along with 
Leonard Wood, the former Governor of Cuba – who had spent much time in the 
southern provinces of the Philippines – to head a commission set up by Harding to 
investigate the Philippine problem. 
In March of 1921 Taft spoke on the issue of the Philippine relationship, just as 
the Harding administration took office, in a ‘survey of the Philippine situation.’ The 
Press Bulletin, a distinctly pro-independence publication, characterised the message 
of his statement as wanting to turn ‘the wheels of Philippine progress backward.’ Taft 
stated that ‘There are many…who have thought the case as of a badly set broken 
bone, the only remedy for which is to break the bone again and reset it. This would 
involve the taking back of power, of abolishing the Senate, of putting Americans in 
charge of departments and bureaus again. Such a course might create disturbance and 
require strong measures to carry it through the American people are not prepared to 
make the sacrifice.’ The editor lamented Taft’s comments, remarking, ‘We regret it 
because it may have a more or less far reaching effect on public sentiment in the 
islands. Because of Mr. Taft’s prominence in American-Philippine affairs, and 
because of an impression in the islands that Mr. Taft is very close to President 
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Harding, some may be led to think that the United States is actually considering some 
such a policy as Mr. Taft suggests.’ Here, a publication unsympathetic to Taft and his 
imperial vision was suggesting that he was still influential when it came to Philippine 
policy. The editor conceded, however, that Taft had probably been ‘imposed upon by 
those who stand to profit from continued American occupation… Mr. Taft has not 
been in the islands for fourteen years, and his lack of knowledge of the Philippines of 
today could easily have been taken advantage of. And it evidently has been.’ In this 
instance the editor aimed to undermine Taft’s credibility as a Philippine expert, 
portraying him as out of touch and was markedly different to how Taft regarded 
himself and his reputation.682  
However, just as the political spectrum in the United States had realigned to 
favour the retentionists, their leader was taken out of private life once again. In July 
1921 William H. Taft became the new Chief Justice of the Untied States, a realisation 
of a long-held ambition. Taft, who had turned down the offer of an associate 
justiceship twice during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt claiming that his 
commitment to the Filipinos was more pressing, now embraced his seat at the head of 
the judicial table. His acceptance of this new position signalled the end of his tenure 
as head of the Philippine retention campaign. 
The period 1913-1921 had seen Taft use what influence he had, although 
unsuccessfully, to hold back the tide of increased Filipinization and prevent a promise 
of Philippine independence. Nevertheless, with the sweeping Republican victory in 
1920, and the return of retentionists such as Forbes to positions of influence, the 
expectation was that the next four years would herald a stop to Democratic moves, 
and most likely, a gradual reversal of policy wherever possible. Having finally gained 
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the position he had so openly aspired to for decades at the age of sixty-four, Taft 
relished the opportunity to return to his judicial roots and step off of the political stage 
that had not treated him so well over the past two decades. Taft also felt that the 
federal judicial system ‘badly needed reorganization and leadership’ and this for him 
would be the challenge for the rest of his days.683 For a man who considered himself a 
far from perfect president,  the Supreme Court offered him a chance to end his career 

































                                                





 The preceding chapters of this thesis analyse the nature and evolution of 
William H. Taft’s distinctive imperial vision. In so doing, they explore Taft’s 
influence over the Philippine policy of the United States and the extent to which he 
was successful in promoting and implementing his imperial vision. This imperial 
vision, discussed in detail throughout this thesis, was a somewhat narrow and 
parochial one, focusing almost exclusively on the future of the U.S.-Philippine 
relationship. In some respects this factor helps to explain the way in which Taft’s 
imperial vision began to diverge from the wider geo-political outlooks of figures such 
as Theodore Roosevelt. Taft did not seek to further expand U.S. possessions overseas 
but he felt that what the U.S. already had should be developed to form a successful, 
lasting and mutually beneficial relationship. The path Taft sought to lead the United 
States along in foreign relations, evidenced by his Philippine policy between 1900 and 
1921, was a path ultimately not taken by the U.S. in the twentieth century when they 
intervened in the affairs of other countries. However, though Taft’s imperial vision 
never achieved its ultimate ends, a path not taken can certainly be informative in 
contextualising and understanding the actual progress of U.S. foreign relations in the 
years that followed. 
*** 
The first three chapters of this thesis evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of 
Taft’s “policy of attraction,” viewing it as a multi-pronged strategy aimed at 
achieving his imperial vision. Taft’s policy of attraction sought to influence U.S. 
strategy in the Philippines in three, key spheres: social, economic and political. In the 
social sphere Taft stressed widespread education and negotiated the friar lands 
purchase, giving a sense that his aims were indeed those of a benevolent imperialist. 
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Taft “attracted” Filipinos with displays of respect and his apparent openness to 
Filipino voices in an attempt to win over popular opinion to the idea of a continued 
American presence. However, Taft’s assumptions and tactics were often based on 
broad racial assumptions about the Filipino people. He believed, for example, that 
Filipinos were impressed by spectacle and that they were best suited only to 
vocational education, informed by ideas such as Booker T. Washington’s Tuskegee 
model for African Americans in the United States. In the economic sphere, Taft 
sought to increase American trade with and investment in the Philippines to tie the 
countries closer together financially. In this instance Taft’s efforts were far from 
uniformly successful. Perhaps the parochial nature of Taft’s imperial vision was the 
cause of some of these setbacks, as he did not always seem to take into account the 
wider implications of policies such as free trade with and Chinese immigration to the 
Philippines. In these instances Taft fell far short of his goals for increasing American 
investment in the islands to the levels he desired.  
In the political sphere, Taft aimed to create a successful and more democratic 
form of government in the islands, but simultaneously wished to enshrine the idea of a 
continued imperial connection within these systems. He oversaw substantial 
democratisation during the Taft Era, ensured Filipino participation in all levels of 
government and crowned these achievements when he opened the representative 
Philippine Assembly in 1907. Taft even went further than his fellow commissioners to 
argue for Filipino participation on the islands’ ruling commission. However, Taft felt 
sincerely that the Filipino people were not ready for independence, that independence 
need not be the ultimate outcome of the imperial venture and that discussion of the 
subject would serve only to delay the end of guerrilla warfare in the islands and 
reduce the benefits of American rule. To these ends Taft was willing to go against the 
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general tenets of the policy of attraction. His favouritism towards and patronage of the 
pro-U.S. Federal Party in the islands and willingness to re-establish the islands’ 
existing elites undermined the nascent democratisation process. The Federal Party 
itself proved only a short-lived success that began to unravel soon after he left. Taft 
also oversaw the passage of a sedition act that outlawed advocacy of independence 
and ensured that the U.S. would continue to hold the balance of political power by 
maintaining U.S. veto-wielding powers. In addition, Taft, at least partially, accepted 
U.S. military brutality as an unfortunate by-product of the guerrilla tactics of the 
Filipino insurgency. 
As secretary of war, from 1904 to 1908, Taft became the “Great Postponer,” 
visiting the Philippines twice, and making clear on both occasions that his position on 
independence had not changed. Japan became a key player in U.S. foreign relations 
during this period and, with his somewhat intractable views on Philippine retention, 
Taft understated the dangers to U.S. strategic security that the islands now seemed to 
pose. It was at this point, when no longer in charge of the day-to-day running of the 
islands and during a period of tense relations with Japan and China, that Taft’s policy 
started to run counter to his great patron and friend Theodore Roosevelt. 
 The year 1907 proved a turning point in the relationship between Taft and 
Roosevelt regarding their relative approaches to American imperialism. Roosevelt 
suggested making a promise of independence to the Filipino people, seeing retention 
both as increasingly unpopular politically and as a strategic problem for the future. 
Taft saw the military/strategic weaknesses as relatively minor and had clearer long-
term aims for the Philippines that he stuck to rigidly, often in spite of the course of 
events. In both matters, Roosevelt was more in tune with political and strategic 
realities and practicalities than Taft. The U.S public was beginning to turn against the 
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Philippine experiment by 1907 and enthusiasm had been waning for some time. Only 
in the first couple of years after the Spanish-American War was there significant 
public opinion in favour of annexing and retaining the former Spanish territories. 
Equally, as events of subsequent decades would show, Japan was more of a threat to 
U.S. security than Taft had anticipated, and the Philippines were indeed a weak 
strategic link.  
 Throughout his career, Roosevelt rose steadily to power on his own steam; he 
jumped at the chance of heroism in the Spanish-American War, not simply through 
his love of manly virtues, but with an understanding that few presidents had been 
elected without a military service record. Taft was quite the opposite. He never really 
actively sought a political position and was appointed to every position in his career 
other than the presidency. Taft only showed real earnestness in his love of the law and 
always regarded the Supreme Court as an ultimate career goal. Unlike the more 
bellicose Roosevelt, Taft was uninterested in the Spanish-American War and was 
equally against joining the First World War. Taft was motivated more by a view of a 
well-ordered world of legal treaties and agreements, regulated by multilateral 
organisations and discourse. He had grand views for a post-war world in 1918-1919, 
much like his successor to the presidency Woodrow Wilson. However, also like 
Wilson, Taft failed to convince enough others of his vision’s benefits, and the various 
reciprocity and arbitration attempts during his presidency came to nothing.  
 During his time in the Philippines, Taft developed an imperial vision that 
required huge investment in both time and money on the part of the United States, 
whereas Roosevelt’s loyalty to such schemes wavered when tested by wider strategic 
considerations. Roosevelt was certainly in favour of a Large Policy, but not at the 
expense of U.S. strategic security; overseas expansion was supposed to have benefits 
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for the United States and if this was no longer the case then withdrawal had to be a 
serious consideration. However, as president, Taft was able to continue with his 
Philippine policy unhindered by Roosevelt’s doubts, and when victory in the election 
of 1912 looked doubtful, he did not surrender to the seeming inevitability of an end to 
the “Taft Era.”  
 After the presidency Taft doggedly defended his aims to continue the imperial 
connection. Indeed, one might argue that Taft’s stubbornness to retain the Philippines 
was due to an overriding concern with protecting his legacy and, of course, there is 
ample evidence that he was concerned that his “good work” would be undone. As 
noted on numerous occasions, Taft’s supporters presented his role in the Philippines 
as one of his finest achievements, especially when he ran for the presidency in 1908. 
After the electoral disaster of 1912 his earlier Philippine successes seemed to contrast 
sharply with his lacklustre presidency. Legacy was certainly a concern for Taft and he 
saw the ultimate fruition of his imperial vision as of paramount importance. However, 
Taft was sincere in his beliefs that a continued connection and future dominion 
relationship would be the right course for both the United States and the Philippines. 
His prior achievements were very important to him but they were not his exclusive 
concern. 
In June 1921 Taft was nominated as Chief Justice of the United States, and the 
Senate confirmed him with only four dissenting votes. Just a few months before his 
long-awaited return to the bench, President Harding had sent a new commission to 
investigate conditions in the Philippines, the same job that had taken Taft away from 
the federal courts more than two decades earlier. The joint leadership of Harding’s 
commission fell to the former governor-general under President Taft, William 
Cameron Forbes, and the man who would go on to become the new Governor-
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General, Major General Leonard Wood, who had been a candidate for the Republican 
presidential nomination in 1920.  
The Forbes-Wood Commission’s findings – unsurprisingly, given their 
affiliation to the Republican Party – reiterated what Taft had been saying ever since 
he left the Oval Office: that under the Republicans things had progressed well and 
under the Democrats things had gone markedly off course, with the years after 1916 
being the ‘darkest years in Philippine history.’ Historian Jack McCallum argues that 
the first step the Republicans felt they had to take now that they were back in control 
of Philippine policy was to re-establish ‘colonial control’ and ‘quash all the loose talk 
of independence.’684 In the years following this turn around in policy, as historian 
Paul Kramer summarises, Republican presidents of the 1920s ‘sought to halt or 
reverse the Filipinization process that had intensified under the Democrats, in an 
effort to shore up U.S. rule in the islands.’685 This is just what Taft had been saying 
would happen throughout his years in the political wilderness: when the Republicans 
returned to office, they would undo as many of the changes made under the 
Democratic administration of Governor-General Harrison as possible. In essence, 
although Taft had taken up a new focus with his long-held goal of becoming Chief 
Justice, the continuation of his policies was at the same time becoming firmly 
established with Harding’s endorsement and reliance on retentionists such as Forbes 
and Wood. 
* * * 
  
On numerous occasions Taft stated that he saw the imperial experiment as a 
long-term project that could, if properly undertaken, see the Philippines remain as a 
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U.S. Dominion (like the relationship between Britain and Canada) but only after 
around a century of tutelage and progress towards responsible self-government. Taft’s 
distinct imperial vision offered a very different view of U.S. intervention, regime 
change and future relations than was ultimately realised throughout the course of the 
twentieth century and beyond.  
Though the rhetoric of formal imperialism grew increasingly unpopular during 
the twentieth century, especially following the disintegration of the European empires 
after the Second World War, the blueprint for U.S. policy that Taft failed to establish 
provides a useful counterpoint to the path that was ultimately taken. Taft regarded the 
active pursuit of territorial aggrandisement as ill-advised and favoured, throughout his 
days, the use of international arbitration and peace-keeping processes. As frequently 
stated, Taft did not seek to acquire new territories for the United States and he 
believed that the U.S. had much to do perfecting its own system before it should feel 
the need to change those of other nations. However, Taft regarded the Philippine 
experiment as a fait accompli once the islands had been annexed, becoming both a 
burden to the United States and a chance to illustrate how the United States could 
conduct imperialism differently and more successfully than its European 
predecessors.  
Taft tried to make imperialism something more saleable to a distant nation that 
had long been a colony and, indeed, his own nation where many regarded themselves 
as born out of a rejection of empire. Taft believed that success in U.S. intervention in 
the Philippines could only be accomplished through a long-term commitment of many 
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decades of investment, education and political tutelage to create a nation that would 
rise to call the name of the United States ‘blessed.’686 
During the twentieth century the United States set a very different pattern of 
intervention, regime change and then, after a forestalled period of “nation building,” 
what Taft would have termed, ‘scuttle.’687 For Taft, this sort of policy of scuttle would 
prove disastrous and the twentieth century might well have proved that Taft was much 
more far-sighted in this area than he was ever credited with. Even so conservative a 
historian as Niall Ferguson argues that few outside the United States today ‘doubt the 
existence of an American empire.’ Ferguson goes on to claim that the continued 
rejection within the United States that their nation is an imperial nation does actually 
matter and points to two major mistakes, as he sees it, of an ‘empire in denial’: ‘The 
first may be to allocate insufficient resources to the non-military aspects of the 
project. The second, and the more serious, is to attempt economic and political 
transformation in an unrealistically short time frame… the United States would seem 
to be making the second of these in both Iraq and Afghanistan.’688 
In early 2008, while running for the nomination as the Republican Party 
candidate for the presidential election of that year, Senator John McCain suggested 
that the United States might have to stay in Iraq for one hundred years or more to 
achieve success. In response Democratic opponents derided McCain for suggesting a 
policy that would prove too costly in dollars and lives, not to mention the negative 
effects on the U.S. public that a projected century-long war might create.689 However, 
what the Vietnam War veteran senator did recognise as the crux of the issue was 
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similar to Ferguson’s suggestion, that for real success in an intervention, long-term 
commitment was the key. A century before McCain’s failed bid for the White House, 
the 1908 Republican nominee, William Howard Taft, was suggesting a very similar 
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